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Debaters' Handbook Series

SELECTED ARTICLES

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

In response to a very lively demand for material on National Defense, an Abridged Debaters' Handbook on the subject was compiled in February, 1915. Continued demand has made it seem wise to issue this enlarged edition, which conforms to the general plan of the Debaters' Handbook Series in its adaptation to the needs of the seeker for general information as well as to those of the debater. In arrangement it follows the customary sequence of brief, bibliography, general, affirmative and negative reprints.

This volume includes most of the material in the Abridged Handbook on National Defense. The brief has been slightly changed, and the bibliography and selected articles brought up to date, August 2, 1915. Owing to the vast amount of literature on this subject, a complete bibliography would be an impossibility and has not been attempted.

For the sake of convenience, the bibliography has also been grouped under three main headings, General, Affirmative, and Negative, but an article is not necessarily listed under the same heading in the bibliography as in the reprints. For example, an article containing material valuable for both sides appears in the General division of the bibliography, but if the paragraphs quoted bear solely on the Affirmative, they will be found under this heading in the text.

The amount of material on the enlargement of the Army and Navy is so great, that no attempt has been made here to develop fully the allied subjects of military training in schools and colleges and of compulsory military service. An Abridged Debaters' Handbook entitled Military Training will be issued shortly to cover these phases of National Defense. This volume will be enlarged as soon as sufficient up-to-date material is obtainable, and published in the regular Handbook Series.

C. B.

August, 1915.

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Congressional Record. 52:110-11. D. 11, '14. National Defense: Speech of Frank W. Mondell in the House, December 10, 1914.

*Congressional Record. 52: appendix 103-5. Ja. 15, '15. The War Terror, Extension of Remarks of E. W. Saunders, in the House of Representatives, January 15, 1915.

*Congressional Record. 52: appendix 195. Ja. 26, '15. Carl Schurz on Peace and War, Extension of Remarks of Alben W. Barkley in the House of Representatives, January 26, 1915.

*Congressional Record. 52:2070-2. Ja. 27, '15. Army Appropriation Bill: Speech of William S. Howard in the House, January 22, 1915.

*Congressional Record. 52:2734-8. Ja. 29, '15. Does Preparedness Prevent War? Walter L. Hensley.

*Congressional Record. 52:2741-3. Ja. 30, '15. Speech of Mr. Gillett on the Naval Appropriation Bill, in the House of Representatives, January 30, 1915.

Congressional Record. 52: appendix 417-41. F. 15, '15. How the War Trust Is Robbing the Government While Driving Us on toward the Brink of War. Clyde H. Tavener.

Forum. 52:797-803. D. '14. Smashing the War-Machines. Edwin Björkman.

*Forum. 54:1-4. Jl. '15. Militarism and Sanity. Charles Vale.

*Forum. 54:147-54. Ag. '15. The United States and War. Charles Vale.

*Independent. 57:972-4. O. 27, '04. The New Navy. Charles E. Jefferson.

*Independent. 80:392. D. 14, '14. The Armament Flurry.

Nation. 99:63-4. Jl. 16, '14. Our Military Propagandists.

*Nation. 99:647. D. 3, '14. The "Preparedness" Flurry.

*New Republic. 1:22. D. 19, '14. Mr. Herrick on Armament.

*New York World. Jl. 28, '15. Increase in Army Strongly Opposed by Chairman Hay.

Outlook. 103:145. Ja. 18, '13. Against a Strong Navy. Lucia A. Mead.

*Saturday Evening Post. 188:23, 26-7. Jl. 24, '15. Boycotts vs. Bayonets. Ralph Norman Angell Lane (Norman Angell, pseud.).

*Springfield Republican. Ja. 21, '15. League to Limit Armaments.

*Sunset. 34:36-9. Ja. '15. Military Position of the United States.

*Survey. 33:605-7. Mr. 6, '15. Psychological Bases of Internationalism. George H. Mead.

*Survey. 33:614-5. Mr. 6, '15. Reservoirs of Strife; the Distribution of Wealth in Relation to the Invisible Causes of War. Frederic C. Howe.

Survey. 33:616-20. Mr. 6, '15. Constructive Mediation: An Interpretation of the Ten Foremost Proposals. George W. Nasmyth.

Survey. 34:355-9. Jl. 17, '15. Revolt Against War. Jane Addams.

SELECTED ARTICLES ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

The question which is just now arousing the greatest popular interest is probably that of our national preparedness or unpreparedness for war. We are a non-military people, and as a nation are definitely pacific in disposition. Our policy in the past has been to maintain a small Army and Navy, sufficient for police work and national defense. A few have lifted up their voices for many years in behalf of a large Army and Navy, but these voices have been for the most part unheeded.

Our international status is, however, today greatly changed. We may still be geographically, but we are no longer politically isolated. For good or ill, we have become a world power. In taking the Philippines, in fortifying the Panama Canal, in our recent relations with Central America and with South America, and in our protests to Germany concerning the freedom of the seas and the safeguarding of American lives, we have definitely entered the arena of international politics. American isolation is ended forever, and we must help to make the world secure because our own security depends on it. Whether we can best do this by peaceful means, such as treaties and world courts, or whether it can best be done by means of armaments is to many a debatable question.

If we are to rely on armaments, we must clearly define to ourselves the purposes for which we wish to use our Army and Navy, and their present fitness for these purposes. It is no longer possible, as it was in the early days of our history, for a citizen army to spring into being overnight. Modern weapons and methods of warfare have made necessary long and arduous training. Munitions of war take much time to manufacture.

In 1914, the Army of the United States had 4,701 officers and 87,781 enlisted men and petty officers, a total of 92,482. Owing to the demands in the maintenance of overseas garrisons, the drains on the Army have been such that, in the United States proper, the "mobile army"—that is, the army which can be moved from place to place and which consists of the engineers, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, but does not include the coast artillery—was reduced, in June, 1914, to 1,495 officers and 29,405 men. Back of this regular Army establishment, we have a state militia, or National Guard, of nominally about 120,000 men. Its efficient strength is probably not more than 60,000.

The Navy had, in 1914, 3,821 officers and 52,667 enlisted men and petty officers, a total of 56,488. "Ship for ship and man for man," Secretary Daniels considers our Navy equal, if not superior, to any navy in the world. But on the basis of ships completed on July 1, 1914, we ranked third among the navies of the world in respect to tonnage.

Opinions as to the necessary numbers of ships and men, the necessary amount of ammunition and the value of our present coast defenses differ greatly. President Wilson's annual message of December, 1914, stated that we had "not been negligent of national defense," nor "unmindful of the great responsibility resting upon us," but that we were not "ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms," and that we would never be ready to do this in time of peace, so long as we retained our present political principles and institutions. The whole message was moderate and non-militaristic in tone.

At the present time, however, the President and many other Americans seem more disposed than before the interchange of our 1915 notes with Germany, to favor an investigation into the condition of and a probable increase in our Army and Navy. Americans may be roughly classified, as to their attitude in this matter, into three groups: First, the "peace at any price" people, opposed to all increase in armaments, like the members of the Anti-Enlistment League; second, the militaristic party, who call loudly for a large Army and Navy, like many members of the National Security League and the Navy League of the United States; third, those who believe that while working towards international peace as our

ultimate ideal, we must be in some measure prepared to enforce certain international regulations as well as to defend ourselves in case of attack. This is the attitude taken by many members of the American League to Limit Armaments and the new League to Enforce Peace.

Professor Roland G. Usher (New Republic, June 26, 1915) says: "There is no indication as yet of any effective consensus of opinion. At a time when all the other great nations are committed to a specific, if erroneous, national policy in relation to peace and war, the American people are hesitating and drifting. At a time when their own opinion of what is true and false is the most vital fact in relation to the crisis, they are bewildered and unable to make up their mind.

"The best illustration of the confusion is the prevailing agitation for and against increased armament. Back of the propaganda in favor of increased armament there is a limited amount of justifiable apprehension, a real need for a better Army and Navy, some genuine patriotic aspiration, a new expression of the instinctive fighting spirit of the early Americans, and too much incoherent panic and muddled thinking. Back of the uncompromising opposition to any increase of armament there is a profound conviction of the barbarous futility of war, a passionate revolt against its cost in ruin and blood and anguish, a clear vision of the beneficence of peaceful adjustment of human difference, an indisposition to face the realities of international politics, and an ultimate but usually furtive reliance on the doctrine of non-resistance. Both the friends and the foes of increased armament are partly victims of panic. The pacifists in their anxiety to avoid war forget that war is not avoided merely by keeping the peace, and that even the keeping of the peace may involve the use of force. The militarists in their fear of being caught unprepared seem willing at times to plunge the country into one war for the purpose of securing better preparation for another."

This Handbook deals mainly with the condition and question of the enlargement of the regular Army and Navy. The allied questions of military training in schools and colleges and of compulsory military service, while touched upon incidentally, have not been fully developed. The facts seem to show that we are not getting as efficient an Army and Navy as we might have for the money already expended. The

Affirmative will have no difficulty in proving the numerical weakness of our forces for national defense, but the Negative, on the other hand, will be able to show how numerical strength in fighting men may tend to national weakness and a change in our national ideals, how the very preparedness for war may tend to involve a nation in war.

No bibliographies have been listed, as the few accessible ones have contained so much material now out of date. Much valuable new material is appearing daily, and the student is advised to consult the latest numbers of the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Much additional material may be found in the files of the Congressional Record, especially in Vols. 50, 51 and 52. A brief list entitled "Publications for Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Pertaining to the Subject of the Nation's Preparedness or Lack of Preparedness for War, and Favoring and Opposing an Increase in Our Army and Navy and Armament," may be obtained gratis from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C.

It has been with some surprise that the editor of this Handbook has learned of the number of organizations in the United States that are working for or against the increase of the means of national defense. Some of these are of years' standing, others have recently sprung into existence to promote or combat the present agitation for the strengthening of our Army and Navy. As many of these publish literature which is for free distribution and which may be useful for reference, the users of this Handbook may be glad to know of them. A list is given here of these with addresses as far as they could be secured:

American Association for International Conciliation, 407 W. 117th Street, New York.

American Defense League, 15 Broad Street, New York.

American Defense Society, 303 Fifth Avenue, New York.

American League to Limit Armaments, Room 509, 43 Cedar Street, New York.

American Legion, Room 303, Maritime Building, 10 Bridge Street, New York.

American Peace and Arbitration League, A. B. Humphrey, Secretary, 31 Nassau Street, New York.

American Peace Society, 31 Beacon Street, Boston.

American School Peace League, 405 Marlborough Street, Boston.

American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Baltimore, Md.

Anti-Enlistment League, Jessie Wallace Hughan, Secretary, 61 Quincy Street, Brooklyn.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 Jackson Place, Washington.

Chicago Peace Society, 30 N. Lasalle Street, Chicago.

Church Peace Union, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Intercollegiate Anti-Militarism League.

International Peace Forum, 18 E. 41st Street, New York.

International School of Peace, 29a Beacon Street, Boston.

Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, Mohonk Lake, N. Y.

League to Enforce Peace, William H. Short, Secretary, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Masaschusetts Peace Society, 31 Beacon Street, Boston.

National Anti-Armament Association, Mr. L. H. Wood, Secretary, 43 Cedar Street, New York.

National Security League, Henry L. West, Secretary, 31 Pine Street, New York.

Navy League of the United States, Southern Building, Washington, D. C.

New York Peace Society, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Woman's Peace Party, 1105 16th Street, Washington, D. C.

World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Mass.

CORINNE BACON.

August 2, 1915.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 683. January 30, 1915

Strength of Naval Powers

The data given below as to the relative strength of the principal naval powers were furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, as of date July 1, 1914. Owing to the state of war in Europe the Office of Naval Intelligence was unable to furnish any definite information of the relative strength of the principal naval powers of the world later than July 1, 1914.

It is shown that the United States Navy, on the basis of ships completed on July 1, 1914, was third among the navies of the world in respect to tonnage. Great Britain was first and Germany second. When vessels under construction on July 1 are completed the United States Navy will be in fourth place, surpassed by Great Britain, Germany and France. Figures are lacking, however, to show the progress in naval increase among belligerents in the present war in Europe since its commencement, and it is well known that both England and Germany have been increasing their naval power as rapidly as possible.

Warship Tonnage of the Principal Naval Powers

[Number and displacement of warships, built and building, of 1,500 or more tons, and of torpedocraft of more than 50 tons.]

Type of vessel	Great Britain (including colonial vessels)		United States		Germany	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Battleships (dreadnaught type)[1]	36	845,100	20	472,934	12	307,450
Battleships (predreadnaught)[2]	40	589,385	20	242,800	22[6]	309,282
Coast-defense vessels[3]	..	.....	2	8,168	4	12,900
Battle cruisers[4]	10	216,300	8	200,749	..	.....
Armored cruisers	34	406,800	9	94,245	11	149,295
Cruisers[5]	91	449,815	46	177,647	14	66,410
Torpedo-boat destroyers	188	147,620	154	81,494	62	47,024
Torpedo boats	49	11,488	..	.....	13	2,528
Submarines	97	47,598	45	28,540	49[7]	.....
Total tons built and building	..	2,714,106	..	1,306,577	..	894,889

For notes see page 8.

Type of vessel	France		Japan		Russia	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Battleships (dreadnaught type)[1]	12	286,024	6	164,000	7	159,409
Battleships (predreadnaught)[2]	18	262,675	13	191,380	7	98,750
Coast-defense vessels[3]	1	8,800	2	9,086	2	10,380
Battle cruisers[4]	..	.....	4	110,000	4	128,000
Armored cruisers	20	201,724	13	138,483	6	63,500
Cruisers[5]	9	46,095	13	57,915	17	106,445
Torpedo-boat destroyers	87	38,465	52	22,163	135	90,412
Torpedo boats	135	13,426	27	3,017	14	2,132
Submarines	86	42,706	15	3,872	49	19,790
Total tons built and building	..	899,915	..	699,916	..	678,818

Type of Vessel	Italy		Austria-Hungary	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Battleships (dreadnaught type)[1]	10	249,794	7	153,540
Battleships (predreadnaught)[2]	8	96,100	6	74,613
Coast-defense vessels[3]	..	.....	6	41,700
Battle cruisers[4]	..	.....	..	.....
Armored cruisers	9	74,020	2	13,380
Cruisers[5]	8	23,718	10	35,031
Torpedo-boat destroyers	51	31,010	18	9,450
Torpedo boats	70	11,856	63	12,738
Submarines	27	11,317	12	7,056
Total tons built and building	..	497,815	..	347,508

[1] Battleships having a main battery of all big guns. (11 inches or more in caliber.)

[2] Battleships of (about) 10,000 or more tons displacement, whose main batteries are of more than one caliber.

[3] Includes smaller battleships and monitors.

[4] Armored cruisers having guns of largest caliber in main battery and capable of taking their place in line of battle with the battleships. They have an increase of speed at the expense of carrying fewer guns in main battery and a decrease in armor protection.

[5] All unarmored warships of more than 1,500 tons are classed as cruisers. Scouts are considered as cruisers in which battery and protection have been sacrificed to secure extreme speed. The word "protected" has been omitted because all cruisers except the smallest and oldest now have protective decks.

[6] Does not include Idaho and Mississippi, recently sold, or ships of current program for which contracts have not been awarded.

[7] Includes three submarines authorized in 1913; contract for fourth not yet awarded.

The following vessels are not included in the tables above: Ships over twenty years old from date of launch, unless they have been reconstructed and rearmed within five years; torpedo craft over fifteen years old; those not actually begun or ordered, although authorized; transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedo depot ships, or other auxiliaries; vessels of less than 1,500 tons, except torpedo craft of less than fifty tons.

Vessels undergoing trials are considered as completed.

United States War Department. Office of Naval Intelligence.

Active Personnel of United State and Foreign Navies. July 1, 1914.

Rank	England	Germany	United States	France
Admirals of the Fleet	3	2	1[1]	..
Admirals	12	6	..	..
Vice Admirals	22	12	..	15
Rear Admirals	58	22	25[7]	30
Captains and Commanders.	702	154	212	360
Other line officers	2,508	2,220	1,680	1,419
Midshipmen at sea	639	448	..	77
Engineer officers	837	577	..	505
Medical officers	593	340	336	390[3]
Pay officers	750	276	231	211
Naval Constructors	122	162	75	187
Chaplains	147	30	24	..
Warrant officers	2,740	3,183	867	147[4]
Enlisted men	119,597	65,797	52,566	60,505
Marine officers	465	177[5]	341	..
Enlisted men (Marines) ..	21,414[2]	5,791[5]	9,915	..
Total	150,609	79,197	66,273	63,846

Rank	Japan	Russia	Italy	Austria-Hungary
Admirals of the Fleet	2	..	..	..
Admirals	6	12	1	1
Vice Admirals	19	20	10	2
Rear Admirals	38	21	19	15
Captains and Commanders.	270	346	137	80
Other line officers	1,965	1,378	753	558
Midshipmen at sea	119	..	73	175
Engineer officers	811	538	326	164
Medical officers	364[6]	286	259[3]	84
Pay officers	388	..	228	224[8]
Naval Constructors	135[11]	519	107	141[9]
Chaplains	..	85	..	11
Warrant officers	1,569	..	1,340	387
Enlisted men	50,050	49,258	36,660	17,689[10]
Marine officers	..	..	..	..
Enlisted men (Marines) ..	..	..	..	..
Total	55,736	52,463	39,913	19,531

[1] The Admiral of the Navy.

[2] Includes 3,130 men of the Coast Guard.

[3] Includes pharmacists.

[4] Includes adjutants principaux; does not include premier maitres and maitres.

[5] Marine infantry and seaman artillery.

[6] Includes pharmaceutical officers.

[7] The United States now has, temporarily, as extra numbers, due to promotion for war service, and to officers restricted by law to engineering duty on shore only, 6 flag officers, 20 captains, 9 commanders, 6 lieutenant commanders, and 1 lieutenant.

[8] Includes 21 officers of the Judge Advocates Corps.

[9] Includes 4 hydrographic engineers.

[10] Includes 4,000 recruits for 42 days.

[11] Includes 50 ordnance and 10 hydrographic engineers.

Congressional Record. 52: 1607. January 15, 1915

Relative Order of Warship Tonnage

PRESENT ORDER (TONNAGE COMPLETED)

Nation.	Tonnage.
Great Britain	2,157,850
Germany	951,713
United States	765,133
France	688,840
Japan	519,640
Italy	285,460
Russia	270,861
Austria-Hungary	221,526

ORDER IF VESSELS NOW BUILDING WERE COMPLETED

Nation.	Tonnage.
Great Britain	2,714,106
Germany	1,306,577
France	899,915
United States	894,889
Japan	699,916
Russia	678,818
Italy	497,815
Austria	347,508

Sheip, Stanley S. Handbook of the European War, p. 223

Armies of the Nations: The Strength of the Land Forces, Compiled from Authoritative Sources, the Reserves, and Their Organization

	Standing army	First reserve	Second reserve	Total trained men
Great Britain	[1] 125,000	206,000	463,000	798,000
France	[2] 750,000	700,000	700,000	2,150,000
Russia (Asia)	124,000	1,838,500	2,488,500	5,400,000
Russia (Europe)	949,000			
Germany	790,000	450,000	2,600,000	3,850,000
Austria-Hungary	424,000	396,000	1,400,000	2,220,000
Italy	250,000	450,000	320,000	1,020,000
Japan	250,000	250,000	1,000,000	1,500,000
United States	[3] 150,000	.....	.....	[4] 150,000

[1] Not including army in India, 77,000; army in colonies, 45,000.

[2] Not including 40,000 native soldiers in French colonies.

[3] Estimate of The Statesman's Year Book.

[4] 60,000 regular troops and 90,000 partly trained. The United States relies mainly on volunteers.

Congressional Record. 52: 2052. January 21, 1915

Statistics of the Army and Navy

In the year 1914 the Army of the United States had 4,701 officers and 87,781 enlisted men and petty officers, making a total of 92,482, and for the support of the Army that year there was appropriated $92,076,145.51, and the total amount appropriated for the military establishment for 1914 was $165,646,297.77.

In 1914 the United States Navy had 52,667 petty officers and enlisted men, with 3,821 officers, and there was appropriated for the naval establishment in the year 1914 the sum of $140,736,536.35.

You see, the aggregate sum for both the Army and Navy last year was $306,382,834.12, a sum of money staggering to the imagination. Gentlemen, this is not all. In that same year of 1910 you paid out of the pockets of the people to veterans, in the form of pensions, the stupendous sum of $159,974,056.08; and last year you appropriated in pensions $172,408,518.29.

For the military and naval establishments and pensions for the year 1914 there was appropriated $478,791,352.41.

From 1901 to 1914, inclusive, there has been expended on the miltary establishment the sum of $1,942,931,915.77, and for the same period there has been expended on the naval establishment $1,595,609,107.94.

The aggregate amount expended for both the Army and Naval establishments for that period is $3,538,541,023.71.

American Legion

The United States Government has no record of the present addresses and qualifications of its honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines, nor has it information of available men trained in the various occupations essential to the conduct of modern war.

The American Legion is formed to enroll the names of all such citizens qualified either by previous military or technical experience and who will now express their willingness to respond in case the government should at any time need their services. The information obtained by the Legion, carefully

classified as to qualifications and localities by a thorough system of cross-indexing, is intended for the use of the government.

The advice of officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps was obtained as to the kind of information valuable to the government, and also as to the best method of conducting the great amount of detail work involved.

The Legion will not organize into military units; nor require any drill or assemblage; nor arm or equip its members, which functions when necessary, are for the government to perform. Members will be under no obligation of service to the Legion, but must inform the secretary of changes of address. By his enrollment the citizen expresses his intention and desire to serve the government, and states in what manner he is especially qualified so to serve.

The service membership of the Legion shall be composed of:

First.—Men of previous experience in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States or in the National Guard or Naval Militia of any of the states.

Second.—Men especially trained in any of the numerous vocations drawn upon to meet the conditions of modern warfare, such as navigation, aviation, operation of motor-cars and motor-cycles, and all trades in which technical and skilled manual labor is employed. Of vital importance, also, will be the services of those trained in surgery, medicine and nursing. The form of application blank recites about seventy distinct vocations, comprised in the above divisions.

A man may be qualified in either class or in both classes of the Legion, and those who are not qualified to enroll in either of these classes can, nevertheless render most valuable service by obtaining the names and enrollment of those who are so fitted.

Men serving in the Army, Navy or Marine Corps of the United States, or in the National Guard of any of the several states, being in the first line of defense are not eligible for enrollment in the Legion. Upon their resignation or honorable discharge they, however, become eligible.

No more conservative step in the direction of advance preparation than that advocated by the Legion has yet been devised. The Legion creates no new means of national defense. It merely collects, co-ordinates and makes instantly available for time of need such material as already exists.

President Wilson has said that the United States in case of war must depend chiefly upon a "citizenry trained and accustomed to arms." What the Legion plans to do is to provide the necessary advance information regarding citizens already "trained and accustomed to arms" and in other essential occupations, so that in case of war the work of the government will be greatly facilitated.

Arms and the Race

Roland Matteson Johnston

"Coast" defense means nothing at all. We can't defend our coast; nor have we got to defend it, at all events, not in the terms of our Coast Defense theory. We have either to prevent a raid against one of our ports, in which case we are dealing with port or harbor defense at most; or else we have to meet the attack of an expeditionary force, the landing of which will not take place, for obvious enough reasons, at any of our ports, but in between ports, along some sheltered strip of coast. Now to protect our coasts against such an eventuality and at all possible points by shore defenses, is ridiculous; the enterprise is gigantic. Half the effort entailed, directed into other channels, would leave us the greatest military power in the world.

On the other hand the mere protection of our harbors against a raiding cruiser or two should not be a very complicated or difficult matter. Even New York, our greatest port, could probably be defended with complete success against a raid without a single one of the formidable guns placed in the shore batteries. With such a narrow and difficult channel a half dozen destroyers and a couple of mine fields with a few shore guns would make the entrance perfectly secure.

In any case this question is one for experts; and for a mixed board of experts, naval and military. It is worse than ridiculous to continue dealing with it on a basis of reassuring formulas about defending our "Coast," formulas that cloak false military principles and the squandering of public money. The danger of an attack by a raiding cruiser on a port can be solved simply and economically by a competent board of experts. The landing of an expeditionary force can be dealt with in only one way, which is by an immediate concentration of equal or superior numbers

of troops. To protect every landing place on our coast lines is a fantastic proposal.

On the whole we may safely cut down our coast defense force by a half or more. Let us call it 10,000 men, and add it to the previous total. Adding this item we find that our national needs for defense amount in round numbers to 184,400 regulars and 130,800 effective militia, on a peace footing. We further note that each force should be capable of being doubled as rapidly as possible in a national emergency.

National Security League: Purpose and Organization

Purpose

The National Security League is a duly incorporated organization. Its purpose may be summed up with the following statement of principles:

1. Whereas, There is no assurance that the United States will not again become involved in war;

2. And since a peaceful policy, even when supported by treaties, is not a sufficient guarantee against war, and the United States cannot safely entrust the maintenance of its institutions to them;

3. And since we are not adequately prepared to maintain our national policies;

4. And since present defenseless condition of the nation is due to the failure of Congress not only to follow the carefully considered plans of our naval and military advisers but also to provide any reasonable measure for gradually putting such plans into practice; therefore, be it

5. *Resolved,* That until a workable plan for a world alliance has been evolved and agreed to by the principal nations, with proper guarantee of good faith, the United States must undertake adequate military preparations for its defense.

Platform

The National Security League favors an Army and Navy with citizen reserves which will be sufficient only for the adequate protection of the United States. It does not believe in a large standing army or in any form of militarism. It believes in preparation against war, and not "for war."

Program

The League is working for the following program:

1. Legislation correcting present wasteful methods of military appropriations and disbursements.
2. The adoption of a definite military policy.
3. A stronger, better balanced Navy.
4. An effective mobile Army.
5. An adequate National Guard organized under the War Department.
6. The creation of an organized reserve for each branch of our military service.

American Review of Reviews. 51:48. January, 1915

An Efficiency Expert on National Defense.
Harrington Emerson

December 12, 1914.

The United States Government is in some respects founded on the negation of the fundamental principles of organization, and therefore of efficiency.

Experts are needed for plans, but in our form of government neither those who appoint the experts nor those who pass on the plans are qualified so to do. They may hit it by accident, certainly not by antecedent probability.

Permanence is needed to carry out well-made plans of national defense, but as to our national policies, excepting the shadowy but very real Monroe Doctrine, there is no permanence.

In addition, of course, in regard to national defense we are wholly provincial. Our days of Indian warfare are over; Canada is a well-mannered and very dear neighbor; Mexico is a troublesome, but not a dangerous, neighbor, and we only theoretically know about war.

Our national war plans should be for defense, not for offense.

We cannot rival European armies; we are neither ready for, nor willing to endure universal conscription. While our army and naval officers rank as high in intelligence as first-class civilians, the great bulk of our initiative, brains, and energy have gone into industry, transportation, commerce. It would be a serious drain to divert these qualities to armies and navies;

yet without putting the supreme national intelligence into war preparation we could never hope to be of the first rank. We cannot rival Great Britain's navy. A navy depends on submarine cables (less now than before the development of wireless), on coaling stations, on repair refuges. Great Britain has these all over the world; no other power has any to speak of. The hunted German cruisers pounced on defenseless merchantmen. By wonderfully good ability they met and destroyed an inferior British squadron. They fled from sea to sea, meeting here and there semi-piratical supply boats, and trusting to clandestine wireless messages from neutral shores, only in the end to be cornered and destroyed. Our fate in a naval war with Great Britain would be that of the Germans.

It is not for a man who is not an expert to express any opinion on the comparative value of shore defenses, submarines, and dreadnoughts. Believing in defense, I would personally prefer to see many, many sea-going submarines. Small submarines capable of being carried by fast cruisers might prove very dangerous to dreadnoughts, even off the Falkland Islands.

As to armies, for forty years I have admired the Swiss plan of universal school training, for in early youth there is plenty of time. This Swiss schoolboy training is supplemented with outing drills of the young grown-ups. Switzerland has, I believe, in proportion to population the largest and best prepared army in the world.

In this country, also, every grammar-school boy should be thoroughly drilled, and every high-school boy should be trained for service as a petty officer. The National Military Academy should turn out enough graduates to officer an army of four million, these graduates entering civil life but with obligation to serve in case of war.

How, therefore, shall we be able to plan intelligently as to our national defense?

I do not believe in commission agencies of information. No great invention or any great plan was ever developed by a commission. But how can we secure the one great constructive genius who could give us the perfect plan? The counsel of a Kitchener or of a Bernhardi might be of supreme value in the preliminary stages. Those men have been in it. We have not.

HARRINGTON EMERSON.

New York City.

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National Defense; As Discussed by the President in His Message, and by War and Navy Department Officials in Their Reports

The Army

In his annual report to the President, made public on December 10, Secretary of War Garrison states, even more clearly than others had done, the present effective strength of our regular army. Of a total of 92,000 officers and men, 8000 are in the Quartermaster and Hospital Corps, 19,000 garrison the coast defenses, 19,000 belong to the non-combatant administrative and educational branches, 9500 are in the Philippines, 8000 in Hawaii, 2000 at Panama, 850 in China, 850 in Alaska, and 700 in Porto Rico.

Thus Secretary Garrison finds that we have in the whole United States a real fighting strength, in movable forces, of less than 31,000 officers and men.

After recommending the enlistment of 25,000 additional men in the regular army, the Secretary of War discusses "the next necessity, which is absolutely imperative, and that is, the preparation of a reserve."

Reserves are men who have been retired from the Army after a period of enlistment; and Secretary Garrison recognizes the fact that a reserve force can only be created if the conditions of enlistment are made attractive. He would establish a form of enlistment for one year (instead of four years, as at present), discharging into the reserve those who so desire and who have become proficient.

The technical head of our Army is the Chief of Staff, who is charged among other things with the duty of reporting to the Secretary of War upon the condition of the forces under him, and of making recommendations relative thereto.

The report and recommendations of Major-General Wotherspoon, who became Chief of Staff on April 22, were prepared and made public at the time of his retirement on November 15. His recommendations go even farther than those of Mr. Garrison. He believes that:

> Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability and necessity for having at all times available at home and, in addition to the

necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of our military establishment a mobile force of at least 500,000 thoroughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men. . . . It is also agreed that we should have, as a second line, a thoroughly equipped and trained force of organized militia of not less than 300,000 men.

To have 500,000 trained men available at all times, General Wotherspoon would establish a three-year enlistment, increase the standing army to 205,000 and create a reserve organization. One-third of the regular army would be discharged each year into the reserve, and would be held subject to call for a period of five years.

General Wotherspoon does not lack appreciation of the value of the militia. But the reader of his report is impressed with the limitations of that branch of our military organization. Out of a total reported strength of 120,000, more than 70,000 can not qualify even as second-class riflemen, 38,000 failed to attend the required twenty-four drills of one hour each during the year, and 32,000 did not attend the annual camps of instruction Furthermore, General Wotherspoon believes that in a whole year "not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of ten miles fully equipped and armed."

The problem of finding suitable men, and training them sc that they might become officers in an enlarged or reserve or vol unteer army, has occupied the attention of many authorities.

The views of Major-Gen. Leonard Wood, who preceded Gen eral Wotherspoon as Chief of Staff, are appropriate upon the subject of training officers, for he himself is not a West Point graduate, having come into the army as a surgeon. In a recent interview he spoke as follows:

> As you know, for the past two summers we have conducted students' military instruction camps. To enter one of these camps applicants must be citizens of the United States between 18 and 30 years of age, of good moral character, physically qualified, and students in, or recent graduates of, universities, colleges, and the senior class at high schools. The results have been extremely encouraging. During the past summer we had four camps. . . .
>
> Take the Burlington camp as an example. We had there 350 students, and at the end of their five weeks of training 129 were recommended to fill lieutenancies and captaincies of volunteers.

General Wood also made suggestions which, he believes, would result in attracting more students to these instruction camps. He has also outlined a plan whereby graduates of private military

schools of high grade might be given commissions as second lieutenants in the regular army, for one year, afterward becoming reserve officers.

Besides a shortage of men and officers, there is alleged a shortage of field guns and ammunition with which to equip an enlarged army. A paragraph on this subject in General Wood's last report as Chief of Staff is particularly interesting, because it was written and published several months before the beginning of the European conflict.

> In addition to the shortage of field artillery organizations for the regular army, attention is again invited to the very alarming shortage in field artillery, guns and ammunition for the militia and volunteers, and to the fact that this class of material cannot be made quickly, but must be prepared in time of peace. No amount of money or effort will serve to overcome this shortage without the expenditure of such time as might be fatal to our chances in case of war.

That conditions in this respect have improved during the past year is indicated by the report of the Chief of Ordnance, just issued, in which reference is made to enlarged output from the Government's powder mills and gun shops, and to a "gratifying" increase in the appropriation for field artillery. At this increased rate, the project for field artillery "will be complete about 1920."

The report of the Chief of Ordnance indicates that there is on hand, or covered by funds already appropriated, a sufficient quantity of rifles and ammunition for an enlarged regular army, for the organized militia, and for volunteers.

The Navy

President Wilson's statement, in his message to Congress, that a powerful navy is our proper and natural means of defense, caused many to await with aroused curiosity the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, made public on December 12.

Mr. Daniels points to the sudden despatch of our fleet to Mexican waters, last April, as furnishing ample proof of the preparedness of our Navy. We quote his tribute:

> Within twenty-four hours after the directions to sail were flashed from the wireless at Arlington to the commander-in-chief the gray fighters were ready, and the giant ships slipped swiftly seaward and hurried to the waters of the Gulf. . . . It showed the country that the navy is always ready,—it lives in a state of preparedness,—and that when the emergency arises every man in the navy and the marine corps shows such enthusiasm and resourcefulness as to quicken the pride of their countrymen in them.

"Ship for ship and man for man," our Navy is equal if not superior to any in the world, in the opinion of Secretary Daniels. He recommends the construction of two new battleships, —after calling attention to the fact that three were authorized last year, and mentioning the "necessity for economy, which the rigors of foreign war have imposed."

Secretary Daniels invited attention to the report of the General Board of the Navy Department, as entitled to great weight, and he made it a part of his own report. Among other things, the Board's duty is to advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the proper number and types of ships; and the report referred to embodies that advice. It bears the signature of Admiral Dewey.

The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear-Admiral Victor Blue, has estimated that there is an "actual shortage of men to man all vessels serviceable for war purposes of 4565,"—this in view of the fact that for the first time in many years the navy enlistment is up to the limit prescribed by Congress, and the service has a waiting list.

Regarding officers, Admiral Blue points out that more than half the entire number are of or below the second lowest rank,— "an abnormal condition, which should be remedied." The matter of promotion, too, "is a serious question, and becomes worse each year."

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 457-8. December 12, 1914

Report of the Secretary of War

The annual report of Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, is a valuable and instructive document, and if a copy of it could be placed in the hands of every citizen of the United States it would dispel many of the delusions which now make it difficult, if not impossible, to secure proper preparations for the defense of the country. The Secretary calls attention in the opening of his report to the reports of his subordinate organizations of the Army which we shall give as they appear from time to time. They show that the health of the Army is exceptionally good. The system of disciplinary companies bids fair to be very successful. The duty our soldiers are engaged in in Galveston, Vera Cruz and all along the Mexican border and in Colorado and

Arkansas has been "of an exceedingly difficult kind and in some respects even more difficult than actual warfare."

It called for patience, self-control, discretion, and good judgment under very trying conditions, and required implicit obedience to orders—a prime military necessity. The fact that this duty was everywhere done in an exceptional manner and without untoward incident is gratifying in the highest degree and deserves recognition as difficult service extremely well rendered. Of a somewhat similar character was the work carried on in Europe by the officers sent over to aid the Americans marooned there because of the European war. Their service was done in a manner to reflect credit on themselves and the Army, and it is reckoned as a similar high character to that just mentioned.

The student camps were very successful and undoubtedly can and should be developed into a most valuable assistance. There has been a decrease in the number and percentage of desertions. The Secretary gives a passing word to non-resistance, showing that all governments must have physical force and military force, the only question is as to the character and extent of the force required. Continuing he says:

No reasonable person in this country today has the slightest shadow of fear of military despotism, nor of any interference whatever by military force in the conduct of civil affairs. It is perfectly apparent to anyone who approaches the matter with an unprejudiced mind that what constitutes undesirable militarism as distinguished from a necessary, proper, and adequate preparation of the military resources of the nation depends upon the position in which each nation finds itself, and varies with every nation and with different conditions in each nation at different times. To the extent, however, that it confines its military preparedness to the purposes required, there is neither warrant nor justification in characterizing such action as "militarism." Those who would thus characterize it do so because they have reached the conclusion that a nation today can properly dispense with a prepared military force, and therefore they apply the word to any preparation or organization of the military resources of the nation. Not being able to conceive how a reasonable, prudent, patriotic man can reach such a conclusion, I can not conceive any arguments or statements that would alter such a state of mind. It disregards all known facts, flies in the face of all experience, and must rest upon faith in that which has not yet been made manifest. Equally useless, in my view, is the discussion frequently indulged in as to whether military preparation tends or does not tend to avoid war. I term such discussion "useless" because, so far as we are concerned, whatever conclusion might be reached thereon would not affect our duty. Unless and until the Congress of the United States, representing the people of the country, places on record the conclusion of the people to the contrary, my duty is, I think, entirely clear; and that duty is to set forth the facts and the necessities growing out of the facts, and suggestions as to the ways and means of fulfilling such necessities. Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between nations,

followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international courts of arbitration, and other greatly-to-be-desired measures to lessen or prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all know that at present these conditions are not existing. We can and will eagerly adapt ourselves to each beneficent development along these lines; but to merely enfeeble ourselves in the meantime would, in my view, be unthinkable folly. By neglecting and refusing to provide ourselves with the necessary means of self-protection and self-defense we could not hasten or in any way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire in these respects.

Considering what this nation needs in the way of military preparation the Secretary shows the extent of territory it has to protect and describes the size and distribution of our regular Army, which has in the continental United States only 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.

The Secretary continues:

We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in time of war—consisting of sixteen men.

If all of the National Guard could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond (an inconceivable result), and if they were all found fairly efficient in the first line—that is, the troops who would be expected to immediately take the field—we could summon a force in this country of Regulars and National Guard amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men.

And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready would take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months.

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

With respect to reserve matériel, one or two obvious things had better be stated. This matériel, of course, can not be quickly improvised. It requires long periods of time to produce; it is the absolute essential of modern warfare, and must be kept on hand if emergencies are to be prepared for. We have on hand in reserve sufficient small arms, small-arm ammunition and equipment, roughly figuring, for the 500,000 men that would have to be called into the field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery and artillery ammunition. This has been urgently presented in all of the recent reports of the head of this Department and the Chiefs of Staff, and Congress has from time to time recently increased the appropriations for these purposes. There is universal agreement among all who know, that artillery is an essential feature of modern warfare, and that a proper proportion thereof to any arm is indispensable if success is to be even hoped for. It is imperative that the manufacture of artillery and artillery ammunition should progress as rapidly as is possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained.

In present day strategy and tactics the Aviation Corps has bid fair to

become the eyes of the Army, and a general commanding an army without an adequate flying corps against an army of equal strength in other respects, but with an adequate flying corps, would be in the position of a blind man contending against a man with sight. The present Congress made a good start toward putting aviation on a substantial basis. This work should be followed up and consistently pressed.

The universal utilization of motor transportation in the present war has vastly increased the mobility of armies. It is necessary that we keep abreast of the times in utilizing motor vehicles for army transportation. It might be well worth while to devise ways and means of organizing into a volunteer motor transportation reserve the motor vehicles adaptable to military use now in the hands of private citizens.

The first question is, whether the proper remedy is to so largely increase the standing Army as to constantly have under arms a military force of sufficient size to meet our contemplated needs. What shall be concluded in this respect after the mature and comprehensive study which I have suggested should be made of the subject must, of course, be left for the present. Following the lines that I have laid down for myself, which are to deal now only with those things which clearly should be done now, I do not advocate any such considerable increase as would probably result from the comprehensive study suggested.

Whatever else may properly be drawn from the facts as disclosed, it can not be disputed that it is imperative that we have in this country a very much larger percentage of men who have had proper military. training and who are in a position to instantly respond to the call of the nation. Of the troops that we now have, it will be necessary in the very near future to take from the United States and put in the Philippine Islands thirteen companies of Coast Artillery, 1,950 men; in the Hawaiian Islands, three regiments of Infantry, one battalion of Field Artillery, and two companies of Coast Artillery, 6,372 men; and in the Panama Canal Zone, one regiment of Infantry, one squadron of Cavalry, one battalion of Field Artillery, one company of Engineers, and twelve companies of Coast Artillery, 4,776 men. (I may say in this connection that I do not consider the Panama garrison sufficient, even when these contemplated additions are made.) This will then leave in the United States proper 12,610 Coast Artillery troops and 24,602 of the mobile arm, the latter being then not much more than twice the size of the police force of the city of New York.

My recommendation of what we should immediately do is to fill up the existing organizations which compose the aggregate mobile army force just mentioned to their full strength. This would require 25,000 men. In addition to the enlisted men just mentioned, we should be authorized to obtain 1,000 more officers. The legislation to accomplish these purposes would be of the very simplest character, being merely authorizations to the Department to do these things.

An increase of the enlisted personnel of the Army by 25,000 men would accomplish threefold results. It would, as before mentioned, bring up to full strength the existing units of the mobile army in continental United States and thus supply a more adequate force. Second, it would afford training for the officers in the command of such units as they must command in time of war and would prevent, as far as the regular Army is concerned, the crowding of the ranks with raw levies which always disorganize and render inefficient the organizations into which they come.

Third, it would be a wise investment from the standpoint of economy, in that no material increase of overhead charges would be necessary, and the addition of these men could be effected at a per capita cost to the government of about one-third the per capita cost under existing conditions. Since the existing physical plant and the administrative organization would not have to be in any way increased to take care of this increased force, the only additional expense would be clothing, feeding, and paying thereof

By the time these 25,000 men could be procured the mobile forces in the United States, as hereinbefore pointed out, would number 24,602; so that after the addition the mobile army in continental United States would consist of 49,602 men.

With the Army thus increased, we would then be able to undertake the next necessity, which is absolutely imperative, and that is, the preparation of a reserve. The present legislation with respect to a reserve has proven utterly useless for the purpose, it having produced in twenty-four months only sixteen men, and there is little or no hope that it will ever properly accomplish its purpose. The reasons why it will not do so it is not profitable to discuss.

Again, without attempting to wait until perfection has been reached, it seems to me that it is only the part of wisdom to do that which we know will produce a beneficial result, and one that approximates the best. I am firmly convinced that if we can use the standing Army as a school through which to pass men who come into it, with the knowledge that if they are proficient they can be discharged at any time after a year or eighteen months, we will begin at once to build up the necessary reserve, and will, for the first time in the military history of this country, have something approximating a balanced organization. There is unfortunately opposition to this policy. I say "unfortunately" because it is always the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to select the best that is possible, out of what is obtainable, rather than to reject that obtainable best because it is not perfection. It is furthermore true that by intensive military training, any young man of good health and average mentality can be made a serviceable soldier in twelve months, and, in fact, has been so made. This has been tried abroad, and I have caused it to be tried under my own administration and inspection. Even if there were doubt about it, it would not cause a different conclusion to be reached by a reasonable man, because we certainly would be better off with a reserve of men who had had one year's training than we are without any reserve at all and having to depend, as we do, upon men who have never had any training whatever. I caused, about a year ago, recruits, as they came in, and without selection, to be organized in a battery of artillery, a troop of cavalry, and a company of infantry; and from my own observation and from the reports of experts, each of these units, well within a year, was found proficient to a very high degree.

I am therefore firmly convinced that we should have immediate legislation dealing with the matter of enlistment and reserve. I am not so much concerned with the length of the enlistment, provided the Secretary of War is given power to discharge into the reserve, at the end of twelve months, those who have shown themselves proficient up to a required standard. A practically similar provision should exist in every state which maintained an organized militia.

I am convinced with equal firmness that we should adopt some one

or more of the methods which have been suggested for the training of more civilians to become officers in case of necessity. The potentiality of the student military camps and of the schools and colleges at which military training is obtainable suggests a fruitful source of accomplishing this purpose.

When one has reached the conclusion, as I have, that a minimum of military preparedness is essential, the question of its cost is secondary and can not be permitted to be the determining factor. No citizen will or can properly object to the expenditure of money for vital national purposes.

It is a pleasure to be able to turn from a consideration of what we need to a realization of what we already have. While our existing organization is of the exceedingly small numbers already mentioned, it is unquestionably in as excellent condition as any similar number of men in any other military establishment in the world. Were it not for a desire to avoid invidious comparisons I should say that, man for man, it is better than any similar existing military establishment in the world. I do not believe that anyone will dispute the statement that the Army has never been in better condition than it is today, from the most recently enlisted man up to the highest officers. There is an esprit de corps, an eagerness to constantly strive toward perfection, a willingness to undertake and satisfactorily perform any and every duty, that is most commendable and encouraging. If we are authorized to use this exceedingly valuable nucleus to produce the reserve needed, there never was a time when the experiment had so great a chance of success as now. Both the enlisted personnel and the officers furnish a school of unexampled excellence for just such work.

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 458-60. December 12, 1914

Report of the Secretary of the Navy

The report of the Secretary of the Navy is accompanied by the report of the General Board of the Navy. This we give first as it will conduce to a better understanding of the report of the Secretary which follows it.

Report of the Navy General Board

Those who are seeking information as to the needs of our Navy will find much useful information on this subject in the report of the General Board of the Navy, signed by Admiral George Dewey. The General Board recommends for 1916 a program of naval increase which is summarized as follows:

- 4 battleships
- 16 destroyers
- 3 fleet submarines
- 16 coast submarines
- 4 scouts
- 4 gunboats
- Air service—$5,000,000.
- 2 oil-fuel ships
- 1 destroyer tender
- 1 submarine tender.
- 1 Navy transport
- 1 hospital ship
- 1 supply ship

The reasons for adopting this program are set forth at length in the report of the Board. In 1903 the General Board, after a mature consideration of national policies and interests and those of foreign nations, recommended a program for the completion of the Navy by 1919 to a strength then believed adequate. The basis of the fleet recommended was forty-eight battleships. The Board adhere to the opinion that that number is required, but new inventions and discoveries of new ideas have modified somewhat the original recommendations of the General Board as to the auxiliaries required to complete a fighting fleet. Starting with a total of ten battleships completed in 1903 and fourteen authorized, it was estimated that building two ships each year would complete the program by 1919; but instead of authorizing the number asked for by the Board, Congress authorized only one ship in 1904, 1906, 1907, 1912 and 1913; it authorized two ships in 1905, 1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911. To make good the deficiency the Board asked for three ships in 1905 and 1906 and four in 1908 and the years succeeding. This led to a misconstruction as to the number of ships asked for, which was not an annual program of four battleships, but two each year from 1904 to 1915 to provide a fleet of forty-eight battleships by 1919. As it has been determined since this program was originally adopted that the life of a battleship from time of completion is only about twenty years, it was decided, in order to make good the deficiency thus arising, that it was necessary to lay down a replacement ship twenty years after the laying down of the original ship. This was taken into consideration in making a recommendation for four battleships in the programs for 1912 and 1913. Up to the present time the General Board has advocated continously and consistently a program to produce a fleet of forty-eight battleships by 1919. This would have called for, considering replacements, a general two-battleship program with a third added every three years. The number of battleships called for by this policy, forty-eight, and the date set for their completion, by 1919, were fixed by a calm and logical review of the policies and aims of the nation and the known laws and prospective developments and aims of other countries; and the policy was to provide and maintain at all times a fleet equal to or superior to that of any nation likely to challenge our policies.

We are now deficient ten battleships built, building and authorized from that contemplated in the 1903 program. The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the nation without being a protection. It therefore strongly urges the adoption by the Government of a policy looking to the making good of the deficiencies of the past, and the building up of this arm of the national defense until it becomes equal to the task that war will put upon it. That point will not be reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest probable adversary.

The wisdom of such a policy is well illustrated by recent events, says the Board, and is reinforced by the teachings of all history. For a review of the history of all ages will show that no nation has ever created and maintained a great over-sea commerce without the support of sea power. It will further show that trade rivalry, which is the active expression of the most universal of all human traits—desire for gain—has been a most

fruitful cause of war; and, when the clash has come, the commerce of the weaker sea power has been broken up and driven from the seas. That has been true for all time, and is true today; and has a particular bearing on the United States at the present time, when such strenuous efforts are being made to build up a national merchant marine and extend our foreign commerce. Our main defense and protection from invasion must, therefore, always rest with the Navy, which must ever remain our first and best line of defense. This defense, unless adequate, is impotent; and, as before stated, adequacy is not reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the Navy of the strongest probable adversary.

In the matter of battleships the General Board remains of the opinion that it has always held, that command of the sea can only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all weathers and overcome the strongest enemy vessels that may be brought against them. Other types are valuable and have their particular uses, all of which are indispensable, but limited in character. But, what has been true throughout all naval wars of the past, and what is equally true today, is that the backbone of any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest sea-going, sea-keeping ships of its day, or of its battleships. The General Board recommends, therefore, in the light of all the information it has up to this present date that the development of the battleship fleet be continued as the primary aim in naval development, and that four of them be authorized in the 1916 program.

For the general purposes of war on the sea the General Board has placed the destroyer as the type of warship next in importance to the battleship, and it concludes that four destroyers should be provided for every battleship built, and therefore recommends that sixteen destroyers be provided in the 1916 program, three of them to be fleet submarines, which, with one now building, will provide a fleet submarine division of four for work with the fleet. Boats of great speed and size are not required for coast submarines, and indeed would be detrimental, their size debarring these vessels from shallow waters, and speed would be gained at a sacrifice over desirable qualities. Four scout cruisers are recommended in the belief that this branch of the fleet has been too long neglected.

In 1913 the board recommended the purchase of fifty aeroplanes, one fleet dirigible and two small dirigibles for training. In spite of this our Navy now possesses only twelve aeroplanes of too little speed and carrying capacity and no two of which are of the same type. The board says: "In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the past year, and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper air service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now developed air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities. In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. We would be without the means of detecting the presence of submarines or mine fields or of attempting direct attack on the enemy from the air, while our own movements would be an open book to him. The General Board can not too strongly urge that the Department's most serious thought be given to this matter, and that immediate steps be taken

to remedy it, and recommends that Congress be asked for an appropriation of at least $5,000,000, to be made available immediately for the purpose of establishing an efficient air service."

Another lack of our Navy is gunboats, very few of those we now carry on our naval list under that name being available for service. Four are recommended for the 1916 program. Other vessels recommended by the Board will be found included in the summary given above. The specific reasons for these recommendations are included in the report.

The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the Department, this report says, the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board, made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. They recommend legislation accordingly, and it is thought possible with the help of the naval militia and the national naval reserve of trained officers and men to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

Secretary Daniels's Report

The report of the General Board is given as an appendix to the report of the Secretary of the Navy. Their recommendations seem to have made small impression upon our worthy Secretary, for he reduces their recommendations to two dreadnoughts, six destroyers, eight submarines or more, one to be seagoing, one gunboat, and one oiler. Twenty vessels in all instead of fifty-four as recommended by the General Board. The Secretary's report shows he is much more optimistic on the subject of the condition of our Navy than are his professional advisers. He commends Congress for giving two dreadnoughts last year where the Board asked for four. The additions noted above will, in the opinion of Mr. Daniels, "give us a well rounded Navy, equal, if not superior, to that of any Navy in the world, ship for ship and man for man." The past year in the Navy, the Secretary tells us, affords gratification to all who take pride in its growth, strength and assurance. We are glad to have Mr. Daniels's assurance as to this for we were quite of the contrary opinion, as the General Board would appear to be. "Not only is the Navy up to its present prescribed quota as to numbers," we are told, "but the popularity of the service renders unnecessary strained or unusual methods to attract a sufficient number of young men." The present enlistment is 52,667, or 4,612 greater than in 1913.

The welfare of the young men who are so freely offering

themselves for their country's service has been by no means neglected, but their avenues of promotion are not as numerous as they should be or they will be. From the highest rank to the newest recruit there has been manifested a spirit of comradeship and cooperation and ambition, says Secretary Daniels. In every activity of our many-sided service, officers and men have risen in splendid performance of duty to add new glory and new luster to our Navy, which, from the days of Paul Jones and Barry to those who fought at Vera Cruz, has won glory, more by restrained self-mastery than by aggressive display of courage. With the authorization by the Congress of a program as progressive as at the session which closed in October, the Navy will be stronger, relatively and actually, than at any period of our history.

The estimates for 1916 are $139,569,409.88, or $664,306.73 less than the 1915 appropriation. There has been saved from the appropriation for the fiscal year ended June 13, 1914, $2,427,539.76, nearly all of which has been at the expense of construction and repair and equipment and steam machinery of our vessels.

The Secretary tells us that he approves the recommendation of the General Board as to the character of all the ships that are to be constructed, but not as to the number, but this approval is not shown in his recommendation to Congress, though he believes the opinion of the Board is "entitled to great weight." He says:

> In view of the demonstrated power of the submarine, I would impress upon Congress the importance of making a larger increase in the submarine craft, appropriating generously therefor without reducing the appropriations for other craft. The estimates for these were reduced to the minimum. As far as the submarines themselves are concerned, it is believed that ours are on a par with any in the world. The development of our types has been logical, and in each new type the ideas and comments of the officers and men who operate the submarines in service have been considered.

In the new battleships of the California class authorized, following the policies inaugurated in the past year, the fullest possible provision will be made to secure the maximum comforts for the crew. A crew's reception room, wherein members of the crew can receive the members of their families and other guests, will be provided, and, similar to the provisions now existing for officers, laundries will be installed for the use of the crew.

The value of aircraft is dwelt upon at some length by the Secretary, and he says:

Those at Vera Cruz were used continually, and although the Navy's aeroplanes are not fitted for land work, for forty-three days they did a good deal of scouting over the trenches protecting Vera Cruz. There were daily flights without regard to weather or other conditions. To every call made upon them our young aeronauts made ready and cheerful response, and their forethought and caution prevented any accidents. Their scout work in the sky assured the Commander-in-Chief that no mines had been planted, enabled him to locate sunken works, and was of inestimable value in the combined operations of the Army and Navy. The heavy toll that must be paid for progress in all invention calling for daring has resulted in the death this year of one air pilot, Lieut. J. D. Murray, U. S. N. His name will be remembered among the immortals who have given their lives to the development of aeronautics. He was an efficient officer, courageous in life, mourned in death.

To enable the flying school at the aeronautic station at Pensacola, Fla., to test foreign built aeroplanes, several have been ordered from abroad, but have not been obtained owing to the war. A volunteer militia, if it may be so called, has been organized by the owners of aircraft, and has been patriotically placed at the command of the Navy Department if times of peril should call for its assistance to the regular airship flotillas.

The Secretary says:

It is not the policy of the Department to extend manufacturing by the Navy to all that it needs, but to continue buying the bulk of its supplies from private manufacturers and business men. It should be able, however, to demand competitive bids by having potential facilities to manufacture anything needed for armament or equipment which may at any time be controlled by those who demand excessive prices. There is another reason why the Navy Department should be able to manufacture munitions of war—that policy would prevent effective agitation or organization for big preparations for war conducted by those who make profit by the manufacture of war supplies.

The Department approves the recommendation of the Bureau of Ordnance that some plan be devised by which a cash reward may be given to any civil employee who may work out an improvement or economy in any manufacturing process or who may submit a design for some important improvement in ordnance material or plant machinery, or any improvement of naval equipment. This scheme should follow generally that authorized by Act of Congress in 1912 for the Ordnance Department of the War Department. In many private manufacturing establishments some such scheme is in vogue.

The test of electric propulsion in the collier Jupiter has led to an authorization of its installation in the battleship California

building at the New York Navy Yard. Considerable attention is given by the Secretary to the subject of substitution of oil for coal as fuel and the advantages of this change are shown at some length. He says:

> I am still of the opinion that the Navy should own its oil lands and ultimately produce, transport, refine, and store its own oil in order that the Department may at all times be assured of an adequate and dependable supply of fuel oil at reasonable cost, so that in the design of ships full advantage may be taken of the great superiority of oil as a fuel, without fear of the privately controlled price and supply of oil forcing the Government to enormous increase in cost of operation of the fleet or reduced activity of the fleet in time of greatest need to the nation.

An argument is presented for the erection of an armor plate factory, and a description given of the naval radio service. In its military feature there has been an enormous advance during the past year and much of this progress, perhaps the greater part, is due to the original work of the department.

Because of the many advantages, it is the policy of the department to develop shipbuilding at navy yards. Among said advantages are: (1) A check upon the cost of private shipbuilding; (2) increased efficiency and preparedness of the yard working forces due to a more uniform and steady employment of workmen; (3) an improved morale of yard service, from master workmen to the unskilled laborer; (4) elimination of the expenses of inspections and trial trips.

Distribution of Navy Personnel

Attention is invited by the Secretary to the report of the chief of the Bureau of Navigation on the subject of personnel. It is estimated that more than 90 per cent of the effective fighting power of the Navy is now fully manned. And this percentage will be increased proportionately as new ships are placed in active service by taking the crews from the older ones of little or no fighting value. Owing to the financial condition of the treasury, due to war conditions abroad, the department does not ask for more men this year, but intends, by the distribution of the personnel to the best advantage, to not only maintain the effective fighting strength of the Navy, but to increase it proportionately as ships now under construction are completed and added to the Navy list during the next year.

Since March, 1914, the department has placed in full com-

mission twelve more vessels of the older type than were deemed necessary a year ago. These were in addition to the vessels newly built, and were demanded by the situation in Mexico. The department was enabled to meet this increased demand on the personnel by recruiting to the authorized strength during the year and thus gaining 4,600 more men than were in the service last year.

The present force, the Secretary states, can be made sufficient by placing in reserve old vessels of little or doubtful military value. For the manning of such vessels and of the auxiliaries, which would be required with the fleet in time of war, a naval reserve is necessary, and should be organized and trained at the earliest practicable date.

It is recommended that at least one admiral and two vice-admirals be authorized, reducing the number of rear-admirals correspondingly.

Some account is given of the organization of the naval militia under the law enacted in February, 1913, establishing a Division of Naval Militia Affairs. The Secretary says:

> Some increase in the appropriation will be needed to effectively carry out the provisions of the act, chiefly to maintain the annual cruises, in which the personnel receives its actual sea training. A naval militia, adequate in personnel and equipment, goes a long way toward avoiding the financial burdens of un-American militarism and yet of proving ready for national defense in case of war.

Each navy militiaman costs only $54 per year and as the cost of an enlisted man of the regular Navy is $636.97, the Navy Department can maintain 7,132 of the naval militia for approximately $385,000, against $4,542,870 to maintain 7,132 enlisted men of the regular Navy for the same time.

The establishment of a strong naval reserve is recommended. Of the 380,000 men who have helped the service in the past ten years, it is believed that, at least, 25,000 would respond to the first call to the colors. Plans are being made to so organize this body of reserve that they would constitute an immediate, effective reserve in time of war.

It is earnestly recommended that Congress pass a graded retirement law based upon the length of service and which will also differentiate between total and partial disability. In the case of partial disability there should be graded pay based upon the number of years in the service of the United States.

A description is given at length of the educational system adopted by the Navy which has transformed it into "the biggest university in America." "The better educational facilities in the Navy will," says the Secretary, "with every passing year enable ambitious and capable youths to qualify for this instruction and to prepare for commissions in the Navy. They will bring practical experience aboard ship to the academic life at the Naval Academy and will help the other midshipmen while they are in turn being helped by the influences and instruction that train American naval officers capable of the high duties required of them in the service."

The occupation of Vera Cruz is described at some length and is an illustration of the efficiency of our Navy. The Secretary says:

> The get-away of the fleet and its efficiency in the waters of Mexico illustrate the energy, brain work, and teamwork which give signal proof of our national efficiency, an efficiency which is emphasized only to illustrate what may be expected of the Navy whenever it is called into action.

The good work of the marine corps at Vera Cruz is described.

Reference is made to individual acts of daring and presence of mind in the Navy and we are told:

> A most unusual achievement for which the departmental gratitude was called forth was a piece of impromptu civil engineering on the part of a hospital steward and a blacksmith in constructing a five-mile trail over a well-nigh impossible route in Alaska, for the purpose of transporting coal to the coast by sled in the dead of a far-northern winter, and this task was achieved under the eye of a Navy surgeon.

The Secretary expresses hope that we shall have an international agreement that will prevent war and closes by saying:

> This has been a proud and solemn year for the American Navy. It has shown that it knows how to bear itself under fire, how to obey orders, how to maintain the honorable traditions of the service. Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you as its Commander-in-Chief upon the record it has made, upon its preparedness for duty, upon the reliance you can place upon it in any time of national need.

Congressional Record. 52: pt. 6 appendix 129-31
January 18, 1915

Report of the Chief of Staff

According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, exclusive of the Philippine scouts, is 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 enlisted men below its authorized strength.

Of the total present enlisted strength of the Army, 22.50 per cent, including recruits and recruiting parties, belongs to the noncombatant and noneffective class, and is not with the colors; 19.45 per cent is in that branch whose special function is coast defense; and 58.05 per cent belongs to the mobile forces (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry).

Of the actual strength of the Army from the latest returns, 1,067 officers and 19,899 enlisted men (including recruits and men engaged in recruiting) belong to the staff, technical, and noncombatant branches of the Army.

Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 enlisted men belong to the coast artillery and 2,738 officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong to the mobile army (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry).

Mobile Army

The total strength of the field or mobile forces in our Army is therefore less than 52,000 enlisted men. If from this strength the noncombatants and noneffectives, belonging to the regimental, troop, battery, and company organizations, such as the noncommissioned staff, musicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which aggregate 5,376, are deducted, the actual fighting strength of the Army with the colors, and without deductions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached service, etc., would be 2,738 officers and 45,968 enlisted men.

A fairly adequate supply of ammunition and other matériel to maintain the mobile army in the field for a period of six months is now on hand and available.

As to the coast artillery branch of the Army, the strength of that corps must necessarily depend on the number and character of the coast defenses which it is required to man. Its strength

has no relation to the strength of the mobile army other than that the strength of the latter must be adequate to protect the fortified positions from attack from the rear.

Under the present approved policy of the War Department the coast artillery defenses in our foreign possessions are to be manned entirely by organizations belonging to the regular service. The coast artillery defenses in the United States proper are to be manned at the rate of 50 per cent of the gun and mortar defenses by the Coast Artillery Corps of the organized militia.

The strength of the coast artillery of the regular Army, from the latest returns, is 746 officers and 17,201 enlisted men. The estimate of the chief of coast artillery shows that 1,312 officers and 30,309 enlisted men of the regular Army in addition to the 740 officers and 18,531 enlisted men of the organized militia required to man 50 per cent of the gun and mortar defenses in the United States are necessary to man the seacoast defenses now existing at home and in our foreign possessions. As the authorized strength of that corps of the regular Army is 748 officers and 19,019 enlisted men, it is at present 2 officers and 1,818 enlisted men below its authorized strength and 566 officers and 13,108 enlisted men below the necessities as estimated by the chief of coast artillery, in addition to the deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the organized militia. The total deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the regular Army and the organized militia are, therefore, 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men.

Matériel for the Coast Artillery Defenses

Matériel for the coast artillery defenses as at present established and under construction is fairly adequate in the matter of guns, mortars, and mine matériel. There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these defenses, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in over-sea fortifications. According to the report of the chief of coast artillery the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent for the mortars.

Organized Militia

According to the latest returns, the total reported strength of the organized militia is 8,323 officers and 119,087 enlisted men. Of this force, 855 officers and 5,026 enlisted men belong to the staff and noncombatant branches, 450 officers and 7,150 enlisted men belong to the coast artillery, and 7,018 officers and 106,911 enlisted men to the mobile forces (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry). Of this force there were present at the annual inspection 692 officers and 4,090 enlisted men of the staff corps, 439 officers and 5,989 enlisted men of the coast artillery, and 6,553 officers and 85,541 enlisted men of the mobile forces, a total absenteeism from inspection of 639 officers and 23,467 enlisted men. Reports as to the attendance at camps of instruction show that 568 officers and 3,744 enlisted men of the staff corps, 423 officers and 6,135 enlisted men of the coast artillery, and 5,904 officers and 77,353 enlisted men of the mobile forces attended these camps of instruction, showing a total absenteeism of 1,428 officers and 31,855 enlisted men from these camps.

Military Establishment

If it is deemed that the condition and strength of our military establishment (including the organized militia) as above set forth is satisfactory and adequate to our needs at home and in our foreign possessions under modern conditions and existing circumstances, there appears to be no necessity for special action beyond maintaining that establishment at its present strength and in about its present condition. To make even this force effective, however, by proper training and instruction, a number of additional officers and noncommissioned officers of the regular Army are urgently needed—first, in order that a full complement of these instructors may be kept with the units of the regular Army; second, that we may have available an adequate corps of trained instructors for the militia.

In case, however, the strength and condition of that establishment as set forth is deemed inadequate and unsatisfactory, it is pertinent to make suggestions as to what should be done to correct this condition and provide a military establishment adequate to our needs and responsibilities. These suggestions, in my opinion, should be based upon study of conditions as they

are in our country and in our foreign possessions, including home needs and the needs which might arise in our relations with other countries.

In looking over the strength of our garrisons in foreign possessions it becomes at once manifest that the garrisons we are maintaining there or propose to maintain there under the scheme of distribution of our Army as it exists at present are entirely inadequate to the needs of those possessions. That an effective defense against an enterprising enemy in the Philippines could be made with a deficiency of 33 per cent of the manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay and with a mobile force of a little over 7,000 American troops, supplemented by less than 6,000 Philippine scouts, is manifestly impossible; that the great waterway of the Panama Canal cannot be protected against the operations of a first-class military power by the present or proposed garrison we contemplate placing there without the power and ability to reenforce it rapidly by troops from the United States is equally manifest; that we can retain our valuable territory of Alaska in its isolated position against an enemy with any military power, by placing there a garrison of less than 500 men, verges on the ridiculous unless we have ample forces at home to occupy that territory in the very earliest stages of an impending conflict. As regards the Hawaiian Islands, all military persons will recognize that the proposed garrison in this possession is far below what it should be to meet a serious attack unless, in this case again, we have an adequate force on the Pacific coast ready to dispatch to the islands when trouble is impending. It must therefore be frankly admitted that the present garrisons of these outlying possessions are entirely inadequate for the purpose for which they have been sent there, and that without a material change in conditions at home we have no available resources from which to reenforce them, even should time be given to us to do so. As the Philippines are too distant from the United States to be reenforced when war is impending, it would seem necessary that the garrison of those islands should be at least a full manning detail for the coast artillery defenses and one complete division at full war strength plus the necessary administrative staff. As to our other outlying possessions, it may be said that the garrisons proposed for those possessions, with the exception of Alaska, may be considered adequate only under the contin-

gency that we have available in the United States sufficient thoroughly trained troops in excess of our home needs to warrant us in heavily reenforcing the peace garrisons.

As to the necessities within the continental limits of the United States, whilst our isolation by water from the other great powers is an undoubted protection, that protection is limited by two main factors:

First.—The power of our fleet to protect the country from invasion over those seas.

Second.—Our ability to assemble rapidly at the points of debarkation selected by an enemy an adequate force to delay, if not prevent, his effecting a lodgment on our shores.

Whether or not our Navy is adequate for the purpose indicated, i.e. to protect our country from over-seas, is a question beyond the scope of this report. That we cannot, with our present strength, rapidly assemble a sufficient force, fully equipped for field operations, to meet such an expedition as might be dispatched against our shores is evident. The very fact that an enemy traversing the seas would have a wide choice of landing points, or points of attack, at once evidences the difficulties attending the assembly of organizations of sufficient strength to meet him at the point he may select. It therefore appears to be necessary that the general distribution of forces to meet such a situation would be on a very wide front if prompt opposition to a landing is to be effected.

Fortunately there is no apparent need for garrisons of any great strength on our northern frontier. This, however, is not true as regards our southern frontier, where for the greater part of the last three years we have been compelled gradually to increase the number of troops until at the present time over two-thirds of the mobile forces of our Army in the United States are concentrated.

Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability and necessity for having at all times available at home and, in addition to the necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of our military establishment a mobile force of at least 500,000 thoroughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men, with adequate supplies for the operation of this force for a period of at least six months. This is a conclusion that seems to have been reached by all those who have given careful consideration to this question. It is also agreed that

we should have, as a second line, a thoroughly equipped and trained force of organized militia of not less than 300,000 men, properly proportioned as to its staff and several arms, with stores and supplies necessary for its operation in the field for a like period. The smaller units of the standing Army and the corresponding units of the organized militia must manifestly be organized into the higher units of brigades and divisions and be susceptible of assembly for drill and field exercises, for without such organization and power of assembly the troops themselves, not to speak of the higher commanders, would be without that experience which is essential to effective operation in war.

As stated elsewhere in this report, the strength of the coast artillery corps bears no relation to the strength of these mobile forces; that corps is charged with the manning and the operation of the seacoast defenses. The mobile army, on the other hand, must not only be prepared to meet the forces of the enemy after they have effected a lodgment on our coast, but must be prepared, at least in the initial stages of war, to guard all the fortified positions on our coasts from attack from the rear by landing parties from naval vessels and such transports as they may be able to convoy. While the strength of the coast artillery corps therefore depends upon the number of fortified positions it has to operate, the strength of the mobile forces will depend upon the number of fortified positions it must defend from attack from the rear or turning point, plus the necessities which may arise to meet and oppose the landing of an expeditionary force in a region beyond the range of our seacoast guns.

In any scheme to create such a force of mobile troops, as is above contemplated, we cannot do better than to follow the example of the master minds in military organization for national defense. The policies developed in this direction all include, amongst others, the primary plan of using the standing Army as a school for the training of men who, on graduation from that school, pass into the reserve and constitute the real national military strength. Experience has shown that from two to three years of active service in the standing Army is the lowest possible limit of time within which the average man can be converted into a disciplined, trained, and effective soldier. After passing through the school and gaining experience, the

men under this plan are separated from the active Army and go into the reserve for periods varying from five to a greater number of years, being held at all times, whilst allowed during peace to pursue with the utmost freedom such civil occupations as they may select, under obligation to respond to a call to the colors in case of national need. This system is economical in the highest degree, as the officers and men receive pay only during their active service, and, on being called to the colors, the period spent in the reserves involving no expense in the way of emoluments.

In arriving at a conclusion as to what the size of the regular mobile Army should be, in order that the country may eventually and within a reasonable time have a military establishment adequate to its needs, it is necessary to decide what the size of the regular, or standing, Army should be in order to provide the 500,000 men believed to be necessary with the colors and in the reserves. Assuming the adoption of a short term of enlistment—say, three years—for the passage of the men thoroughly trained in the school of the regular, or standing, Army into the reserve, and that men so trained should not be held in the first reserve for a longer period than five years, it would appear that the size of the regular, or standing, Army to be used as a school for the training of reservists should be about 205,000 enlisted men. If from such an army, organized on a basis of three years' training, we discharge yearly that increment below the grade of sergeant which had completed its three years' training, we would have, with due allowance for deaths, etc., in the first year of its complete operation an Army of 263,700 (205,000 plus 58,700 reserves); in the second year an Army of 322,400 (205,000 plus 117,400 reserves); in the third year an army of 381,100 (205,000 plus 176,100 reserves); in the fourth year an army of 439,800 (205,000 plus 234,800 reserves); in the fifth year an army of 498,500 (205,000 plus 293,500 reserves). After this the Army would be maintained at the last figure, and in addition we would be accumulating trained men in the second reserve at the rate of about 55,000 each year.

The rule as to the accumulation of reserves for the operation of the coast artillery corps does not seem to have the same force as when that principle is applied to the mobile army, inasmuch as it is necessary for the coast artillery at all times to man their defenses with practically the full complement, and

that corps, as it is not charged with any greater requirements as to strength in war than in peace, does not require expansion in war. However, the principle applies to a degree, at least, to this corps in order that its ranks may at all times be readily filled with experienced men when war is imminent.

Whether our country could adopt the principle of creating a reserve without compensation to the reservists whilst not actively serving with the colors is doubtful, but it would seem that a small remuneration might be given for the retention of their services.

No reason is seen why the same principle as to reserves should not be applied to the organized militia, and the men trained in its units be bound for service for a period corresponding to that of the reservists for the regular Army. It must, however, be admitted that unless there be a material change in the laws governing the organized militia which will bring about a greater reliance upon and an increased control by the general government, that branch of our military establishment cannot be regarded and depended upon as a reliable force. Such a modification in the law to meet this end might be brought about by placing the organized militia under pay by the general government and, under a binding obligation, to serve at its call. This, it is thought, would produce a state of affairs where the organized militia will be much more thoroughly trained than it possibly can be under existing laws, and to that extent can be more surely depended upon. In any regulations or modifications of law looking to the better organization of the militia as a national force, it naturally follows that the United States should have the power to create in the organized militia that parity of the several arms of the service and staff which is essential for effective operations in war. It should also have the power to detach from the regular Army such numbers of officers and noncommissioned officers as it may find necessary to place on duty with the organized militia to aid and assist the officers of that branch of the national defense in a thorough training of the units.

The question of supplies and equipment necessary to make such forces as we may organize effective is of primary importance. No matter what size force we may have, it will be ineffective without proper and adequate supplies and equipment. It would therefore appear that we should establish depots in

which should be deposited all those supplies necessary to the effective operation of our Army which cannot be readily and rapidly procured in the first stages of war.

No attempt will be made to enter into particulars as to the character of supplies that it will be necessary to accumulate and store for the use of such forces as are contemplated in the above scheme; that is, a regular mobile army, including its reserves of 500,000 men, and a force of 300,000 mobile organized militia troops, including its reserves. One illustration will be sufficient, and that will be taken from the munitions most necessary in war, as rifles and field artillery. The proper proportion of rifles in a force of this character, including the cavalry, which is armed with the rifle, would be 642,541. The minimum accumulated supply of rifle ammunition, based on 1,000 rounds per rifle, should be 646,000,000 rounds. The proper proportion of field and heavy guns of the mobile type, and exclusive of the gigantic engines of war of more recent introduction, drawn by tractors, no types of which have as yet been developed in this country, would be 2,834. The ammunition for this type of guns, based upon a supply of 5,000 rounds per light field gun, with a corresponding proportion for the heavier field guns, a conservative estimate, if we regard the examples of the great military nations, would be 11,790,850 rounds. It is sufficient to point out that at the present time we have on hand and being manufactured 698,374 United States rifles (model 1903) and 241,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these rifles, 852 field guns and 580,098 rounds of ammunition for these guns. The number of guns per thousand men used in the calculation as to the total number required in the above estimate as to force is five, that number being considerably below the average in European armies. It should also be remembered that large numbers of guns and large masses of ammunition are, in an active war, liable to capture and destruction, and that to start into field operations with the expectation that the proportions given will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious. As the factories and works in this country which can produce munitions of war of the above character are exceedingly limited, it is evident that a full supply of this type of matériel must be stored and ready for use before war is undertaken.

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 629. January 16, 1915

Naval Program of the General Board

The Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, publish a table of the building programs recommended by the General Board for the years 1904 to 1914, inclusive, the action of the Navy Department as far as published, and the action of Congress. This shows that where the General Board has asked for 38 battleships Congress has given them 18 and sold 2 of these. In place of 111 destroyers asked for they have given 2; 12 colliers in place of 15; 2 gunboats in place of 19; 3 scouts in place of 8; 1 destroyer tender in place of 5; 2 submarine tenders in place of 7; 1 transport in place of 7 asked for; 2 fuel ships in place of 4; 1 supply ship in place of 2. No appropriations have been made for the following ships asked for by the General Board: Two battle cruisers, 3 protected cruisers, 20 scout cruisers, 14 torpedo boats, 6 ammunition ships, 5 repair ships, 5 mine layers, 1 oil tank ship, 4 motor torpedo boats, 2 hospital ships, 1 destroyer tender and 2 oilers. In the matter of submarines Congress has been liberal, appropriating for 55 when only 31 were asked for. They have also given 2 armored cruisers when 1 was asked for. In all, Congress has supplied one-half of the vessels the General Board considered to be required for the equipment of our Navy.

Current Opinion. 59: 5-8. July, 1915

What We Must Do to Provide Adequate Military and Naval Defenses

Two bogeys, "militarism" and "peace-at-any-price," enter very largely into the discussion. As a matter of fact, the so-called militarists insist that they are the real peace men, and the alleged peace-at-any-price men vigorously repel that epithet. The Lake Mohonk Conference on international arbitration, for instance, is persistently misrepresented as a peace-at-any-price body, though every year it deprecates being called even a "peace conference," and generals and admirals are usually conspicuous among its guests. On the other hand, the organization of effective means to maintain peace is the first professed purpose of the Army and Navy. The European war has fur-

nished arguments that are used by both sides. Vast armaments, it is pointed out by the "peace advocates," have not insured safety. Neither, it is pointed out in reply, have treaties and Hague conventions availed to prevent war. The term "adequate defense" remains an elastic phrase, the meaning of which depends upon the surmise of the one using it as to the power against which we should arm ourselves. Admiral Dewey would have us ready eventually to meet any first-class power on equal terms. General Carter, stationed in Hawaii, thinks a continental army of 500,000 men should be available to repel invasion. General Leonard Wood is on record in favor of a standing Army of 200,000 to 250,000 men. These views are welcomed by the Montgomery Advertiser. It is time our naval and military officers should speak up, it thinks, for the politician has had the center of the stage long enough. But the Jacksonville Times-Union puts in a demurrer. Shall not the same policies that have made us peaceful and respected for a century, it asks, produce the same effects hereafter? "Let these paper warriors," it adds, "tell us what nation under heaven could afford to send an army or navy against the United States?"

Edison's "American" Plan for Defense

Another American inventor, Thomas A. Edison, thinks that we should not follow the European lines of preparation for war which have proved so disastrous. Instead of an increased standing Army of unproductive men, he advocates, in the New York Times, new military and naval academies for the training of 25,000 to 40,000 drill sergeants competent to instruct quickly a vast number of volunteer soldiers in time of emergency. Modern warfare, he says, is more a matter of machines than of men, and most of the machines are simple compared to those of industry. We should not take men from industry and over-train them, but have 2,000,000 rifles ready, armories equipped with machinery for rapid manufacture of new firearms, stores of ammunition and machinery to make high explosives, a supply of a thousand trenching engines ready, together with every other mechanical equipment for rapid defense. Less than 5 per cent of the country would need defense from invasion, and automobiles would transport men quickly to where they are needed. He would build many acroplanes and submarines, harbor defense mines and vessels to plant them, cruisers

and battleships—all to be tested, but for the most part put in cold storage, so to speak, until the day of need came. Training of many officers, as suggested, for Army and Navy, is the important matter to Mr. Edison's mind. Create a great surplus of trained men, he urges, then send them back to industry, with payment of a small annual retainer. Then let the government maintain a great research laboratory, jointly under military and naval and civilian control. Here could be developed the continually increasing possibilities of great guns, the minutiæ of new explosives, all the technique of military and naval progression, armament, sanitation, transportation, communication, without vast expense. When the time came, if it ever did, we could thus take advantage of the latest knowledge to manufacture quickly the most efficient instruments of warfare.

Fortnightly Review. 103: 782-94. May, 1915

America: the War and the Millennium. Archibald S. Hurd

In the course of their history, the American people were never so defenseless as today. There was no state in the world which had so much to gain from all the work which had been performed with the view to robbing war of some of its horrors and confining operations within certain definite channels. The United States consists of a vast territory with an area of approximately 3,000,000 square miles, populated by about 100,000,000 persons. The effective Army consists of less than 90,000 officers and men, of whom no inconsiderable portion are stationed in the canal zone and over-seas. The regular Army is supported by a militia which, in 1914, comprised about 120,000 enlisted officers and men. The latter force is controlled by the individual states, and maintained in part by grants from the federal government. It is admittedly inefficient, lacking in unity of command and in unity of training, and, being distributed on no strategic plan, is not even what we should regard as a citizen army. As a military power, the United States can hardly be said to have any existence; its forces on a war footing compare most closely with those of Montenegro. Yet the United States has watched in studied immobility the acts of German troops in Belgium, northern France and Russian Poland.

It may be said, and it is no doubt said, that the Americans

have nothing to fear from the great armed forces of the military powers, since they are defended by the sea. Whatever may have been the case in the past, the sea, in these days of steam propulsion, the submarine, the airship, and the aeroplane, is no defense. *The time is at hand when it will be realized that a sea-frontier is more difficult to defend than a land frontier.* With vast stretches of coast-line, washed by the Atlantic and the Pacific, the United States has done well to place its Navy on a pinnacle as the first line of defense. Can the Navy protect the United States? The difference between the great republic and the United Kingdom is that the Americans have practically no other line of defense; we do possess a regular army in the United Kingdom of about 125,000, supported by a quarter of a million territorials and 140,000 army reservists. Once the United States Navy has been defeated or even stalemated by the great ocean-going submarines which are now taking the water, the Americans will be able to offer no serious resistance to invasion.

The size and character of the American Army and militia are such that it is unnecessary to pause to examine the measures recently adopted by Congress. The United States Navy, however, is in a different category. The American fleet ranks with, but after, the German fleet. Including ships building, it embraces 41 battleships, 25 cruisers, about 60 destroyers, 24 torpedo boats, and a large number of submarines. In strength the American Navy far away surpasses that of Japan, contesting with Germany the position of second greatest naval power of the world.

Congress has devoted more attention to armaments and voted larger sums for their creation than in almost any preceding year of its history.

A picture of the work which has been done in the name of the American people and with their approval on behalf of the United States Navy was recently presented by Mr. Josephus Daniels on the occasion of the launch on March 16 last of the Pennsylvania, the largest and most costly ship of war in the world. Speaking at the luncheon which followed the ceremony, Mr. Daniels, after referring to the development of battleship design in the past, continued as follows:

> Turning to the Navy of today and the impetus given it by the recent legislation, it is fitting here to declare that the Sixty-third Congress made

the naval legislation the brightest of its pages and gave it rank with the greatest Congresses that have assembled in our country. This Congress had a larger vision of the value of the submarine, and translated that vision into effectiveness by authorizing the construction of three sea-going submarines of a size and endurance that will enable them to keep the sea and operate in concert with the fleet, and costing, completed, $5,166,000. In addition to the above, authorization was made for the construction of twenty-three smaller submarines at a total cost of $14,800,000, or twenty millions for modern submarines.

No nation has placed such substantial faith in the deadly power of this modern craft. Within a comparatively short time, when our mighty fleet lies in Hampton Roads, ready to traverse the ocean, it will be accompanied by submarines which can make twenty knots and send hurtling through the water torpedoes capable of sinking the leviathan ships any nation can construct.

The Sixty-third Congress had the wisdom to see that the backbone of any naval fighting machine is the great ship able to keep the ocean when it is storm-tossed. It authorized five mighty dreadnoughts, as against only two by the previous Congress. Each will cost in the neighborhood of $15,000,000 (about £3,000,000). *They will have no superiors afloat.*

It recognized the necessity for destroyers—those fleet cruisers upon which dependence can be placed—and authorized the construction of twelve.

It recognized also that iron ships are no better than "painted ships upon a painted ocean" unless equipped with what experts have found to be the best projectiles, powder, and guns, and it made adequate provision for ammunition and oil that these great ships can need to make them ready instantly for any emergency.

I wish time permitted and sound policy did not forbid the telling of the big things—Navy secrets—that are being done in construction, ordnance, and engineering by the distinguished naval officers at the head of the bureau. No country in the world has abler men; none are producing the implements of warfare superior to those now in making—the result of new methods and invention in our Navy.

There never was a time when the Navy was so powerful, so ready, so efficient as now. Nor has there been a year when the fleet has given so much time to target practice, maneuvers, war games, and practices as the present year. Skill, modern adaptation, new tactics are being carried out day and night. The motto of the Navy of today is "Training, training, and more training; practice, and more practice." Nothing else keeps ships and men fit. Today they are fit and ready.

It is the crowning honor of the second session of the Sixty-third Congress that it authorized the organization of the naval militia and gave it an appropriation sufficient to secure a valuable naval reserve. The third session of the Sixty-third Congress doubled the appropriation for the naval militia. Of naval legislation, the provision, wise and constructive, for an effective reserve is the greatest piece of constructive naval legislation of this generation. It has been hailed with delight by the men in the Navy and universally approved by the country.

Ours is a navy to incite our pride. It is no longer necessary to beg men to join the Navy. Since March, 1913, the enlistment has increased 5,670 men, and there is a waiting list of splendid young men anxious to

become blue-jackets. *This increase has enabled the Department to put thirty-three more ships into commission than in* 1913. What else has resulted from the policy of education, promotion, and larger opportunities? Re-enlistments have increased 12 per cent, retaining in the service experienced men, and thereby greatly adding to the efficiency of the Navy. Desertions have decreased 17 per cent. Modern methods of penology in the Navy have kept pace with modern methods of armament and equipment and construction.

Far from leading in the movement for the limitation of armaments, Congress in its last session has given the movement a fresh impetus. Three huge battleships, the largest ever constructed, having been laid down since the war in Europe opened, together with other units, authority has now been given for the building of two more battleships, probably even larger, six destroyers, two sea-going submarines, sixteen coast defense submarines, and one oilship.

A reform which indicates the serious attention which is being devoted to naval affairs on the other side of the Atlantic consists of the appointment of an officer as chief of naval operations. He will occupy a position corresponding more or less closely with that of the first sea lord of the British Admiralty. His advent is the most remarkable development in American defensive policy for many years past. This officer, acting under the Secretary of the Navy, "is to be held responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and in charge of its general direction." The House committee which reported in favor of the appointment of this officer made the following comment upon the new departure:

> At present there exists a General Board and Naval War College, neither of which seems to be equipped for adequately performing this duty, nor have they sufficient officers under their jurisdiction to do this fundamental work for preparation of the plans of war. The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the General Board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and material of the Navy are such that they have not had time and opportunity to fully prepare in detail and perfect this work. It is the opinion of the committee that the necessity for such an office exists in the naval establishment.
>
> It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy retains absolute control over the office, and the Chief of Operations performs only such duties as are assigned by the Secretary, and the orders are issued under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. The principal or civilian control of the Navy Department is in no way affected by the provision recommended.

New Republic. 3:89-90. May 29, 1915

Our Inconsistent Foreign Policy. Roland G. Usher

The sinking of the Lusitania brought to public attention with terrible directness the clash between our interests and those of Germany. Our existing disputes with England over our rights on the sea as a neutral nation reveal almost as insistently another clash of interests. In both cases the recognition of our rights compels us to demand from each nation renunciation of effective warfare against the other—in the one case, the destroying of commerce by submarines, in the other, restrictions upon neutral commerce.

The most significant fact in the present situation was the general failure of the American people to realize the imminence of the clash. We have other interests as vital and important upon which some sort of a clash is probable in the near future. The soberest and most conservative student will concede that because this great war disturbed existing relations, it will beyond a doubt alter existing interests; that when it is over, the readjustment to its results as well as the return to a peace footing will further alter the interests of nations and develop divergences where none before seemed credible. This has always been true during and after other great wars, and there is nothing to prove that this war will be an exception.

There is in this probable clash of interests nothing sufficiently dangerous to America's safety to cause great alarm, unless the American people are taken by surprise and led to believe it dangerous. A thorough study of the probable operation of forces by the relation of cause to effect, a knowledge of the normality of the forces which will be at work, and of the powerlessness of armament to obviate their operation, will allow preparation for all probable dangers and will prevent hasty action, which, if it avoided war, might cost us as much financial loss and physical suffering as an actual war.

Our present peril exists less in the aggression of other nations than in our own failure to have already decided the basic notions which of themselves determine expedient conduct. If the people are determined not to arm on any account, the authorities must be exceedingly careful not to raise diplomatic issues which will in the least degree provoke opposition abroad, and

must relegate to the waste-basket a number of policies of previous administrations—among others the Monroe Doctrine. If, on the other hand, we decide to maintain certain interests and policies which can be made effective only by extensive armament, the people must reach that decision in advance or the government will be unable to execute the popular will when the time comes. It seems unwise to provoke a dispute and then to decline to fight about it, or to determine to fight and to find ourselves without the means.

The most perplexing factor of the situation exists in the contradictory precedents which descend to us from past history. First and foremost, we are a non-military people and as a nation are definitely pacific in disposition. Yet our most popular policy, the Monroe Doctrine, tacitly assumes our readiness to fight European nations who propose to extend their territory or influence in the western hemisphere. This we cannot maintain if we do not mean to fight. It will be a peculiarly empty policy to enunciate if we declare that we do not propose to maintain it when it is challenged.

We cherish the tradition of non-interference in European politics, ye we hold at least three extra-continental possessions which are strategic spots of great interest to European nations—the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and Hawaii. The nineteenth century has extended the interests of European nations to the confines of the globe, and has made our isolation impossible. We cannot continue to act as if the great powers of Europe were not in existence so long as we hold places of as great importance to their interests as these. Our very possession is in itself a radical departure from the policy of isolation. The two are irreconcilable and we cannot follow them both, for the simple reason that we cannot walk both forward and backward at the same time.

Again, our protestations of brotherhood and amity for Latin-America and the various congresses and unions connected with Pan-Americanism radically conflict, to the thinking of South Americans at any rate, with our past conduct in the Mexican war, the formation of the Panama Republic, the Platt amendment in Cuba, and our financial relations to San Domingo and Nicaragua. Yet both of these lines of precedent are generously represented in the diplomatic utterances of the past. We may follow either consistently and honestly; we cannot long continue to promulgate both.

We have enunciated a policy of free trade and the "open door" with Asiatic nations and have concluded treaties with them, placing them upon a par with the great European powers. We have also enacted exclusion laws to limit their immigration; at least one state has denied them the privilege of owning land—a privilege which the Japanese regard as essential. These policies, too, are irreconcilable.

Here is an astonishing array of contradictory ideas, all of which have behind them precedent and tradition, any of which will further somewhat the interests of the United States or its citizens, and for all of which plausible theoretical and high moral motives can be alleged. The one thing really imperative is a definite decision between these alternatives, and the greatest danger seems to lie in the apparent determination of the American people to support a highly inconsistent selection from them. We are apparently determined to remain a non-military nation, but to reassert the Monroe Doctrine without qualification, to retain our present extra-continental possessions, to form a Pan-American Union with Latin-America, and to deny the Japanese and Chinese the privileges in this country they both desire. This is an impossible policy because its parts are inconsistent. We cannot in actual fact challenge the influence or possessions of European nations in Latin-America unless we are willing to use force in case they should decline to yield to our demands. We shall retain our extra-continental possessions, unless we are able to defend them in fact, only so long as other nations do not desire to seize them. We cannot effectively threaten others withour displeasure so long as the known condition of our armament makes impossible the execution of our threat. Something must be sacrificed, and the American people must decide what it is to be.

If the people vote decisively against armament, that will probably decide the whole situation, and the government will then be able to enunciate clearly non-interference in Europe or elsewhere, prosecute plans for a Pan-American Union, and nurse the policy of the "open door" in the Far East. This will be consistent and clear. If, on the other hand, the people decide that the Monroe Doctrine must be maintained and will agree upon a definition of what it means, if they are unwilling to surrender the Panama Canal or Hawaii to any other nation, the government will know that this means a readiness to fight and it will arm accordingly.

Armament and disarmament are means and not ends, and cannot be divorced from policies and interests. The American people must define as soon as possible the objective of American policy. The real truth seems to be that there is a variety of alternatives, none of which is wholly good or wholly bad, wholly against our interests or wholly in favor of them, entirely without precedent or sustained by a consistent reading of precedent. Unfortunately, there seems to be nothing from which it cannot be plausibly argued that we have something to gain, and nothing from which it cannot be reasonably alleged that we have something to lose. The most essential thing is that the American people should advisedly make up their minds as to which they prefer to lose. The greatest menace to our safety at present is their apparent disinclination or inability to reach a decision, for it prevents the government from preparing effectively for an emergency of any kind.

New Republic. 3: 188-90. June 26, 1915

"Preparedness" for What?

The crisis provoked by the European war is putting the mental and moral fiber of the American people to a severe test. They are engaged in discussing the momentous issue of peace and war and its relation to national policy, interests and ideals. As professing democrats they wish to decide this issue for themselves, and if they are to be worthy of their pretensions to democracy they are manifestly under an obligation to make their own decision. But there is no indication as yet of any effective consensus of opinion. At a time when all the other great nations are committed to a specific, if erroneous, national policy in relation to peace and war, the American people are hesitating and drifting. At a time when their own opinion of what is true and false is the most vital fact in relation to the crisis, they are bewildered and unable to make up their mind.

The best illustration of the confusion is the prevailing agitation for and against increased armament. Back of the propaganda in favor of increased armament there is a limited amount of justifiable apprehension, a real need for a better Army and Navy, some genuine patriotic aspiration, a new expression of the instinctive fighting spirit of the early Ameri-

cans, and too much incoherent panic and muddled thinking. Back of the uncompromising opposition to any increase of armament there is a profound conviction of the barbarous futility of war, a passionate revolt against its cost in ruin and blood and anguish, a clear vision of the beneficence of peaceful adjustment of human difference, an indisposition to face the realities of international politics, and an ultimate but usually furtive reliance on the doctrine of non-resistance. Both the friends and the foes of increased armament are partly victims of panic. The pacifists in their anxiety to avoid war forget that war is not avoided merely by keeping the peace, and that even the keeping of the peace may involve the use of force. The militarists in their fear of being caught unprepared seem willing at times to plunge the country into one war for the purpose of securing better preparation for another.

Both parties to the controversy are trying to identify war and peace with more or less armament. An agitation of this kind cannot result in any sufficient preparation for war or peace, but at best only in preparation against them. The militarists are not candid. They want a larger Army and Navy, according to their own account, chiefly as a measure of insurance in favor of peace; but military preparations which are intended merely to protect a nation against attack can never become a positive agency in favor of peace. It makes apprehension the measure of armaments, and armaments are none the less threatening to other people because they are made in the name of national defense. Germany is characterizing an attempt to police Europe with German soldiers as a necessary measure of self-protection. Great Britain explains her domination of the seas as an indispensable precaution against invasion and on behalf of the security of her food supply. The excuse can be used to justify practically any amount of military and naval preparation. But unfortunately in this respect the pacifist is no better off than the militarist agitators. If military preparedness is a wholly insufficient guarantee of peace, the lack of military preparedness in a country like the United States increases the cost without diminishing the danger of war. The American nation cherishes possessions, convictions and purposes which are liable to bring it into collision with foreign powers. If it were provoked or thwarted, no lack of armament would prevent it from plunging into war.

The important fact is not whether we are armed or unarmed, it is the spirit in which and the purposes for which the burden of armament is incurred. Both the militarist and pacifist agitators are subordinating ends to means, and are making the controversy about armament an occasion for working upon popular mental and moral frailties. The discussion is not being carried on in a spirit and according to methods which is helping popular opinion to acquire the needed firmness of purpose and clearness of vision. The Army and the Navy are not ready to do the work which may be eventually imposed upon them; but they are far better prepared than are the mind and will of the American nation. If the people are to count in the present crisis, if they are to exercise the control over their foreign policy which the democracies of Europe have not possessed, they must make up their minds what the true objects of such a foreign policy are and how such objects are best to be obtained.

Our peculiar unpreparedness results from the necessity of readjusting a traditional foreign policy to new conditions. The great majority of good Americans have regarded the foreign policy of the country as adequate and as irrevocable as the Constitution. The United States was divided from Europe both by 3,000 miles of water and by difference of political ideals. Its geographical isolation enabled the American nation to preserve its democracy undefiled by European autocracy and militarism. Our foreign policy was contrived for the purpose of maintaining this advantage. We were not to interfere with European affairs, and we were not to allow Europe to interfere with our affairs or those of our neighbors. So long as we succeeded in keeping European political influence negligible in the two Americas, it did not make much difference to us what happened in Europe. Our isolation was the safeguard of our democracy. Our democracy brought with it no responsibility in foreign politics except that of preserving our isolation. American nationality was associated with certain positive social purposes at home, but abroad it brought with it only negative associations and responsibilities.

If the American people are to be mentally and morally prepared for peace and war they must substitute a positive for a negative responsibility in foreign affairs. Their geographical isolation, like their rigorous constitutionalism, was an advantage

during youth, but it accustomed Americans to a provincial and indifferent attitude towards the problem of world politics. It prevented them from thinking internationally and from seeking to adjust their own national interests and ideals to those of other countries. The war has done away with the isolation; it has done away in part with the indifferentism; but it has not done away with the provinciality and the consequent inexperience. Instead of thinking and acting as a self-contained democracy whose virtue depended upon its isolation, the American people must think and act as a democracy whose future depends upon its ability to play its part and assume its responsibility in a society of democratic nations.

Mental and moral preparedness of this kind will not insure the United States against war, but it will make war less probable. The treaty of peace will bring into existence a new Europe which is almost certain to be an unstable compromise among conflicting ideas and forces. European instability will infect the rest of the world. The United States cannot occupy to the new Europe the same relation which it occupied towards the old. American public opinion will have to decide what a new Europe can fairly demand of a new America. We shall have to decide whether the United States is strong and disinterested enough to play a wholly independent part, or whether it will have to take sides and accept the resulting friendships and enmities. What the United States cannot do is to do nothing. In that case apprehension would conspire with events to increase the probability of war. But if we are able to distinguish what the real dangers are to American interests and ideals and what the most effective contribution is which the United States can make to an improved international system, and if we act on this knowledge, we shall be able either to avoid fighting or to accept a fight only for some object worth while. Few really desirable political objects can be achieved by war, but some there are that can be. A nation is prepared for war and peace when it realizes what its interests and responsibilities are, and resolutely seeks their adjustment with the interests and responsibilities of other nations. Thus preparedness consists more in knowing what we have to do and why we wish to do it, than in a feverish haste to make ready to do it in some particular way. If the end is clear and certain, there cannot be much doubt about the means.

New Republic. 3: 218-9. July 3, 1915

The Deeper Preparedness

Last week the New Republic insisted that we cannot talk with much point about preparedness until we have answered the question, prepared for what? Behind any decision about arming or disarming lies the question of how we intend to act as a nation among nations. Until we know, at least in a general way, what part we mean to play in the world's affairs, we shall never have even the vaguest notion of whether we are underarmed or overarmed. No fleet and no army is powerful enough for every conceivable emergency, and even the most inefficient navy and insignificant military force is not a guarantee that war can be avoided. So long as we discuss simply the question of armament and ignore the purpose of the armament, we shall be like a farmer who bought a plow before he had selected his farm, or a man who spent hours gazing at wedding-rings before he had met a woman who would marry him.

Both pacifists and militarists—to use inaccurate but convenient words—proclaim their interest in peace. It remains for the public to require both of them to explain the foreign policy they have in mind before they proceed to adopt means for carrying it out. What do they understand by the Monroe Doctrine? How large a responsibility does it imply? How far do they wish to go in upholding it? Will they fight any possible aggressor, will they accept only limited responsibility, say to the equator, will they invite other nations to share the cost of maintaining it? Surely questions like these have to be answered before it is reasonable to talk of preparedness. Where do the pacifists and militarists stand on the question of Asia? Are they for Oriental exclusion, for all that the open door implies, for holding the Philippines and Hawaii and Alaska against all comers? Where do they stand on the creation of a merchant marine to compete with England's and Germany's? Do they feel any direct interest in a better settlement of Europe? How far do they wish to go in maintaining the law of nations, in championing the rights of neutrals? These are the problems of war and peace, and preparedness is only a word which signifies that we know what we wish to do and have the means to do that thing.

The advocates of peace-at-any-price would probably reply that they believe in maintaining the traditional American policies by moral force and perhaps by economic pressure, but that when the ultimate test came they would choose not war but a splendid isolation. In our opinion that is an impossible course. American isolation splendid or otherwise is ended forever. We cannot afford to live complacently in a world where a quarrel between the Magyars and the southern Slavs throws our whole life into a sink of depression, and balks the political and social reforms upon which our hearts are set. We must act to help make the world secure because our own security depends upon it. We had no say in the diplomacy which made this war, yet we find ourselves the virtual allies of one side, our national life thrown into a profound reaction, our ships attacked, our hopes overturned, our own people strained in its allegiance. Surely isolation in such case is a myth. Are we then to sit by and see the diplomats of Europe lay the ground for another great war, without consulting us, without our giving advice, all because we are deluded about our isolation?

On that assumption, that we have to play an active rôle, three general courses lie open to us. We may be able to enter a league of peace, accept its protection, and bear our share of the burdens. Or we can come to a definite understanding with the more peaceful democracies of the world, especially with the British Empire and France; we can agree to stake our spheres of common defence and contribute a definite share of naval and military power in return for a proportionate control of the joint powers. Or we can adopt both policies at once—an agreement with the British Empire in regard to the sea, agreement with the chief South American republics in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and at the same time lend our support to some such world organization for dealing with disputes as the proposed league of peace.

Any one of these policies involves immense risk, but no more risk than does our present policy of drifting isolation accompanied by programs as dangerous as the Monroe Doctrine, Oriental exclusion, and commercial expansion. Our true preparedness will mean the clear-sighted adoption of a new foreign policy to meet the new facts of the world, and on the basis of that policy the creation of power to uphold it. That power will consist not only of armed forces but of economic and moral

weapons, such as the boycott, a discriminating neutrality, and forms of non-military pressure.

The New Republic is convinced that isolation is ended; it is inclined to advocate an understanding with the British Empire, the A. B. C. powers, as well as the general idea contained in a league of peace. But at this moment it would be folly to prescribe too definitely. If only these questions of foreign policy can be made part of the debate between militarists and pacifists, a great step will have been taken. The need just now is for discussion of the issues which are more important than armament because they determine it.

New York Times. June 18, 1915

League to Enforce Peace Is Launched

On June 17, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, under the direction of a group of more than one hundred of the foremost men in the United States, a definite move was made toward linking all the nations of the earth in a movement for universal peace. As the outgrowth of a series of meetings held in the Century Club, New York, terminating in a call for a conference, and embodying the principles of an international "court of nations" as first laid down by former President William Howard Taft, there was formed an organization to take its place in history as the League to Enforce Peace, American Branch.

Born at a time when half the world is engaged in war, disregarding the supposed safeguards set up by the Hague tribunal, the League to Enforce Peace proposes the abolition of warfare through the enforcement of peace by the armed forces of the nations which might become signatories to the proposed pact.

After a spirited debate the conference adopted unanimously the drastic provision that "the signatory powers shall jointly use their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories."

President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard University, chairman of the committee on resolutions, which brought the "peace by force" plan before the convention, brushed aside the arguments against such a proposition by setting forth the manner in

which forest fires are fought with backfire, and declaring "that the only way to meet force is with force."

His declaration provoked warm applause, and he was ably seconded by ex-President Taft, who declared he was heartily in favor of doing something more than thinking and praying for peace, "and, while we favor praying for peace, we favor also something to support that prayer."

Dr. George W. Kirchwey, professor of international law at Columbia University, took exception to the words "league to enforce peace" and wanted substituted the words "the league to establish and maintain peace." Dr. Lowell promptly urged "that we are here to enforce peace or we are here for nothing."

Several other delegates supported Professor Kirchwey, but the amendment was promptly defeated by a vote of 60 to 49.

The resolutions proposed by the committee were adopted by an almost unanimous vote, only Professor Kirchwey, Mr. Berger, and a few others being recorded in opposition.

The resolutions follow:

Throughout 5,000 years of recorded history, peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have cooperated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its borders. States have formed leagues or confederations or have otherwise cooperated to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept by all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good.

Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilization may be conserved, and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment and happiness may continue.

We, therefore, believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

1. All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiations, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

2. All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

3. The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

4. Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern the decision of the judicial tribunal mentioned in Article 1.

It is expected the executive committee will meet in the near future to adopt plans to carry out the objects of the league. One of the things that probably will be done, according to members of the executive committee, will be to start a propaganda in this country with a view to having the United States Senate adopt measures in line with the object of the league. Mr. Taft said that judging by its action in rejecting treaties in the past, the chief stumbling block to the aspirations of the league would be the Senate. Steps will also be taken to get European countries interested in the league.

Outlook. 110: 409-13. June 23, 1915

National Security and International Peace

The League to Limit Armaments

The efforts that are being made to educate the American people in the needs of the present hour are being met by no small number of men and women claiming a monopoly of the desire for peace who apparently believe that their opponents are actuated solely by a desire to increase the profits of "the armor trust" and to plunge the country into instant war. President Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia, still repeats, "When we are told in terms of most vivid eloquence that we must be prepared for war, I ask for what war, and for war with whom?" The American League to Limit Armaments, in their communication to President Wilson signed by the heads of some fifty-eight American colleges, presents the following "peace program for trying times":

1. Ask those who would say that the peace movement is a failure if the war movement is a success. Ask them if a greater failure than war could possibly be imagined. Tell them to try the peace movement before they denounce it as a failure.

2. Set aside preferences for this, that, or the other general peace policy and work now for a constructive program adapted to the needs of the moment, such as the immediate entertainment at Washington of a league of neutral nations which could more forcefully assert our and all other neutral rights than many army corps and battle-ships. A few more cannon and rifles would scarcely be heard in the present European uproar.

The united voice of the neutrals would be heard in every European capital and in every corner of the world, and would command instant attention and respect.

3. Finally, in any event, stand loyally by the President in his undoubted purpose to adjust the present difficulties without resort to war unless all conceivable peaceful methods fail absolutely.

The main issue for which the League to Limit Armaments contends is a world-wide effort for the restriction of all armaments after the present war, and since the Lusitania massacre it has advocated United States leadership in forming a league of neutral nations with non-intercourse as its weapon in dealing with Germany if diplomatic interchanges fail. To the first of the queries to which the League desires an answer, it may be said that a society in which men placed physical comfort above law and morality would be a greater failure than a world at war. A civilization which left Belgium undefended would be nearer barbarism than the civilization which has attempted to drive out the invaders of Belgian soil with cannon and sword.

The National Security League

In contrast to the activities of the League to Limit Armaments, the National Security League has been taking very active steps in the education of the United States as to its military needs. Under the auspices of this society, a graphic display of our military shortcomings was exhibited at the Hotel Astor, and a large mass-meeting held in Carnegie Hall, a meeting addressed by both Democrats and Republicans in favor of its program. This meeting was held as part of a two days' "Peace and Preparation Conference," and attended by delegates and speakers from all over the country. To indicate a step to secure adequate preparation, Dr. Abbott read and indorsed in substance a letter he had received advocating the formation of a council composed of the President, Secretary of State, Secretaries of War and Navy, chairmen of the Congressional committees on foreign relations, appropriations, naval affairs and military affairs, Chief of Staff of the Army, President of the Army War College, an admiral who has commanded a fleet, and the President of the Naval War College, a council which should be intrusted with all the details of preparedness and would make its recommendations to Congress with the weight of expert authority. Such a council would, of course, do away with a great deal of the present political interferences with the affairs of the Army and Navy. It would place the security of the country above the security of the

political fences of individual Congressmen. Ex-Secretary Stimson, in a remarkably effective address, took the position that our country's chief danger from war was due to the fact that it "had so acted in the past as to give good reason for believing that we really do not mean to protect our rights." He asked:

> Is there a man who doubts that President Wilson's note to Germany would receive more attention if it were known that our Navy was in readiness and that our "free people," in the language of Washington, were "disciplined and trained in arms"?

Democracy's Defense Against War

It is not sufficient that this country should merely defend its own citizens. It must, as it did in those first years of the nineteenth century, take its share in the burdens of maintaining law throughout the world. It is not knighterrancy that invites us; it is a plain duty that commands us.

If, then, we are to take our full part, we must have the means by which to take it. The disorderly and lawless are not quelled by words. And it is not sufficient for us to organize for national security. We must organize to help establish international security.

This is the significance of the conference in Philadelphia last week to which we have already referred. That conference looks toward peace, but it looks first toward some method of establishing justice, and in doing so it recognizes the need for defending justice with arms. The American people must not be content until this nation is fit to take part in the world's work.

To that end no one proposes a great standing Army, no one proposes any unnecessary burden or any peril of establishing here the methods and policies of militarism; but all Americans should unite in insisting that there should be established here a system of democratic defense. It should be a part of every citizen's duty to take his place in helping to defend, not merely his country's territory, but his country's obligations.

Sunset. 33: 1087-8, 1196-1202. December, 1914

Davids of the Deep. James B. Howell

Germany's success against invasion from the sea has demonstrated that the best defense a nation has, is first, an excellent submarine fleet; second, adequate mine fields off ports or harbors, and third, a good line of shore batteries.

England's success in keeping commerce open upholds the advocates of the battleship program.

A combination of the two will make our nation invulnerable.

Twenty submarines can be built for the cost of one battleship.

Ten submarines insure our possession of the Philippines.

Ten submarines insure our possession of Honolulu.

Five submarines at each end of the Panama Canal insure it against attack.

Sixty submarines protect all our ports on both coasts.

The yearly naval appropriation for the construction of vessels, if used for submarines instead of battleships, would render the United States immune to attack.

If this assertion is true, if a strong fleet of powerful submarines can protect the United States against hostile invasion under all conditions, the reported intention of the naval board to ask Congress for four battleships deserves serious and painstaking consideration. It may be assumed that the United States will never fight an offensive war. The country's purpose will be served by an armament which will protect her from invasion and keep the ocean trade lanes open. If submarines can defend the American coasts, they are the cheapest weapons to build. The $60,000,000 for dreadnoughts would supply a submarine fleet sufficient to keep every enemy at a respectful distance from the harbor.

Sunset. 34: 858-9. May, 1915

Coast Defenses Vindicated

Early in March the optimistic London reports predicted that Constantinople would be in the hands of the allies within two weeks. Fort after fort had been silenced, their guns dismantled and their garrisons put to flight by the armament of the attacking fleet—according to the cables—and in these successful operations not even the warships' paint was scratched.

In the light of these reports the day of the coast as well as of the inland fortification seemed to be over. But the coast defenses vindicated the faith of their builders during the bombardment of March 18, during which mines and shell fire put at least six of the attacking fleet's powerful units out of action. Early in April the Dardanelles were still holding out and

the attack upon them was confined to cautious long-distance firing.

It has been asserted over and over by magazine strategists that the coast defenses of the Pacific shore were positively useless since an enemy, giving the guns a wide berth, could land at a hundred undefended points and take the fortifications from the rear. This opportunity has been open to the allies on the Gallipoli peninsula since Turkey began hostilities. In absolute command of the Mediterranean, having nothing whatsoever to fear from hostile vessels, in easy striking distance from numerous bases, well supplied with transports and auxiliaries, it should have been easy for the allies to have effected a landing and to have cut the forts' lines of communication—if the magazine strategists' prediction of the Pacific coast's fate in case of invasion had had a basis of fact. The failure of the allies to follow the procedure outlined by the typewriter generals indicate that the Pacific coast, after all, need lose no sleep.

If three world powers in full command of the sea, with two bases within four hundred miles, with perfect equipment and ample transport facilities, hesitated to land an expedition on the shore of a foe without a navy, without submarines, how could any combination of powers hope to succeed in an invasion of the Pacific coast from a base 6,000 miles distant, against a coast line defended by the second largest fleet on the globe and by numerous submarines?

Even if the attack upon the Dardanelles ultimately proves successful, the tenacity of Constantinople's long defense proves that bomb-proof cellars are not needed in the big cities along the western shore.

AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION

America and the World War

Theodore Roosevelt

Another argument advanced against preparedness for war is that such preparedness incites war. This, again, is not in accordance with the facts. Unquestionably certain nations have at times prepared for war with a view to foreign conquest. But the rule has been that unpreparedness for war does not have any real effect in securing peace, although it is always apt to make war disastrous, and that preparedness for war generally goes hand in hand with an increased caution in going to war.

Striking examples of these truths are furnished by the history of the Spanish-American states. For nearly three quarters of a century after these states won their independence their history was little else than a succession of bloody revolutions and of wars among themselves as well as with outsiders, while during the same period there was little or nothing done in the way of effective military preparedness by one of them. During the last twenty or thirty years, however, certain of them, notably Argentina and Chile, have prospered and become stable. Their stability has been partly caused by, and partly accompanied by, a great increase in military preparedness.

Our Army should be doubled in size. An effective reserve should be created. Every year there should be field manoeuvres on a large scale, a hundred thousand being engaged for several weeks. The artillery should be given the most scientific training. The equipment should be made perfect at every point. Rigid economy should be demanded.

Every officer and man should be kept to the highest standard of physical and moral fitness. The unfit should be ruthlessly weeded out. There should be at least ten times the number of rifles and the quantity of ammunition in the country that there are now. In our high schools and colleges a system of military training like that which obtains in Switzerland and Australia should be

given. Furthermore, all our young men should be trained in actual field-service under war conditions, preferably on the Swiss, but if not on the Swiss then on the Argentinian or Chilean model.

The Swiss model would probably be better for our people. It would necessitate only four to six months' service shortly after graduation from high school or college, and thereafter only about eight days a year. No man could buy a substitute; no man would be excepted because of his wealth; all would serve in the ranks on precisely the same terms side by side.

The Swiss people have beyond all question benefited by their system of limited but universal preparation for military service. The same thing is true of Australia, Chile, and Argentina. In every one of these countries the short military training given has been found to increase in marked fashion the social and industrial efficiency, the ability to do good industrial work, of the man thus trained. It would be well for the United States from every standpoint immediately to provide such strictly limited universal military training.

Do Armaments Cause War?

Navy League of the United States

1. Disarmament Does Not Insure Peace

While the present age is one of great armaments, as it is one of great commercial growth, nevertheless wars have been rarer between the great Powers than in the era of less military preparedness. History shows clearly that disastrous wars have repeatedly occurred coincidently with conditions of disarmament.

2. Strong Armaments by Pacific Nations Prevent War

Unlike Belgium, the armed strength of Switzerland has always been a matter of common knowledge. Although essentially peace-loving and non-aggressive, Switzerland is one of the most military peoples in the world. She is military without militarism. Under a system of graded compulsory military service every male citizen becomes a trained soldier and marksman. In consequence she was able, upon the outbreak of the war, when her neutrality was threatened, to concentrate upon her frontiers such a powerful army as effectually to prevent the violation of her

territory and the visiting upon her inhabitants of the horrors of war.

England's powerful navy has prevented the invasion of her shores since the time of William the Conqueror (nearly a thousand years), and for one hundred years England has been practically free from naval warfare. Her powerful navy under present conditions is not called excessive even by America's pacificists Instead of being an evil, it has been a force for the upholding of world-peace, in addition to preventing the invasion of Great Britain. England's navy today stands in the way of any continental Power attaining world-supremacy through aggression. It is needless to say that such a world supremacy would threaten the Monroe Doctrine and the welfare of the United States.

In this connection one must not forget the truism that the Monroe Doctrine, for the upholding of which the United States would undoubtedly go to war, is just as strong as our navy and no stronger, and, in the last analysis, it is the American navy that has kept it intact, and will do so in the future.

Facts of Interest Concerning the Military Resources and Policy of the United States

United States. War Department

The nations and races capable of maintaining and protecting themselves are the only ones who can flourish in this world competition. We have been drawn from our state of isolation and are inevitably involved in this competition. We must consider what preparation we will make to meet this change in our national situation. It may be said that we claim the undisturbed enjoyment of our possessions at home and the protection of our interests abroad. Our military requirements may then be summed up as follows: (1) To secure our home country from invasion; (2) to protect our foreign interests; (3) to maintain domestic peace and good order. Our forces should be proportioned, organized, and trained to meet these requirements.

1. Estimate of the Land Forces Needed in the United States.

Our requirements in the way of land forces are certain to change as the years go on, but in the light of present-day condi-

tions it is estimated that at the outbreak of war with a first-class power we should be capable of mobilizing at once in the United States an effective force of 460,000 mobile troops and 42,000 coast artillery; that this is the minimum number of first-line troops necessary; and that to augment this force and replace its losses we should have plans made for raising immediately an additional force of 300,000 men.

To meet requirements less vital than a great national war—as, for example, the sending of expeditionary forces to protect certain foreign interests—it may be presumed that we would draw upon the forces thus enumerated; and as in the light of our recent experiences we can not possibly foretell to what places expeditions may have to be sent nor what numbers will be required, all of these forces should be available for service anywhere.

2. Regular and Volunteer Troops

The regular Army contingent of this total mobile force at home should be sufficient to provide an expeditionary force capable of acting with the utmost promptness and decision, and sufficient to furnish a training nucleus for the volunteer troops in peace and a stiffening element in war. To meet conditions we can now foresee it is believed the regular Army should comprise four complete divisions and that it should furnish as extradivisional troops a division of cavalry and the quota of heavy field artillery, engineers, signal, and sanitary troops appropriate for one field army. On this basis the regular contingent of mobile troops within the United States proper when raised to war strength would comprise about 112,000 men. The remaining 348,000 mobile troops would be made up of citizen soldiers organized in division and in field army auxiliaries.

The regular contingent of coast artillery troops in the United States should comprise 26,500 men when on war footing, leaving 21,000 to be furnished by the citizen soldiery. These figures are based on a complete regular personnel for mine companies and 50 per cent personnel of regulars for gun companies for authorized armament.

The Interest of America in Sea Power

A. T. Mahan

It has been said that, in our present state of unpreparedness, a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the United States, and especially to the Pacific coast. When the canal is finished, the Atlantic seaboard will be neither more nor less exposed than it now is; it will merely share with the country at large the increased danger of foreign complications with inadequate means to meet them. The danger of the Pacific coast will be greater by so much as the way between it and Europe is shortened through a passage which the stronger maritime Power can control. The danger will lie not merely in the greater facility for dispatching a hostile squadron from Europe, but also in the fact that a more powerful fleet than formerly can be maintained on that coast by a European Power, because it can be called home so much more promptly in case of need.

The Military Needs of the United States

Henry L. Stimson

In any discussion of the military needs of this country the first thing to be avoided is the formulation of any ill-matured suggestions by civilians who have no special knowledge on the subject. Constant change and lack of continuity have been characteristic faults from which our military policy has suffered since the beginning of our national history.

As a matter of fact, there is already in existence a carefully matured plan for our national defense which has been evolved and promulgated by the best military minds of the country. Some fourteen years ago, when he was Secretary of War, Elihu Root laid the foundations for the creation of such a policy in the establishment of the General Staff of the Army and the Army War College. After some ten years of study and preparation, during which the ideas and criticism of every officer of the army were sought, there was published, during the summer of 1912, a "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." This report is supposed to cover the relations between our land and naval forces, between the forces

at home and in foreign service, the relation between the regulars and the citizen soldiery, the peace and war administration of all classes of units, the problems of the mobile army and of the coast defense, methods of enlistment, service with the colors and in the reserve; in fact, all of the matters which should enter into this broad subject and of which many are now being discussed for the first time by the public at large. This report represents the best plan that the best trained military minds of this country have been able to give to us after careful study and preparation. The manifest duty of the hour is not to supersede or replace it with some undigested proposition put out by less competent men in the excitement of the hour, but rather to ascertain the various respects in which our actual condition at present falls short of the plan and policy thus promulgated and to concentrate all our efforts towards bringing up these deficiencies.

In rough figures, we are spending now about one hundred millions per annum on our Army and about one hundred and forty millions on our Navy. Practically all authorities agree that this amount of money, if wisely spent, would be amply sufficient for the maintenance of a most adequate system of military and naval defense. The real question before the country is not to spend more money upon our forces but to spend more wisely and economically that which we do spend. For example, under a wise military policy the republic of Switzerland, by a yearly expenditure of six and one-half millions, has been able to prepare and train an army of nearly 300,000 men, which it was able to call out this summer for the successful protection of her borders against the calamity which befell Belgium. We, under a less wise system, have been spending about one hundred million dollars a year on an Army whose total strength is only about 90,000 and of which Army only 30,000 are available today within the United States for the general purposes of a mobile army. There are many facts which differentiate our condition from that of Switzerland; there are many reasons why we cannot maintain an army as cheaply as she can, but there is no possible manner of doubt that under proper methods we can come much nearer to her example than we do. The practical question which lies before the American public today is simply this: Why should we not spend this large sum of two hundred and forty millions per year so as to produce the most efficient result possible rather than a result which is admittedly inefficient?

The Army and Navy are peculiar sufferers from our "pork barrel" system, which is the result of our lack of any national executive budget. So long as the men who are responsible for the efficiency of these two services as a whole—the Secretaries of War and of the Navy—have no hand in the preparation of a budget and no voice to defend such a budget on the floor of the Houses of Congress, while the men who wish to spend the Army and Navy appropriations upon unnecessary army posts or unfit navy-yards have such a voice as well as a vote, a great degree of waste and extravagance is sure to result. Our military system can never be made highly or permanently efficient until a budget system is adopted in this country similar to that which exists in substantially all other civilized countries. This general governmental need is the first need of our Army and Navy.

Roughly stated, our national defensive needs, as discussed in the above enumerated report of the General Staff, and as agreed to by all competent military and naval authorities, are comprised under the following heads:

First: An adequate and efficient Navy as the primary line of defense.

Second: An adequate system of coast defense to prevent the naval bombardment of our principal sea-ports and cities.

Third: A small but highly efficient regular Army to serve in time of peace as a protection against civil disorder; in time of war as a temporary protection against invasion; and in times of both peace and war to be a pattern and nucleus for the organization of the larger citizens' army upon which, in any serious conflict, our protection must ultimately depend.

Fourth: A citizens' army composed of men who do not make arms their vocation but who have been willing to spend a short portion of their lives in undergoing the training which modern methods of war make absolutely necessary as a condition of usefulness on the battlefield.

A very brief discussion of the deficiencies of each one of these four classes and the need of immediate steps to remedy it is all that can be brought within the scope of this report.

In our need of an adequate and efficient navy the United States comes second only to Great Britain. We have 21,000 miles of coast line and a rapidly increasing commerce to defend. The general purpose of a navy is purely defensive, although tactically it must always be able to act on the offensive for the

purpose of making effective defense of the country. Standing by itself, a navy is not designed for military aggression, such as the invasion of another country. Its function, on the contrary, is to defend our own country and our commerce against such aggression. Yet, in order to do this, it must be able to seek the enemy's fleet and attack it wherever the conditions for American success are most certain. To scatter the fleet or to tie it down to operations near our own coast is to destroy its real defensive ability. In the Napoleonic wars, England was saved from invasion by victories of her fleets which took place hundreds of miles away from her coasts; and a policy which would prevent our own fleet from adopting such a course of operation would be hazardous to our safety.

These considerations, in addition to the fact that we have distant foreign possessions, require that we should have a seagoing navy of adequate size and efficiency. The many vital questions which are still unsettled in naval tactics require that we should have a navy which is up to date in all of the various branches of the service.

As a matter of fact, naval authorities today agree that not only has our Navy been falling behind, in its general relative strength, to that of other nations, but it is strikingly deficient in certain vital particulars. It is extremely short in personnel; it is deficient in the number of our capital ships; it has no battle cruisers and practically no scout cruisers; it is extremely lacking in effective submarines and destroyers.

In view of the fact that the Navy is practically our only existing defense today, its needs should meet with the promptest and most earnest attention.

Coast Defense

Our system of coast defense is in the best relative condition of any of our land defenses. But its function is very limited. Its purpose is merely to protect our seacoast cities from a naval raid and damage such as recently befell Scarborough and Hartlepool. It offers no defense against an enemy who has control of the sea and can land an army at any unprotected point of our huge coast line.

Even in our coast defense there are great deficiencies. Our military policy contemplates that its personnel should be supplied half from the regular army and half from the militia.

Substantially 50 per cent of each of those two quotas is lacking and in the case of a sudden emergency, against which it is the purpose of the coast defense to be a protection, many of our forts would be hopelessly undermanned. The amount of ammunition is deficient. The plans of our military advisers contemplate only sufficient ammunition for an hour's firing. The actual supply at present is very considerably behind even that most modest standard and, in many cases of our most important seacoast guns, would be sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes' firing.

The Mobile Regular Army

The report of the general staff above referred to estimated the size of the mobile regular army which it deemed necessary for the defense of the continental United States at about 110,000 men, to be composed in part of men serving with the colors in times of peace and in part of reservists to be called to the colors in time of war.

The Secretary of War reported last November that, excluding the troops in our foreign possessions and in our coast defenses and on various non-combatants and detached duty, our mobile regular army consisted of 29,405 men and 1,495 officers, an aggregate of less than 31,000. This number must be still further depleted in order to complete the garrisons of Hawaii and Panama. When those are finished our mobile army within the United States will consist of less than 25,000, a force but little more than twice the size of the police force of New York City. Under the present imperfect reserve law it has a reserve of just sixteen men. The mere statement of these figures is sufficient to indicate the gravity of the situation. The Secretary of War asks:

First.—For the immediate increase of 25,000 men in the mobile army, to be obtained by raising the present organizations within the United States to their full strength.

Second.—He asks for the institution of a practical reserve system by which an additional number of reservists for the regular Army will be eventually obtainable. He also asks for an increase in the number of officers to take the place, in time of peace, of such officers as are serving with the militia or on detached duty with educational institutions and, in time of war, to assist in the organization of the citizens' army.

The Citizens' Army

It has been the historic policy of this country to depend upon a volunteer army of citizens, called out at the outbreak of war, to defend it in case of any serious conflict. The development of the art of war during the last half-century has been such as to make radical changes in this policy necessary if it is to be successful. Hitherto we have relied upon training and equipping our volunteers after the outbreak of war. In our previous wars we have escaped disaster under this method largely on account of conditions which will in all probability never occur again. In the civil war we were fighting against an enemy who was as unprepared as ourselves. Each side trained the other as the conflict proceeded. In the war of 1812 we were fighting a nation which was almost wholly absorbed in a great European war and which spent very little attention upon us. Yet in that war we called out, from first to last, 527,000 men to defend us against an enemy which never had a force of 16,000 men in the field at any one time and whose total forces throughout the war aggregated only about 54,000 altogether. We were defeated in most of our battles and we lost our capitol at Washington after a force of 5,400 untrained Americans had run away from less than 1,500 British on suffering a loss of only eight killed.

We can safely assume that any serious antagonist whom we shall have in the future will not be unprepared. Modern war is fought with weapons which require time to construct and training to use to an extent hitherto unknown. Our citizens today are wholly unaccustomed to the use of the military rifle, let alone the modern field piece. The training, equipment and discipline of the modern army is much more complicated than that of fifty years ago and requires very much greater time and expert knowledge. The conditions surrounding the raising and equipment of a force of citizen soldiery have therefore completely changed since the civil war. To attempt to organize such a force of volunteers in the way in which we did it then would be to invite disaster against practically any army of modern Europe.

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In order, therefore, to be able to depend upon citizen soldiery it is clear that much more time must be spent in preliminary training and in providing for their equipment in time of peace. Today there is no other force of citizen soldiery within the United States than our National Guard, comprising the organized militia of the country. On paper this force consists of 127,000 men, but certainly not more than half of it is even moderately well trained. It labors under the disadvantage of being a state force whose officers are commissioned by the state authorities and whose main support and training come from the states. Under legislation which has been proposed in Congress, but not yet enacted, this force could, at considerable further expense, be somewhat improved in efficiency, but not substantially so or enough to make it a very much more reliable dependence than it is at present.

Under these circumstances it is inevitable that new and broader foundations must be laid for the creation of a body of citizen soldiery in time of war; provision must be made for the training of a force of reserve officers to constitute the junior officers of such a force. Steps have already been taken by the War Department, in the institution of summer camps, where young school and college graduates can, in association with the regular Army, get a brief intensive training. We believe that this should be supplemented by a legislation permitting the graduates of such camps to obtain temporary commissions as junior officers in the regular Army, on condition of becoming thereafter reserve officers, subject to call in time of war.

Provisions should also be made for general training in rifle shooting among our young men both in schools and in colleges. To this end we call attention to the steps which have already been taken in Switzerland and Australia—two of the most

advanced and liberal governments in the world—where, from early boyhood, their young men are trained to use the rifle as a necessary part of their education. In these two countries, representing in their respective ways the most advanced types of modern democracy and going hand in hand with their freedom of thought and liberalism, we find the doctrine that every man owes to his country not only to die for her, if necessary, but also to spend a little of his life in learning how to die for her effectively. We believe that the institution of a somewhat similar system in this country is not only highly important with a view to its defense in the time of war, but we believe that the necessary self-control and discipline which is inherent to such training would be highly conducive to the moral, mental and physical betterment of our youth in time of peace.

Finally, we find that there is great shortage in the material in this country necessary to equip a citizens' army for war; particularly in the vital element of field artillery and field artillery ammunition. Such equipment cannot be extemporized nor can it always be purchased after war breaks out. It takes at least five months for the manufacture of a modern battery of field guns within the United States. At present we have in stock but little more than half the necessary number of field guns to equip a citizens' army of the minimum size believed by our military advisers to be necessary. And we have ammunition sufficient to serve those guns, at the rate ammunition is now used, rather less than one day and a half of fighting. We are very insufficient in aeroplanes, being outranked by at least thirteen other nations. Immediate steps should be taken to bring up these shortages.

Taken as a whole, we find that the condition of military unpreparedness of the United States is most serious and lamentable.

The Navy League and the Peace Movement

E. K. Roden

Conciliation through arbitration among nations, should it ever be achieved and brought to a successful solution, would be a blessing to humanity. Its adoption as a means of settling questions of great moment arising between powerful nations

would be a step toward the millennium. But in the present status, the usefulness of arbitration is limited to the extent of the armed pressure that can be brought to bear in enforcing its decisions. The same is true in regard to treaties. They are useful only so long as the parties interested are able to enforce their terms and stipulations. Not very long ago, Russia startled the world by giving notice to the powers that she intended to make a military demonstration against China because of the latter's refusal to comply with terms and conditions embodied in the Treaty of 1881. And this in spite of Russia's advocacy of peaceful means of settling international disputes; which bears out the point maintained that arbitration, like treaties, must be enforced to be effective.

So long as this condition exists, it is clear to the sober, unbiased mind that armies and navies are needed. They are required because, after having exhausted all methods of diplomacy, military pressure is the only effective means of enforcing decrees of arbitration tribunals and compliance with treaty obligations. Until ironclad treaties are devised that will make arbitration binding without military demonstrations, the question of disarmament is, of necessity, chimerical. We might as well accept this as a matter of cold, indisputable fact. It was so considered by the first Hague peace conference, which met in 1899, and at which representatives of twenty-six different powers were assembled; and the same opinion holds today. This conference was held in response to an invitation issued by Russia, "on behalf of disarmament and the permanent peace of the world," and the verdict rendered then was that, though greatly to be desired, limitation of military charges could not be accomplished through an international compact. The Second Peace Conference, assembled at The Hague in 1907, did not accomplish any more than its predecessor in regard to limitation of armament. In fact the conference was not even in a position to discuss the subject, because it was not on the program, having been stricken off for good and valid reasons, the chief of which was that limitation of armament is conceded to be a national, not an international affair. It must be studied as a distinct national issue in all countries interested before it is likely to be considered by an international assembly; and the chances for its being thus considered are not very promising, if we are to judge by the ever-increasing military budgets.

Failure to Limit Armaments

Mr. Roosevelt, in one of his annual messages, sounded the keynote of the League's attitude in no unmistakable terms, when he referred to the Navy and disarmament as follows:

> It was hoped the Hague conference might deal with the question of the limitation of armaments. But even before it had assembled, informal inquiries had developed that, as regards naval armaments—the only ones in which this country had any interest—it was hopeless to try to devise any plan for which there was the slightest possibility of securing the assent of the nations gathered at The Hague. No plan was even proposed which would have had the assent of more than one first-class power outside of the United States. The only plan that seemed at all feasible—that of limiting the size of battleships—met with no favor at all. It is evident, therefore, that it is folly for this nation to base any hope of securing peace on any international agreement as to the limitation of armaments. Such being the fact, it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding of our Navy.

Not only is the navy an instrument for the preservation of peace and the enforcement of treaties and the decisions of Arbitration Tribunals, but it is also an instrument to force an adversary to seek redress from, and submit its claim to a duly established Court of Arbitration before a resort to war. Thus it serves a double purpose, in the interest of peace and arbitration, which fact is not recognized or appreciated by the peace propagandists.

Our Faith

Navy League of the United States

We believe in a strong navy. Not for aggression, but to defend our lands and peoples; to defend our commerce and merchant marine; to defend American policies, to defend the principle of self-government in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy as an instrument to oppose militarism, with its attendant evils of conscription and autocratic government wholly alien to democracy in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy as an instrument to make obligatory international arbitration in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy as an instrument to make the decrees of the proposed international court of arbitral justice effective in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy as an instrument to make Hague conventions and treaties effective and international law a reality in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy because the United States has the largest responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and justice in the western hemisphere.

We believe in a strong navy because the use and control of the sea is generally the deciding factor in international war.

We believe in a strong navy because "the permanent peace of the world can be secured only through the gradual concentration of the preponderant military strength into the hands of the most pacific communities."

We believe in a national naval policy and endorse the recommendations of the General Naval Board, a body of authoritative experts, for four new battleships a year until an ultimate strength of forty-eight ships, with necessary auxiliaries, is secured.

Present Day Problems

William H. Taft

We need an army for three purposes: first, as essential to any satisfactory system of national defense; second, as an indispensable instrument in carrying out our established international policy; and, third, the suppression of insurrection and civil strife.

In his Farewell Address, Washington advised his countrymen to remember "that timely disbursements to prepare for danger, frequently prevented much greater disbursements to repel it," and also advised them to take "care always to keep themselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectable defensive posture."

Secondly, we have taken the position with respect to the republics established in this country in Central and South America and the West Indies, which is approved by both the great national parties and which has been repeatedly announced as the policy of the government by various Presidents and Secretaries of State. I allude to the Monroe Doctrine. There are differences of opinion as to what this doctrine includes, and as to how and with what limitations it ought to be stated. Speaking generally, however, it is an assertion on the part of the United States to the European and other powers of the world that no interference with the Central and South American and West Indian governments by

a European Power will be permitted which shall have for its object and result the acquisition by a European Power of the territory of such nations for colonization or territorial aggrandizement. This is not a doctrine sustained by any principle of international law; it is a governmental policy which this government believes to be essential for its own interests and well for the interests of the countries whose integrity it protects. Whatever the motive, whatever the purpose, the assertion involved must rest for its sanction, not upon the international law acquiesced in by all civilized nations, but rather upon the power to enforce it of the nation which asserts it. How could we maintain such a doctrine if it should ever be questioned in the strenuous race for trade and for colonization that is now rife among the European Powers? Could we do it otherwise than by an expeditionary force to the country invaded for the purpose of assisting the local forces in repelling the invader? It is true that our Navy, enlarged as it is, would discharge a most useful function in the defense of the invaded country, but it would make but little headway against hostile forces landed therein, and after that, the only method of asserting our international policy would be by the use of the Army of the United States.

Third. Of course there is no probability of a recurrence of a great Civil War, but should the forces of anarchy and socialism and revolt against organized government manifest themselves, a well-organized militia would be most necessary. The suppression of local disturbances is to the regular army a very unpleasant duty, and it is one to which the President would summon regular troops with great reluctance. An increase in the efficiency of the militia which we may anticipate may well relieve the regular army of any such duty. The moral effect of a regular army, however, to discourage lawlessness is valuable.

Story of Our Navy

William O. Stevens

Finally, the Navy teaches men a very important lesson, something that they learn in no other school in the country—namely, to obey orders and to do a piece of work thoroughly. In short, the thousands of young men who yearly leave at the end of their enlistment and go back to civil life have been equipped to earn a living and are in all other respects much more valuable citizens

than when they entered the recruiting office. The American Navy is a great democratic university, with an enrolment of about fifty thousand men for a course of at least four years.

We Are Unprepared

National Security League

No Naval Policy

Annual report of the Navy Department, 1913. Page 31. President of General Board to Secretary of the Navy, subject—Naval Policy. "There is no naval policy except the policy as outlined by the General Board itself in 1903. This policy, as a policy, has remained a General Board policy only, without adoption by the Government or even by the Navy Department, and without being understood by the people or Congress."

Page 32. "The absence of any definite naval policy on our part except in the General Board and the failure of the people, the Congress and the Executive Government to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war. This inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation."

Lack of Ships

Annual report, Secretary of the Navy, 1914: From the report of the General Board. Page 55. "We are deficient 10 battleships, built, building and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program."

Page 58. Scout Cruisers. In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy—battleships, destroyers and submarines—the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no scouts have been provided for since 1904.

Page 59. Aircraft. The Board of Aeronautics in 1913 recommended the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, one fleet dirigible and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of aircraft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work.

"In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with

any foc possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind."

Gunboats. "The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under gunboats, only a very limited number of these 30 are in condition to be available for service. Some. . . . are old boats of little value, taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons or less. Of the others . . . no gunboats have been authorized since 1902."

Lack of Men

Page 62. "No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition to trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies and furnish a reserve for casualties."

To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war, including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary, with trained crews is impossible because of the absence of trained reserves.

Page 66. The bureau is of the opinion that there exists at the present time a shortage of 203 line officers, required to place in full commission all vessels of the Navy serviceable for war purposes.

Page 67. There is "an actual shortage of men to man all vessels serviceable for war purposes of 4,560 men."

Army Conditions

From the report of the Chief of Staff, 1914. Page 3. "According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, exclusive of the Philippine Scouts, is 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 men below its authorized strength."

Page 4. The mobile army is distributed as follows: In the United States proper, 30,481 men; in our foreign possessions, 20,863 men. "Of the enlisted men of the mobile army in the United States, 18,954 are in the field in Texas and on the Mexi-

can border, 1,665 are in the field in Colorado, 245 are temporarily in Montana, 300 are in Arkansas, and only 9,317 are at their home or permanent stations."

Page 5. The "aggregate enlisted strength of the coast artillery corps required to man the coast defenses in the United States is reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery to be 24,075. The actual number available is 14,633. The aggregate enlisted strength required to man the coast defenses in foreign possessions now and soon to be completed is 6,234. The actual number now in those possessions is 2,568. There is a deficiency of 9,442 enlisted men for the home coast defense and 3,666 for those in our foreign possessions."

National Guard

Page 7. Organized Militia. "According to the latest returns the total strength of the organized militia is 8,223 officers and 119,087 enlisted men." "Only 81 per cent of the total . . . attended the annual inspection; only 73.9 per cent attended the camps of instruction"; only 52.6 per cent "had any practice with the rifle during the target season of 1913 and the number who qualified as second-class men or better was 33.43 per cent."

Page 8. In the Philippines there is a deficiency of 33 per cent in the "manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay"; and there are only 7,000 mobile American troops. The proposed equipment of the Panama defenses and of the canal zone in the matter of coast defense and mobile troops is utterly insufficient; so is also a garrison of 500 men in Alaska. It is evident that our troops, with our present strength, cannot rapidly assemble a sufficient forcefully equipped for field operations to meet an expedition such as might be dispatched against our shores.

Our Army Reserve—16 Men

From the report of the Secretary of War, 1914. All of the Army organizations in the United States "are on what is known as a peace footing," ranging from one-half to two-thirds of the war footing.

Page 8. "We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in times of war—consisting of 16 men." On June 30, 1914, the country had a mobile

army in the continental United States, "1,495 officers and 25,405 men. If all the National Guard could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond (a doubtful result) . . . we could summon a force in this country, regular and National Guard, amounting to 8,818 officers and 148,492 men. This is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers and to equip, organize, train and make them ready would take at the smallest possible estimate six months." This means that in modern warfare "a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest. "We have on hand, in reserve, sufficient small arms, small arms ammunition and equipment, roughly speaking, for the 500,000 men who would have to be called into the field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery and artillery ammunition . . . It is imperative that the manufacture of artillery and ammunition, therefore, should progress as rapidly as possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained."

Page 9. The aviation corps has but started; motor transportation for the Army is in its infancy.

Page 11. Herewith the United States could commence "the preparation of a reserve." "The present legislation" providing for a reserve "is utterly useless for its purpose, it having produced in 24 months only 16 men" and there is little or no hope that it will ever properly accomplish its purpose.

Artillery

Extracts, abstracts and comments on the report of the Chief of Ordnance to the Secretary of War, 1914. Page 21. In addition to the shortage of horse equipment for field artillery troops there is a complete deficiency of horse equipment for other branches of the volunteer service.

Page 49. Manufacture of artillery ammunition. "The principal output of artillery ammunition for the year was 34,929 3-inch fixed common shrapnel and 9,600 3-inch Navy common shrapnel; 10,005 unfixed common shrapnel for 4.7 inch howitzer; 2,982 unfixed common steel shell for 4.7 howitzer," etc. The Russians at the battle of Mukden alone are stated to have fired 250,000 rounds of 3-inch ammunition.

Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, 1914. Page 16. In

continental United States "many of the existing batteries are of a type designed approximately twenty years ago and require extensive modernizing."

Our Insufficient Navy

Statement of Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy, before the Committee on Navy Affairs of the House of Representatives, December, 1914:

Mr. Roberts: How many of the mine-laying ships should we have?

Admiral Fiske: We have the San Francisco.

Mr. Roberts: How many should we have?

Admiral Fiske: Germany has five, I believe.

Mr. Roberts: Do you think we should have five?

Admiral Fiske: I think so.

Mr. Roberts: Should we have more than that?

Admiral Fiske: Yes, I should think so. Our coast is very much longer than Germany's coast. I should think we should have more than that.

Mr. Roberts: Have we taken any measures to develop that kind of service in our fleet?

Admiral Fiske: Practically speaking, no. That does not mean we have done nothing; but that we have done nothing to amount to very much. I believe Germany spent $500,000 in 1913 on mines. They are supposed to have about 20,000 mines. How close those figures are to the actual facts, I do not know. That is what I hear. I have a good many sources of information and I am under the impression that they have 20,000 mines.

Fleet Auxiliaries

Mr. Hobson: Admiral, are there any other auxiliaries of the fleet and auxiliary defenses you would like to call the attention of the committee to?

My idea in questioning was to bring out about our mines and the use of them, particularly our inadequate provision for them.

Admiral Fiske: I think, of course, it is very well known we are behind other nations, for instance the two great naval stations in Europe, in the matter of mines and aircraft. I think in case of an attack on our coasts by one of those powers that our inadequacy would be very keenly felt.

Mr. Hobson: Are we in a position to do any serious scouting with an enemy's first-class fleet leaving Europe, approaching our shores or our position; are we in any position to send a ship that could stay with them or follow them and give us any serious information?

Admiral Fiske: Very imperfectly. We could do it with some, of course.

Behind Other Navies

Mr. Hobson: Have we any ship in the merchant marine that would be faster than their battle cruisers that could do such a thing imperfectly while running away from battle?

Admiral Fiske: You mean the United States merchant marine?

Mr. Hobson: Yes.

Admiral Fiske: I do not thing so. Of course, the merchant marine is not under the Navy, and the Navy has had very little touch with it, unfortunately.

Mr. Hobson: I want to keep to the question of grand strategy. Suppose your enemy gained control of the sea, then we would be liable to attack from one end to the other of our coast line, and also subject to attack in our possessions; and our policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine, would stand or fall with the control of the sea?

Admiral Fiske: Yes, altogether.

Mr. Hobson: On the other hand, if we ourselves, in such a fleet engagement, such a master engagement, gained control of the sea, the whole protection of our coasts and the maintenance of our policy would be possible as a matter of course?

Admiral Fiske: Absolutely.

Mr. Tribble: Are we not now in a better position to control the sea than we have ever been?

My question has no regard to the trouble among foreign nations now. It is just a straight question if we are not in a better position to control the seas today; if our Navy is not better than it has been; whether, with the advantage of having the Panama Canal, we are not in a better position to control the seas, as far as our seas are concerned, than we have ever been?

Admiral Fiske: No.

Mr. Tribble: Why are we not?

Admiral Fiske: Because three other navies have gone ahead much more rapidly than ours.

Ready to Fight? When?

Mr. Roberts: Admiral, we have had quite a number of opinions expressed to the committee as to how long it would take us to get ready with our Navy to fight. I would like you to give us your views as to how long it would take?

Admiral Fiske: I suppose you mean in order to fight effectively?

Mr. Roberts: That is it—successfully and effectively to meet the enemy?

Admiral Fiske: And against, of course, an effective navy?

Mr. Roberts: An effective enemy.

Admiral Fiske: I would say about five years.

Mr. Roberts: Five years?

Admiral Fiske: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: I am surprised.

The Chairman: Do you mean to fight with the ones we have or the ones you think we ought to have?

Admiral Fiske: In all the talk that I am indulging in here today, I am not thinking so much of the material of the ships, my line of work being in other directions, as of the operations. My thoughts are more on the operating end of it than simply the number of ships, the number of submarines, or the number of torpedoes; and what I have in mind all the time is what I would do if we were to have war tomorrow or next month. When I think of the number of things that we would have to do in order to get the Navy into really effective shape—by which I mean having plans, plans of preparation and plans of conduct of the war, and properly drilled mine layers and mine sweepers, and the aeronautical branch——

Mr. Roberts (interposing: Right on that point, some nations already have aeronautical equipment and mine layers and mine sweepers, have they not?

Admiral Fiske: Oh, yes.

Mr. Roberts: And we have nothing in those lines?

Admiral Fiske: Practically.

Mr. Roberts: Virtually nothing in the way of aircraft and nothing in the way of mine sweepers?

Admiral Fiske: We have two tugs fitted.

Mr. Roberts: Two tugs fitted to sweep mines?

Admiral Fiske: Yes; we have two tugs.

I was going on to say that when I think of all that has to be done in preparing general plans and detail plans of war, in getting the personnel enlisted and trained for mines and mining and aeronautical and patrol work, and the personnel enlisted and trained, ready to fight our battleships that are now in reserve, and in ordinary, and figure it all out, I conclude that it will take at least five years. At first I thought it could be accomplished in one year, but I could not get anybody to agree with me on one year; though some people thought five years too much. It is at present largely a matter of guesswork; but I doubt if in five years we could get the Navy up to a state of efficiency, for instance, such as that of one of the navies of Europe now. I doubt it very much. Whether we ever could accomplish it or not is, in fact, a debatable question. I have heard officers say it is impossible. There is a great nation of which the head is a military man, trained from youth, and his father and grandfather were military men, and his mother was the daughter of a military man, and where all the people all through the country are people of that kind—where the emperor goes out to fleet maneuvers and carries on the operations by means of his staff; where the plans are laid in the staff office years before, and changed from year to year; where the staff go out with the fleet to see how their plans are carried out and in order that they may be always kept up to date; where the whole admiralty is organized as effectively as a ship itself is. Can we equal that nation in organizing and developing and operating a navy? Many officers say we never could. While I would not go to that extreme, I will say that it would be very hard, very hard indeed.

Why a Powerful Navy is Needed

Navy League of the United States

Among the strong arguments in favor of a strong navy are the following:

1. The weak, or no-navy, policy in the past has resulted in greatly prolonging all of our wars, thus causing the maximum expense, the maximum loss of life, and the maximum destruction of property. A strong navy from the beginning of our existence as a nation would have entirely prevented some wars, and short-

ened all others, with a saving of life and money that is incalculable.

2. The navy is the only form of insurance against war. The cost of the navy has been 30 per cent less than the cost of pensions since the Revolution.

3. The navy is a splendid national public school; the modern battleship is a perfect manual-training establishment. Enlisted men in the navy are trained to be patriotic and to respect the law; they are developed physically and are employed in a dozen useful trades which improve them as men and prepare them all the better for civil pursuits.

The War of the Revolution lasted seven years, the commercial war with France two years, the war with the Barbary States four years, the War of 1812 three years, the Florida war seven years, the Mexican War two years, the Civil War four years, and the War with Spain and in the Philippines two years. For every five years of peace this country has had more than one year of war.

The historian declares that Paul Jones and the naval commanders and privateers of the War of the Revolution caused such an increase in the rates of insurance on English commerce that the English were compelled to acknowledge our independence. The French fleet assisted. It was sea-power that won our freedom. A strong navy would have won it in two years, instead of seven.

General Upton in his work, "The Military Policy of the U. S.," declares that "the victories of the navy alone saved the country from dishonor in the War of 1812," and he states that had "one-fourth of the cost of the war been applied to the maintenance of a small but efficient army and navy from 1808 to 1811, the war would have been brought to a close in one short campaign."

The no-navy or weak-navy policy has been disastrous from the beginning of our national life. Immediately after the Revolution, Congress abolished the navy, despite the solemn advice of Washington, who was a strong believer in preparedness for war as an economical policy. For eight years we had no navy.

In 1797 the French, in our defenseless condition, preyed upon our commerce, and we were forced to build six frigates. The Constellation whipped the French frigate Insurgente, and our

navy brought peace once more. But no sooner was this result accomplished than it was again proposed to abolish the navy. Congress "determined to endear itself to the hearts of the people by cutting down the appropriations for the navy." A few ships were retained and the others sold.

After paying $1,000,000 in tribute to the pirates of Algiers, the navy was again called upon to put down piracy.

At the beginning of the War of 1812 our navy was so small that the Government at first decided to abolish it entirely, or to keep the ships in port as harbor defense batteries. But Captains Bainbridge and Stewart induced the President to let the navy fight—with the result stated by General Upton—"the navy by its victories saved the nation from dishonor." Our Capitol was burned by the British. The only men who stood and fought at Bladensburg were the sailors under Commodore Bower. Everybody else ran away at the first volley.

When the Civil War broke out, our navy was so weak that Mr. Lincoln could not relieve Fort Sumter. The Confederates seized the Mississippi and every port in the coast. They captured Norfolk Navy Yard, with 1,500 guns, which they mounted throughout the South. The tons of powder which fell into their hands was vital to them; and they raised the Merrimac, and but for the chance arrival of the Monitor they would have smashed our blockade and the Union might have been lost. Naval weakness in 1861 caused a four years' war—the most destructive in modern times. A strong navy in 1861 would have seized the whole coast, the Mississippi, the James, the Norfolk Navy Yard, and absolutely prevented the exportation of cotton and the importation of arms and munitions of war from abroad. The South, without arms, powder or money, could not have maintained itself for more than six months. There were no manufactures, powder mills or facilities in the South for providing the means of making war. Once more the no-navy policy was fatal—hundreds of thousands of lives, billions of dollars and property beyond computation were uselessly wasted.

During the past three years the failure of Congress to build fighting ships has caused the United States to drop from second to fourth place in naval strength, and if this policy continues we will soon drop to fifth place.

Not less than four battleships should be added to our navy every year if we are to be ready for war—*i. e.,* if we are to have peace.

The argument for a strong navy does not depend upon sentimentalism or any rattle-brain and awful prediction. The need of a strong navy is based upon our experience of 140 years since we became a nation—which proves beyond question that the weak-navy policy has been disastrous in the extreme and that we have paid so dearly for war that an insurance against it—the only possible insurance against it—a strong navy—is imperatively necessary.

A navy cannot be built in a short time, it cannot be improvised or bought, it must be ready, not *some* of the time, but *all* of the time, *every minute of the time.*

Annals of the American Academy. 60: 138-42. July 1915

Situation of the United States at the Close of the War as a Question of National Defense. Edward S. Mead

A vigorous, sustained, consistent foreign policy, carried on without reference to party politics, or the fortunes of statesmen, but with exclusive reference to perceived national advantage is necessary for the future development of the United States. It is necessary to keep the trade we now have, to get more trade, to safeguard our large investments in certain foreign countries, and to make new investments. All this means a vigorous foreign policy.

A vigorous foreign policy will naturally bring us into conflict with the interests of foreign nations. Even more urgent will be their pressing into the foreign trade. Already their trade interests in Asia and Latin America are enormous and these interests will continue to grow. It is altogether likely that our interests in these undeveloped regions will clash with theirs. And when the clash comes, if we are found unprepared; if any of our European or Asiatic friends of whom we never speak publicly, save in terms of lofty and affectionate compliment, think that they can wrest from us with impunity any of our possessions, we may be certain, if the gain is greater than the hazard, that they will make the attempt. The only thing that will restrain

them is the size of the hazard, represented by the Army and Navy of the United States.

And so we come to the conclusion that the financial destiny of the United States, so far as it relates to the foreign trade, is bound up with the question of national defense.

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 459. December 12, 1914

We trust that no one with influence enough to affect materially the action of Congress at the coming session will oppose the expansion of the Army and Navy of the United States on the ground that any such military increase by impeaching the sincerity of the United States in matters of peace would tend to make less effective whatever efforts might be put forth to induce the warring nations to conclude treaties of peace. The nations at war in Europe have definite objects in view, and they will fight for them until they see that further fighting is useless. Then and not till then will they be willing to consider terms of peace. It is the needs of the nations at war that determine the right psychological hour for the proffer of mediation, not the condition of the nation making the offer. The proffer of the United States to Japan and Russia ten years ago would have been accepted whether we had one million soldiers or only a dozen. It was what the two warring nations could gain by accepting the offer that was the deciding factor, and this will always be the factor determining when an offer of mediation will be acceptable. The belief that a larger Army and Navy would manifest a lack of peace sincerity on the part of the United States is one of the silly tenets of the anti-militarists and should have no place in the creed of the practical common-sense, virile citizen. Nowhere is there the suspicion of a thought in England that her vast fleet has been the cause of the present war. It will be unfortunate for the American people if any public man with large influence in congressional affairs shall now take the position that an enlargement of our land and sea forces will throw suspicion upon our sincerity in desiring peace. Instead of our sincerity being clouded in any way by a proper augmentation of our military establishment it should be made of still greater effect by our display of forceful statesmanship at a critical point in the history of the nations.

Army and Naval Journal. 52: 487. December 19, 1914

A Citizen Army

It would be interesting to know how the United States can secure "a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms," which President Wilson declares in his message we must depend upon in case of war. Would our citizens at large assume in sufficient number in time of peace the duties of a trained soldier? It is very hard work now to secure recruits for National Guard organizations even with the inducements of club life which many armories offer. While a few generous employers encourage enlistment, these constitute but a small part of the great whole. The majority offer no encouragement, and some of them cannot afford to do so. To assume that this condition of things is going to alter, and that the National Guard can be increased from its present paper strength of some 115,000 enlisted men to 500,000 or more in time of peace, is an idle dream. It can never be accomplished unless Congress appropriates millions of dollars for attractive pay. How difficult it would be for the average citizen to become a trained marksman, is best illustrated by the small percentage of skilled shots in the National Guard, which has a systematic course of practice laid down, but which many men side-track for lack of time.

Numerous officers and men of the National Guard make serious sacrifices in performing their military duties, and the wonder is that they are as efficient as they are, especially as often happens under discouragement. Men of trades who belong to the National Guard lose their pay when absent a day or week for military work. How many of the great firms throughout the United States will encourage their workmen to join the National Guard and agree not to dock their pay when absent for camp and rifle practice? The scheme of President Wilson's to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuvers, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps is beautiful in theory, but utterly impracticable in fact. The demands on the time of citizens now in the National Guard in order to become efficient soldiers, is now a most serious problem, and it is getting beyond the limit of many.

As to how little states sometimes value the military training of its National Guard, we have the fact that the great state of New York failed last year to provide any money for camps or field service, has cut down needed appropriations and the National Guard has been two years without field instruction. Twenty years ago the troops received more regular training, but of late years it has been getting very irregular, and appears to be thought of less consequence. This want of appreciation on the part of governors and legislators as to the needs of the National Guard is very discouraging to its members, besides being a criminal neglect. Even at the height of the Mexican crisis, when it looked as if the Guard would be needed for active service, it did not stir the New York Legislature to action. Are matters going to get any better in the future? If this great state neglects its National Guard, what may other states do?

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 502-3. December 19, 1914

House Naval Committee Hearings

The necessity for a large naval reserve and a definite and scientific estimate of the United States Navy were included in statements made by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, before the Naval Committee of the House on December 16. Describing the Kretschmer formula the witness said:

A certain ship is taken account of in tonnage, armor, gun power, steaming capacity and other elements, and she is rated as having 100 per cent. of efficiency. Every other ship in the Navy is given a percentage based on that standard. The General Board has been working out the efficiency and strength of our Navy by the Kretschmer formula, modified in some particulars. We took the Delaware as the standard.

In rating ships different values are given. In the battleship type offensive efficiency counts sixty points, defensive twenty-five, tactical efficiency ten, and strategical five points. In the battle cruiser type the offensive efficiency counts fifty, defensive twenty, tactical twenty, and strategical ten. In armored cruisers, offensive efficiency counts forty-five points, defensive twenty-five, tactical twenty, and strategical ten. In scouts offensive efficiency counts twenty-five points, defensive ten, tactical fifty, and strategical fifteen.

On that formula the General Board has figured out a comparison between our Navy and those of four countries, which, for the sake of neutral propriety I will not name. Their computations apply to armored ships only.

The Assistant Secretary gave the following list as showing the relative standing in which, parenthetically, the nations included are indicated: First, (England), 7,768.05; second (Germany), 3,818.70; third (United States), 3,562.70; fourth (France) 2,208.74.

Mr. Roosevelt said that he had no hesitancy in saying that the third navy was that of the United States and that, judged by other standards as well, it was his opinion that we stood third at this time. The comparison, he pointed out, did not include submarines, destroyers, scouts, or auxiliaries of any kind.

"Suppose you include all types?" was suggested.

"Well, then," replied the Assistant Secretary, "the comparison would be less favorable to the United States."

Mr. Roosevelt took up first the subject of the enlisted personnel of the Navy, and said that in case of war the present force of 51,000 men would have to be very much increased, probably by 50,000 men. The available force from the present Naval Militia he put at 7,000.

I am firmly convinced," he added, "that there should be a large and well-drilled national naval reserve independent of the State Militia.

Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N., Aid for Operations, made a most impressive statement of naval conditions in his testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs December 17. He said in substance:

1. It would take five years or more to get the fleet in condition successfully and effectively to meet an effective enemy.

2. It would take three years to get the personnel up to a standard of efficiency to make it able successfully and effectively to meet an effective enemy.

3. The United States has no general plan of naval development independent of those framed to meet economical exigencies; no plan of battle approach and no plan of torpedo attack.

4. The United States is deficient in scout cruisers, battle cruisers, destroyers, mining and aeronautical equipment, besides all the smaller auxiliaries. We have only one mine layer, the old cruiser San Francisco, and her mine laying capacity is 336 mines. This lack is very serious. If we got into war we might expect an attack on our coast very quickly, possibly in the vicinity of New York.

5. An immediate necessity, if a coherent plan of naval development is to be followed out, is the creation of a Navy General Staff.

6. The Navy needs more target practice and greater efficiency in all branches of the science of gunnery.

7. Germany to-day is probably the superior of both Great Britain and the United States in gunnery.

Admiral Fiske, says the Times report, gave decided reasons for his declaration. The principal ground for his opinion was apprehension that the American Navy lacked in coherent organization and training, which involved deficiency in gunnery, lack of co-ordination between the fleet and the Navy Department, and the entire absence of a Navy staff with a general plan of national defense.

"In the internal routine of the battleship," said the Admiral, "our battleships as units are well organized. The personnel is well trained in the active fleet. It is in the matter of team work that we fall short of the high standard of efficiency that has been reached in other navies."

Army and Navy Journal. 52: 564. January 2, 1915

Reserves

Aside from their value in the defense of the nation, reservists would be an invaluable asset to the industrial life of the country. If it pays to expend money on other forms of education, there is no doubt that it would be a profitable investment for the country to expend money on a short and intensified term of military training for the young men of the nation. It would be a good policy to shorten the time a boy spends in the public schools to give him a year's training in the Army. Ideas along this line are rapidly taking root throughout the country, and if the Secretary of War, some senator or member of the House should espouse these views he will soon find that he has more support throughout the country than is generally realized in Congress. The country is past the period when it refuses to expend money for national defense. The great lesson of the European war is not lost on the people of this country, and they fully realize that it is dangerous to temporize or economize in solving the problem.

Congressional Record. 52: appendix 164-7. January 21, 1915

"Safety First"; Extension of Remarks of Augustus P. Gardner, in the House of Representatives, January 15, 1915

There is still truth in the old, old story that it is the man behind the gun who counts. But for heaven's sake, how far behind the gun do you want the man to be? Must he be so far behind the gun that he has not even a bowing acquaintance with it until war breaks out? Yet that is where we stand today. Our regular Army is an admirable handful. Our reserve army is a farce. A good deal over one-third of our militia absolutely struck their guns off their visiting lists during the whole of last year.

The Men

We have only 30,000 regulars available for a field army and 120,000 militiamen besides, so says the report of the Secretary of War. In other words, if every mother's son of them answers the call, we shall have 150,000 men to defend us while a new army is being made. That means that we could cover a battle front of thirty miles on the old civil war reckoning of 5,000 men to a mile. Thirty miles is a long, long way from the distance which modern battle fronts cover.

How about it? Will all our militiamen turn up if they are summoned, and what will they do when the howitzer begins to howl? It is the correct thing for really patriotic orators to say that by nightfall every militiaman will be on hand, bubbling with heroism.

The fact is that the fiction of a trained citizenry rushing head over heels to arms in time of war is purely the creature of a deft imagination adroitly interpreted by a clever tongue. The strength of the trained-citizenry argument does not lie in its own soundness, but in the fact that most of us are politically estopped from saying what we really think about the militia, or National Guard, as it is called. Owing to the blessed circumstance that my congressional district is amazingly one-sided, I shall make bold to say what I really think. I believe that most men are actuated by the very best and most unselfish motives when they undertake the thankless duties of militia service. I believe that militiamen are keenly conscious of the fact that many persons scoff at them as "tin soldiers."

At all events, I know that when I was a militiaman I was sensitively alive to the good-natured superciliousness with which my friends regarded what to them appeared to be my harmless vanity. I believe, moreover, that as the duties are made more arduous and more serious the militia steadily improves, although it becomes harder and harder to fill its ranks. On the other hand, I do not believe that over two-thirds of our militia would materialize in war time, and I do not think that dependence could be placed upon them until months of severe training and a weeding-out process had hardened them into military shape.

I cannot forget that no less than sixteen states of the Union fell short by greater or less amounts of furnishing their quotas of troops during the Spanish war. I cannot forget that after the first burst of enthusiasm was over cities and towns offered bounties in order to fill their quotas of troops in the civil war. I cannot forget that the national government later on gave a large sum of money to each veteran who would reenlist, nor that both the North and the South were eventually obliged to resort to the hateful necessity of compelling men to join the Army against their wills. All those things are none the less facts because they are unpopular facts and because it is the fashion to blink at them.

Neither can I shut my eyes to the report of the Chief of Staff on the record of the militia for the year ending June 30, 1914. Out of 120,000 militiamen, all told, 23,000 failed to present themselves for the annual inspection, 31,000 absented themselves from the annual encampment, and 44,000 never appeared on the rifle range from one year's end to the other.

So much for our regulars and our militia. There remains to be considered our reserve army of former enlisted men. We can dismiss it with a word, for President Wilson says that we are not to depend on a large reserve army. Perhaps it is just as well not to depend on it entirely, for at present it consists of but sixteen men.

The Guns

Come to think of it, I have got quite a distance away from the gun in following the man who ought to be behind it. If by the word "gun" a rifle is meant, then we have plenty to give to all comers; that is, at the outset of any war. If, however, when we say "gun" we mean cannon, then the first difficulty facing the man would be to find the gun to get behind.

Nine weeks ago, Major-General W. W. Wotherspoon, Chief of Staff and virtually head of the United States Army, made his annual report to the Secretary of War. If General Wotherspoon had never done anything in life except write page 12 of his report, he would deserve the thanks of the nation for that superb act of courage alone. I know of nothing of the sort which approaches it except the courage of Admiral Fiske when last month he testified to the condition of our Navy. Perhaps I ought to include in the same category the fearlessness of Captain Hobson, who for years has stood the gibes of his colleagues and faced the ridicule of the press while he thundered in the ears of an unattentive public the sad story of the dwarfing of our Navy's normal growth.

But to return to page 12 of General Wotherspoon's report. He tells us that before a war breaks out we must accumulate rifles, cartridges, field artillery, and field artillery ammunition. He tells us how much we ought to have and how much is actually on hand or in sight. Here is the table:

	Munitions required as a reserve in anticipation of war	Munitions on hand or in process of manufacture
Rifles	642,541	698,374
Rifle cartridges	646,000,000	241,000,000
Field guns (exclusive of giant guns)	2,834	852
Field gun ammunition, rounds	11,790,850	580,098

So you see that we are short 400,000,000 rifle cartridges, 11,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 2,000 field guns, if General Wotherspoon's judgment is sound.

Of course, I am not an expert in these matters, but 580,000 rounds of field artillery ammunition seems rather inadequate as a reserve in the light of General Wood's testimony that Russia shot away 250,000 rounds against the Japanese in the battle of Mukden alone; yet 580,098 rounds is all we have on hand. I am told that Lieutenant Hunsaker's report, lately sent over from France to the War Department, tells of a French cannon firing 500 shots in a day. Of course, that must be an extreme case. But cut the figure in half and you will find that 1,000 such guns would shoot away in two days all the artillery ammunition which we have now plus all which we shall manufacture up to July 1. By the way, Russia had 1,204 guns engaged at Mukden and Japan had 922 guns extending over the same front,

so 1,000 guns is not an imaginative figure. I do not know whether General Wotherspoon's estimate of 2,834 field guns is excessive or not. The testimony before the fortification committee in 1913 showed that Russia at that time had 6,000 field guns, while Germany had 5,000 field guns.

The horrid significance of the whole business lies in the fact that it takes so long to make these munitions of war, even with unlimited appropriations. The good Lord knows that we never shall have unlimited appropriations for public undertakings in defense of our nation so long as we need unlimited appropriations for public buildings in defense of our seats in Congress.

Slow Work Making Guns and Ammunition

Last year and this year the Committee on Military Affairs took up the question of the length of time required to make munitions of war. The following facts stand out impressively: Working three shifts day and night, all the factories in this country, government and private as well, can turn out in the first six months after war is declared but 400,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, or only 150,000 more rounds than Russia shot away in a single battle. They can make about 1,600 rounds per day, or enough to keep eight guns under an ordinary battle condition of 200 shots per day. In one year all government and private factories put together can turn out 500 field guns, or one-quarter of our shortage, as General Wotherspoon estimates it.

Friend Hay's Tables

My friend Hay, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, publishes a table of our requirements in the way of munitions of war which differs vastly from General Wotherspoon's table. Three times I have publicly asked Chairman Hay to summon General Wotherspoon and put him through his paces for his temerity in ignorantly setting up his opinions against a congressman's. The first time, the good chairman pointed out that the general had gone on the retired list a few days ago; the second time, he invite my attention to the fact that the hearings before his committee were closed; and the third time, he told me that it was no use summoning General Wotherspoon, because he knew all about his ideas already.

Incidentally my efforts to secure the summons of Major-

General Leonard Wood have been equally unsuccessful. Yet General Wood is not on the retired list. He preceded General Wotherspoon as chief of staff, and he now commands the Department of the East.

As to Chairman Hay's tables, I note, for instance, that he estimates 200,000,000 cartridges as a sufficient equipment for a field army of 460,000 men. That estimate is just one-third of the estimate made by the General Staff of the Army for that identical number of men. It is true that 200,000,000 cartridges will equip the machine guns and will fill the men's belts and will suffice for the combat train and the first ammunition train, but 400,000,000 additional cartridges are needed for the advance basis and the general bases. At least, the General Staff says so. However, General Crozier, the star witness for the defense, coincides with Chairman Hay on this point. It is fair to admit that the general was frank enough to admit that Army men do not agree with him.

Why not a Few Titanic Guns for Us?

But where are all the giant guns which we progressive Americans ought to have? How are we off for these wonderful implements of warfare with which other nations have been arming themselves? We are still shaking hands with ourselves over our biggest gun, the six-inch howitzer, and doubting those newspaper stories about the big field guns in England.

Congressional Record. 52:2714. January 29, 1915

Amendment of Testimony by Rear Admiral Fletcher, United States Navy

United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. "Wyoming," Flagship,
Navy Yard, New York, January 14, 1915.

My Dear Mr. Padgett: I desire to correct my testimony as given on page 547 of the hearings before your committee. The testimony is in answer to the question as to "how many short we would be if we attempted to put all our fighting ships in commission with trained service." My reply was to the effect that I could not give exact figures, but my impression was that it

would take 4,000 or 5,000 additional men to fully man the ships which I think ought to be manned upon the opening of hostilities, and 5,000 in addition to the above to man other ships that should immediately be called out of reserve.

I am now able to give more exact information. Boards, consisting of the captain and other ranking officers of experience, by order of the Navy Department, have been appointed upon every battleship of the Atlantic Fleet, with instructions to carefully consider the complements of both officers and men required on the various types of vessels and scrutinize the number allowed in each rank and rating, with a view to reducing the same to the lowest practicable consistent with efficiency for a peace complement and the lowest number that would be desirable for a war complement.

These boards have now completed their work, and the result has developed an alarming shortage of officers and men that are required to efficiently man our ships for battle. The reports of all these boards were made independently and are singularly unanimous in their conclusions, presenting a more serious shortage than could have been anticipated by either the Navy Department or the fleet until brought to light by this searching investigation.

The reports of these boards show that in the 21 battleships in commission, and now composing the Atlantic Fleet, there is a shortage of 5,219 men and 339 officers required to fill all stations necessary to efficiently fight the ships in battle.

The above figures refer to the commissioned battle fleet alone, and this shortage does not include "4,000 or 5,000 additional to fully man the ships which I think ought to be fully manned upon the opening of hostilities," as stated in my testimony.

My complete report has been sent to the Secretary of the to the date of the delivery of the first gun, an interval of at least Navy, but I desire the above facts to be placed in your possession in order that the testimony I gave before your committee may not be misleading.

Very respectfully,

F. F. FLETCHER,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Hon. L. P. PADGETT,
Chairman Naval Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Greater New York. 3: 3-9. December 21, 1914

Speech of Henry L. Stimson, Former Secretary of War, at the Members' Council of the Merchants' Association of New York. December 15, 1914

Needs of the Army

In the case of the Army our needs can be classified and summarized under three heads:

First, we need a very moderate increase of our regular army, to be accomplished mainly by the introduction of a reserve system.

In the second place, we need to lay the intelligent foundations upon which we can, when war comes, promptly organize the large citizen or volunteer army with which that war must be fought.

In the third place, we must at once acquire a sufficient reserve of the field guns and ammunition and other war material which will be at once needed for the equipment of such a citizens' army and yet which cannot be extemporized under emergency.

Less Than 30,000 Soldiers Here

Secretary Garrison reports that today we have within the United States, as a mobile army, just 29,405 regular soldiers and that, when the vitally important outposts at Panama and Hawaii are completed and the garrisons in those places brought up to their proper strength, our army at home will be reduced to less than 25,000 men.

Secretary Garrison requests that this force be increased by an addition of 25,000 men and by the creation of a system of reserves for the regular army which would make it possible in time of war to call back to the colors men who had retired to private life and so increase its size still further on such an emergency. You can all judge of the reasonableness of this request. The standing army which would thus be created within the United States would not be more than 50,000 men. On the outbreak of a war with such a reserve, it might be increased to 100,000. The report of the General Staff, to which I have previously alluded, places the size of the mobile regular army thus required, including the reserve, at 112,000. Mr. Garrison thus substantially follows their recommendation. Even the most ardent pacificist could not be alarmed by such a regular army.

The Reserve Force

In the second place, we come to the citizens' army. All our advisers agree that in case war should break out with any first-class nation capable of threatening our safety at all, we should find it necessary to raise promptly on the outbreak of the war an army of about 500,000 men, including the regulars as a part of this force. At present we have in this country, besides our 25,000 regulars, only 120,000 militia or National Guard. Not more than 50,000 or 60,000 of this militia, to speak most hopefully, are even reasonably efficient or well trained. Other than these, we have no military reserves of any kind whatsoever. The trained rifleman mentioned by the President in his message last week is today conspicuous in this country for his absence. Modern wars are not fought with sporting rifles. The minuteman can no longer take down his old flintlock and find himself a match in weapons with the trained regular who opposes him. The art of military weapons and military organization and warfare has advanced as much during the past fifty years as the arts of civil life.

Education in Arms

The Swiss Republic and the Australian Commonwealth meet this problem in essentially the same way. From early boyhood their young men are trained to use the rifle as a necessary part of their education. Ignorant, untrained patriotism is not regarded as sufficient for their ideal of a citizen's duty to his land. As a result we find in those two countries, representing in their respective ways, the most advanced types of modern democracy, and going hand in hand with their freedom of thought and liberalism, the doctrine that every man owes to his country—not only to die for her if necessary, but also to spend a little of his life in learning how to die for her effectively.

We should be glad that the President in his message last week seemed to recognize the necessity of a similar ideal for us. And we should be still more glad that for several years General Wood has been earnestly laying the foundations for the realization of such an ideal among us. It is only upon such foundations carried out to the extent of infusing into our citizenship a large body of trained riflemen disciplined in the rudiments of military

tactics, and knowing how to take care of themselves in the open; carried out also to the extent of providing us in addition with a sufficient number of more highly trained reserve officers—men in civil life who, as young men, have learned enough in military schools and maneuvre camps and, if possible, through temporary commissions in the army—to train and handle the riflemen when the occasion arises.

Military Equipment

The third immediate need is to provide and lay up at once in reserve a sufficient supply of arms, ammunition and other equipment to outfit this citizen army when it is called out. Our technical men have done their work well. Our new Springfield is the best small arm in the hands of any army. Our 3-inch field gun is as good as the best.

Since that date the situation has been somewhat improved by increased appropriations. I am informed that we have now 860 guns, and ammunition to serve them about one and one-half days! Now remember, that to send out modern infantry without the protection of field guns against an enemy armed with them, is simply murder—just as it was to send our National Guard Regiments to San Juan Hill armed with black powder. And remember further, that after war breaks out, field guns cannot be purchased abroad, nor can they be extemporized at home. From the date of giving the order for the manufacture of such guns five months must necessarily elapse.

The same shortage holds true in other lines. The present war is proving that the aeroplane is the eye of the modern army and that an army without aeroplanes in combat with an enemy provided with them, would be like a blind man fighting against a man with sight. Yet the United States ranks behind thirteen other nations in her expenditures for aviation. Not only is she surpassed by all the nations of her size and class, but she falls behind such smaller nations as Belgium, Chile, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain and Brazil.

North American. 201: 363-5. March, 1915

The Right and the Duty of Self-Defense.

Joseph Hodges Choate

I am asked to furnish a few lines on any subject I choose, and I think that the most interesting question now before the public is whether we, as a nation, are going to be prepared to maintain the sacred right and duty of self-defense, or are to continue in our present shiftless condition of exposure to attack, and to take it lying down, from whatever quarter it may come.

President Washington in his first annual address to both Houses of Congress on the 8th of January, 1790, declared that—

> Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

And one of the great objects of the Constitution of the United States, as expressed in its famous preamble, is "to provide for the common defense."

Some earnest Christians of today, and among them some of my fellow-pacifists, object to this theory of self-defense and profess to believe that all preparation for defense will only invite attack. But I think that Washington and the framers of the Constitution of the United States, who had just emerged from a seven years' war, understood the subject much better than these doctrinaires of today, and if their theory was correct in the very infancy of the republic, it is certainly equally so now that we have become a great world power with exposed flanks and liable to be attacked at any time. For certainly any nation in the world has as much reason for attacking us today as Germany had for attacking Belgium on the 4th of August last.

The reports of the Secretaries of the Navy and of the Army confirm the belief that both arms of the service are at present entirely inadequate for our needs. We have an Army, such as it is, but its ranks are not full; and we have a Navy which is by no means up to the modern standard demanded by the events of the present war.

It has often been said, and truly, that the Navy is the cheapest defense of the nation. Whether this would hold true if every craft constructed were to be a dreadnought I do not

know. But perhaps the day of dreadnoughts is done, and smaller and less expensive weapons of war will take their place. At any rate, events of the present war have shown that we have very much to learn about a Navy, and that Congress and the Navy Department have much, not only to learn, but to unlearn.

I have referred to our exposed flanks. We are exposed to attack in all directions. The Philippines alone are a perpetual challenge. In constructing and undertaking the defense of the Panama Canal we have assumed vast responsibilities. We have an undefended seacoast, greater, I believe, than that of any other nation, and splendid seacoast cities whose fortifications, however costly they may have been, will not suffice to defend those cities against hostile armies landing at a safe distance from the fortifications. And then there is the Monroe Doctrine, which is so dear to the people, but which is not worth the paper on which President Monroe wrote the short sentence which embodies it unless we have the force to defend it, when challenged, and are ready to use that force.

And then as to the Army—I am as much opposed as anybody to a great standing army such as France and Germany have maintained for a generation, withdrawing millions of men from useful occupations, and of little real use unless they expected and intended war—but that is no reason why we should not adopt some system which would make all the young men of America fit to fight and to defend themselves and their country which could be done by the development of some such method as President Wilson hinted at in his recent speech to Congress, some cooperation between the national authority and that of the states which should secure the training of our youth as strong and healthy units and make them fit to be converted at short notice into soldiers, constituting an invincible army for the defense of our homes and territory.

I believe this to be absolutely practicable and manifestly necessary, and that the cost of it would not equal in a year what either of the great contending nations now is expending in war in a day. Besides, how much better it would be for the young men themselves for all the purposes of life, even though we should never have any war, to be disciplined and made perfectly well and strong and fit for service, and redeemed from the flabby condition in which so many of them are today. And how small an outlay it would cost the nation to make them so.

Outlook. 110:164-6. May 26, 1915

A Fighting Fleet for a Peaceful People.

[The] question of the adequacy of their fleet is always the first one asked by Americans when foreign war threatens, for America, like England, is in an insular position so far as other great powers are concerned, and her fleet has always been her palladium. The remark of the Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, made in an interview published in the Outlook of December 30, 1914, that "at present our Navy is our only considerable bulwark against invasion," has always been true. The function of a Navy in such a nation as this is discussed editorially elsewhere in this number; it is the aim of this article to throw some light on the question as to whether today even our Navy is not only a "considerable" but an adequate bulwark.

Man for man and ship for ship, our Navy will compare favorably with any foreign navy. We can rest further for assurance on the word of Admiral Dewey and a host of other experts, quick to point out shortcomings when they exist. We need not attempt here to substantiate their promises with an array of evidence, since this question is unimportant in the face of the fact that the answer to the first question above is an emphatic "No." Splendid as it is so far as it goes, our Navy is not today adequate for the defense of the country against such a great foreign power as it might be called upon to face.

A few years ago on the basis of tonnage our Navy stood second among the navies of the world; last July it ranked third, but today it is fourth. France has passed us since war began by expediting work on vessels which were under construction in July, 1914. Of course, since that time the nations at war have closely guarded all information concerning additions to their navies, and consequently the latest record we have of the standing of the powers gives their standing as it was last July.

Not only has France passed us, but Japan is known to have six first-line warships under construction to our four, and if we do not mend our pace we shall soon be a secondary naval power.

The trouble is that our navy has been the shuttlecock of politicians. That is to say, we have never had a continuous naval policy. The nearest approach to the adoption of one was in 1903. In that year the General Board of the Navy

outlined a plan calling for the construction of two battleships and the necessary auxiliary units annually. Under this plan we should now have ready for service, under construction, and authorized, forty-seven battleships less than twenty years old, which is the officially recognized "life" of such vessels. Because Congress has steadily fallen behind this two-battleship-a-year program, we have today ready for service, under construction, and authorized, only thirty-seven battleships. In other words, we are ten battleships behind the 1903 program. On the whole, the other types of vessel that go to make up the armed sea power of a nation have suffered even more than the battleships. Our naval authorities calculate that the proportions of the complete fighting fleet demand that for every eight battleships there should be 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, 1 ammunition ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 4 fuel ships, 1 hospital ship, 1 repair ship, 2 submarine tenders, 1 supply ship, and 1 transport. On this basis, the Hon. George von L. Meyer, former Secretary of the Navy, writing in the Scientific American recently, presented the following chart, showing what the deficiencies of our Navy are. For the purpose of comparison he considers ships under construction or authorized as available:

Type	Number of ships available	Under construction or authorized	Total	Number necessary on basis of 42 battleships	Deficiency
Dreadnoughts	8	7	..	..	..
(Pre-dreadnought) ships[1]	27	..	42	..	..
Battle cruisers	..	..	..	10	10
Armored cruisers[2]	10	..	10	..	..
Scouts	3	..	3	42	39
Destroyers	50	18	68	164	96
Tenders	6	3	9	20	11
Repair ships	1	..	1	5	4
Supply ships	4	1	5	5	..
Hospital ships	2	..	2	5	3
Ammunition ships	..	..	..	5	5
Fuel ships	22	2	24	24	..
Submarines	30	28	58	88	30
Transports	3	1	6	5	..
Totals	168	60	228	373	198

[1] Includes old-type battle-ships.

[2] Armored cruisers have been superseded by battle cruisers; those on hand would be employed as scouts.

If there is one lesson that the naval engagements of this war have brought out clearly, it is the importance of speed to

warships. Given two vessels of equal armament, the swifter one can dictate when and where the encounter shall take place. And if a swift vessel has heavier guns than a slow one, the former can keep just out of range of the latter's weapons and pound her to pieces, as the Sydney did to the Emden.

By the way, how many Americans know that we have no vessels which would have been strong enough to cope with the Emden and swift enough to catch her? And how many of them know that the heavy cruiser Blücher, overhauled and sunk by Admiral Beatty's fast-steaming battle cruisers, could have shown her heels to any vessel larger than a destroyer in our navy?

Already the judgment of England and Germany has been fully vindicated in building battle cruisers—a type of ship with the guns of a dreadnought but of much greater speed and of somewhat lighter armor. If Great Britain had had no battle cruisers Admiral von Spee's armored cruisers might still have been roaming the seas destroying commerce; and if England had had none of these ships the battle cruisers of Germany would have been free to leave their hiding-places occasionally and pounce upon smaller vessels of the enemy, or even dart now and then across the North Sea to attack British coast towns. Not only has the United States no battle cruisers, but the American government has authorized no cruisers of any kind since 1904. Were we to go to war tomorrow, we should be seriously hampered by the scarcity of fast cruisers to do scout work and to protect our own commerce and harass the commerce of the enemy. Thus, even if the navy of our enemy were much weaker than ours, if he had a few cruisers faster than any of our ships, we should find ourselves in the anomalous position of "controlling the seas" and at the same time continually losing merchant vessels to the enemy's sea cavalry.

According to ex-Secretary Meyer, we need many more gunboats for Central American, West Indian, and Far East service, and the same authority declares that we have now "only one makeshift vessel for ammunition-carrying purposes, . . . and five of them are required." The National Security League declares that "fast scout cruisers, battle cruisers, aeroplanes, mine layers, supply ships, and transports are lacking." Another authority who has recently pointed out the very great deficiency of our Navy with regard to mine layers, mine sweepers, mines, and aircraft was Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, testifying

before the committee on navy affairs of the House of Representatives.

But the most striking deficiency is in officers and men. If we were to go to war tomorrow, fully to man every craft on our Navy list there would be lacking 18,556 trained men and 933 line officers. This situation arises through no fault of the Secretary of the Navy, but through the fact that Congress, on June 30, 1914, limited the number of enlisted men to 51,500, and the number of officers to 1,898. Mr. Robert W. Neeser points out in his interesting book, "Our Navy and the Next War," just published by Charles Scribner's Sons, that in 1884, with only 8,250 enlisted men, the Navy was allowed 1,114 officers. "In other words," says Mr. Neeser, "while the enlisted personnel in thirty years was increased 43,250, the number of officers today is only 784 greater than in 1884."

The war has done one thing for Americans: it has opened their eyes to the fact that we are not independent of the trade, treaties, and quarrels of the rest of the world. We have not the splendid isolation that we thought we had. Consequently more and more of us are coming to realize that our Navy today lacks many ships and men to make it a sufficient bulwark of protection. Fine as it is, and it is the finest we have ever had, our Navy does not yet offer an adequate fighting fleet for a peaceful people as numerous as we are, and with as extended a coastline as we have to defend.

The root of the trouble is our lack of a naval policy. The Navy has done the best it could with the means placed at its disposal. We ought no longer to delay the adoption of a far-seeing constructive naval program.

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The Military and Naval Defenses of the United States: What They Are—What They Should Be. William Howard Taft

We cannot realize or estimate the losses the United States has suffered and will suffer from the present European war. The interference with our normal trade already suffered; the disarrangement of our finances already felt; the unhealthy, feverish activity in certain branches of our industry, leading, when peace comes, to a sudden and straining halt and inevitable disturbance of industrial conditions; the wasteful destruction of European

capital otherwise available for our use for the indefinite future—will make up a total that a present abnormal excess of exports over imports during the war cannot by any means offset. The benefit of the war that we can share with the rest of the world is in the lessons it ought to teach in respect to future national and international policies. One lesson the war should bring home to us concerns our proper military defenses against the unjust aggression of another power. It is argued that the character and probable consequences of this war render such an attack on us less likely than if it had not broken out; and that as long as the belligerents are engaged, none is likely to seek an additional foe. It is urged moreover that, after the war, victors and vanquished will both be in such a state of exhaustion as to discourage a new war with a nation circumstanced as we are. But despite these contentions that we are in less danger of attack than before the war, the news of battles on land and sea, and the enormous forces of men and armament engaged, naturally rouse among our people an anxious inquiry into our condition of defense in case the Army and Navy of any one of the belligerents were turned against us.

We cannot have such defenses unless the people demand them. It is greatly better that they should be roused to learn the truth by a war between other nations than that it should be forced on them by the humiliating experience of national helplessness after our country is attacked.

I do not claim to have expert knowledge on the subject; but I was Secretary of War for more than four years and was in a manner responsible, as President, for our national defense for four years more; so that, perhaps because of that experience as a layman, I can be of some assistance by giving to other laymen, in language we laymen understand, the general effect of expert evidence on the defenses we need and the defenses we have.

As a preliminary to such a discussion, however, we must answer the question as to whether we need any military or naval defenses at all. If I understand the attitude of the extreme party—the pacificists, so called—it is that we ought not to spend money in additional military and naval armament because our having a large military and naval establishment of formidable character—even if only defensive—is an invitation to a breach of the international peace and tempts us to war.

The view contended for is that if we have no means of offense

or defense we shall certainly not attack any other nation; and that no nation will take advantage of our situation of helplessness if we pursue a just course in dealing with her. It must rest on the predicate that by acting on the assumption that all nations will pursue the highest moral standards in dealing with us we shall bring them to such a course.

With deference to this view, it seems to me to have the same defect as that of the sincere modern anarchist, whose advocacy of no government is that if we had no government, no restraint, no police force, no law, each member of a community, by the trust reposed in him, would be made perfect in his treatment of others and in his conduct in maintenance of the public weal.

This is only a more extreme view than that of the socialist, who thinks that, as a substitute for the motive that the security of private property has created for energy, industry and the exercise of the prudential virtues by the individual, we shall find an altruistic social spirit on the part of all men prompting them to work and energy, without selfish reward, just as soon as the socialistic state is created.

I venture to think that the views of the pacificists and of the anarchists and of the socialists are equally fallacious, and that nations are just as unlikely to become perfect, because of conduct assuming that they are so, as individuals. It is perfectly possible to have a suitable preparation for defense without maintaining a military and naval force and equipment calculated to tempt to a policy of aggression and offense. Such a preparation is in no respect inconsistent with every effort on the part of this country to secure an agreement or league between the powerful nations, by arbitral court and a council of conciliation, making war less likely.

The horrors, the dreadful losses in the present struggle in Europe, and the resulting exhaustion, will tend to restrain nations in the future from seeking war and cause them to look with greater favor than in the past on some such international arrangement; but it by no means follows that the dreadful lesson of the war today will prevent a recurrence of war in the next decade. People are very forgetful. Recovery from war, when it begins, will seem to be rapid and human nature will remain the same. A reasonably adequate defense against aggression of another nation will certainly make unjust attack less likely.

The logic of the pacificists' position leads to the conclusion

that we should raze our fortresses, scrap our battleships, disband our Navy and retain only vessels enough for peaceful police purposes; and that all expenses in the preparation for possible war should be saved. Many of the conscientious supporters of this doctrine would agree that this is the natural corollary of their position and would be quite willing to accept the consequences. But, even if they do not insist on such extreme measures, we must fairly meet their objection to further preparation. Their argument is that by adding to our defenses we shall encourage the spirit of militarism.

How much of a danger is militarism in this country? It seems to me, with some practical experience in governmental possibilities, that the danger is very slight; that there are certain constant factors in our political, social and industrial conditions which make an army and a navy the creation and support of which would be militarism, impossible. We could not have a standing Army in time of peace anywhere near equal to any one of those of the great continental nations of Europe, because the expense per soldier for his pay and support, in accord with the present provisions of law, would make the cost of such an army prohibitive.

It costs a great deal more to feed an American soldier than any other soldier in the world. We pay at least $15 a month per man as wages. His housing is very much more expensive here than abroad. In 1906, when I was Secretary of War, I investigated the comparative costs, and this is what I found to be the case then, and for purposes of comparison it is just as significant now: Our regular military establishment in 1906, with 60,000 effective men, cost us $72,000,000. France maintained her army of 546,000 men on the active list at a cost of $133,000,000. Germany kept up her military establishment, with 640,000 men on the active list, at an expense of $144,000,000.

In other words, France had an army about nine times the size of ours at less than twice our expenditure, and Germany an army of more than ten times ours at just twice the cost. A standing army of half a million men on a peace basis at this rate would cost us at least half a billion dollars annually.

But another trouble would arise. Conscription in time of peace the American people would not tolerate. In good times and at the present pay, it is hard enough to raise an army of even less than a hundred thousand. In hard times, when men

are out of work, recruiting is easier; but the recruiting of half a million men in the United States at the present pay, when we are at peace, would be impossible. In war the volunteer system would produce an army of more than a million men at the present pay, but only when the patriotic war fervor was strong.

Therefore it would be necessary to add substantially to the present pay of the regular soldiers to secure such a standing Army in time of peace. This, if the pay were doubled, would mean perhaps $100,000,000 more for the Army. This, with the expenses of an adequate Navy, would so greatly burden the taxpayers that it could never receive popular sanction. The very heavy pension appropriation of $160,000,000 a year would itself operate as a brake on such a plan.

Safeguards against Militarism

Congressional constituencies constantly present a demand for internal improvements and for other peaceful governmental activities, which is showing its effect in a yearly increase of our national budget, and this, however much it is to be deprecated, has at least the merit of restraining extravagance in our military and naval establishment.

Then the genius of our people is opposed to a large standing Army. This would find still more acute opposition among the labor unions, which even carry their hostility to the organization of a state militia. It is idle, therefore, to fear such an increase in the regular Army as to gratify the spirit of militarism, or to encourage it.

So far as militarism and the Navy are concerned, we must remember that, even though a navy be formidable in ships, equipment and men, it is not an instrument furnishing temptation to aggrandizing warfare. Though the proper use of a navy in actual war would be conducting an offensive campaign against the navy and commerce of the enemy, the offensive would be merely for the purpose of defending ourselves and preventing invasion by the foe. There can be no real aggression in the sense of conquering territory and subduing our enemy with a navy alone.

The necessary limitation on the size of our Army, to which I have referred, must always make remote the possibility of our having an expeditionary force of any size to carry on a foreign war. I repeat, therefore, that, however strong a Navy we may

have, the impossibility of our maintaining a large Army will always prevent our naval strength from tempting us to war.

Take Mexico: We have a Navy large enough to take all the ports in that country. What is the greatest restraint on us from invading Mexico? It is that we have not an adequate Army. It would require 200,000 men to go in and pacify that country—and probably more. It would need the organization of a new Army. The people know that. Great in some respects as is the temptation to abate the international nuisance at our doors, and subdue the anarchy that is fast sapping the lifeblood of a country in whose prosperity and welfare we have so great an interest, there is no popular pressure on the government to enter on such a policy.

Washington pointed out the great advantage we have in our position across the sea from the sources of danger to international peace; and, even in the time when that sea was much more of a protection than it is now, he advocated adequate preparation of a military and naval character in time of peace to avoid war. · We cannot say that the conditions have changed, with reference to the possibility of war, so much that we ought to ignore his advice or depart from the policy he recommended.

The measure of the preparation we ought to make is that which will give us defenses that, added to the difficulties of crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, will put us on an equality with any nation likely to conduct a war of aggression against us. Changed as the conditions of modern warfare are, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans still present a most valuable obstruction and defense for us against attack.

Our first line of defense, of course, would be the Navy. No attacking nation could get at us except by coming over the ocean. Therefore, it is of the highest importance that we should keep our Navy large enough and well equipped enough to equal that of any nation except England.

Why do I except England? In the first place, we have had a hundred years of peace with England. We have a border line of four thousand miles between us and Canada, undefended on either side. The defenselessness of this border in time of war would be greatly to the disadvantage of the smaller population. More than that, there has been manifested, in the hundred years we are now celebrating, the persistent determination of both peoples to settle every controversy by arbitration. We do not

need to embody it in a treaty because both peoples have that mind, at any rate.

In the second place, England in her normal condition is not a nation with a large standing army so that she could raise promptly a great expeditionary force and send it to this country. She would have to make the same kind of preparation that we would.

As against other nations, however, that could at once mobilize against us a very large expeditionary force and transport it to our shores, we do need a means of defense. We need a navy that shall make the sending of an expeditionary force across the ocean to our shores so full of risk and danger that no country will undertake it. It is entirely feasible for the United States to maintain such a navy. It is much easier to secure the personnel of a navy than of an army, because it does not need so many men.

The Naval Program of 1903

Second, the spirit of the American people is not so opposed to a large navy as it is to a large army, and its expense is but a small part of what would be the expense of an army large enough to meet an army that one of the great nations of continental Europe might land on our shores if unopposed on the sea. It is in the Navy that we are to relieve ourselves from the necessity of maintaining a large standing Army to resist attack.

Our Navy is not now adequate. We have fallen behind in the number of ships we have built, and we need greater speed and variety. It is true, naval art is developing, and there is a risk, if we go on, that we may spend money in directions which will not ultimately prove to be wise. Undoubtedly this war will yield most valuable lessons in determining along what lines our expenditures should be made; but we must, to some extent, share with the world the cost of discovering the best naval armaments, and should not remain idle and supine, waiting for the river of advance and improvement to run by. We have competent naval officers, who keep up with every known advance in naval science, and who are able to advise Congress and the Executive on every expert question.

The General Board of the Navy in 1903, there then being ten battleships completed and fourteen others building or appropriated for, recommended a program for the development of the

Navy by the construction of two battleships each year, beginning with 1904. This was to continue until 1915, inclusive, or until twenty-four more battleships had been authorized, and in 1919 all would be completed, giving then a total of forty-eight battleships. In this scheme no replacements were taken into consideration; i. e., a battleship once completed was considered as a permanent possession. This defect was remedied by the General Board in 1910. In its report of that year the effective life of a battleship was found to be twenty years from the date of her completion, after which she should be replaced; i. e., twenty years after Battleship A had been laid down, replacement ship A would be laid down to keep the strength of the Navy constant. Partly for this reason, but chiefly because Congress had not met the program of 1903, the General Board in 1912 and 1913 recommended a building program of four battleships.

This scheme of 1903 was not carried out by Congress. In 1904, 1906, and 1907, against President Roosevelt's wish, and in 1912 and 1913, against the recommendation of the then administration, only one battleship was authorized. In 1914 there were, exclusive of the Idaho and Mississippi, sold to Greece, thirty-three battleships, including all old ones, and seven building or authorized—a shortage of six on the 1903 plan.

The General Board also recommended four destroyers for each battleship. January 1, 1915, found the Navy with forty battleships of all types and ages, built, building and authorized, and sixty-eight destroyers in the same categories.

In the first session of the second Congress of the last Republican administration, by a majority vote in the Democratic caucus of the Democratic House it was sought to bind all the Democratic members to decline to vote for any battleships at all. Through the refusal of a minority of Democrats to be bound, it was possible to secure one battleship. In the next session the Navy Department submitted estimates for four battleships to make up for the deficit, but were able to secure only one.

The change of attitude the Democratic party now seems disposed to show is an indication of the manifest public opinion on the subject, and gives hope that more adequate provision will be made in the future to catch up with the program of the General Board.

I cannot do more than give a brief reference to other reasons

for our naval deficiencies. They are succinctly set forth by Mr. George von L. Meyer, former Secretary of the Navy, in the February, 1915, number of the North American Review. Mr. Meyer has had longer continuous service at the head of the Navy Department, since its reorganization after the Spanish war, than any other incumbent of that office; and he gave such earnest attention to the work that his opinion is entitled to more weight than that of any other civilian.

Mr. Meyer's Figures

He points out that since 1900 we have spent on our Navy $1,656,000,000, while Germany's navy has cost her but $1,137,000,000; and yet that she has a navy more powerful than ours. Germany, on July 1, 1914, had a navy of 951,713 tons, as compared with our Navy of 765,133 tons; and Germany has thirteen dreadnoughts, while we have but eight. When the vessels building for both countries are completed Germany will have a tonnage of 1,306,577, as against ours of 894,889.

Of course the difference in cost for the same weight of armament and force of men must always be against us under normal conditions, due to the higher cost of materials and higher wages of the men engaged in the construction and service. But Mr. Meyer shows that the amount of unnecessary expense, due to logrolling of congressmen and senators on the naval committees in improving and maintaining navy yards where they were not needed or could not be used, has amounted in the past decade to hundreds of millions.

He shows by reference to the evidence of Admiral Badger that our Navy is short of a proper complement for all its vessels that could be made useful by 18,000 men and 900 officers, and that the present Atlantic fleet in commission lacks over 5,000 men for its complement. He invites attention to the manifestly unsatisfactory condition of our submarines, as testified to by expert naval officers. The present war is showing clearly that the use of submarines must form a most important means of beating off from our shores naval attacks and rendering dangerous to our enemy the transportation to our coast of an expeditionary force of invasion.

Mr. Meyer recommends a General Staff for the Navy. Mr. Daniels, the present Secretary of the Navy, seems to think such an innovation would be un-American. It is hard to see

why. We have had a General Staff in the Army for twelve years. It has been most useful and has betrayed no monarchical or un-American tendencies. It is an expert council, to be used by the civil head of the department to supply the professional knowledge needed by him to give a policy for the department and keep it consistent. Of course its conclusions are adopted into executive action only on the approval of the secretary. Such a staff would have helped the naval policy greatly in the past; but, for some reason, the same senators and congressmen at whose door can be laid the responsibility for the log-rolling extravagance in naval expenditures described by Mr. Meyer were bitter in their opposition to a General Staff.

Naval Needs

Mr. Meyer makes another recommendation in which I thoroughly concur. He suggests an allowance by Congress of some discretion to the Executive, under the advice of a General Staff, in the expenditure of money appropriated for the naval establishment. This has a precedent in the voting of $50,000,000 in the McKinley administration, to be allotted to the War and Navy Departments in preparing for the Spanish war. One of the real difficulties we have had in building up a Navy has been the little knowledge of naval matters that members of naval committees in the Senate and House have had, which has proved to be a dangerous thing.

We have available the finest experts in the world. Why should we not make use of them? The expenditures would be subject to thorough and prompt investigation after they had been made. No President, Secretary of the Navy and General Naval Staff intrusted with the allotment of a lump sum appropriation could possibly waste the amount of money that has been wasted under the present system. This would remove the distribution of the money—not entirely, but very substantially—from the baneful political influences that have burdened us with unnecessary expenditures and prevented our having the Navy we ought to have, when the amount that has gone for naval purposes is considered.

Both parties are responsible for this waste and it is difficult to make it a party question. The party, however, with the inquiry that the war has prompted, which shall not now adopt a proper system must be charged with the responsibility for

failing to do so. We certainly need submarines; we need battle cruisers of high speed in addition to our battleships; we need aeroplanes; and we ought to have a council of experts who should have not only power to recommend, but power, with the approval of the President and the Secretary, to decide how the money appropriated for increase of our naval defenses by Congress ought to be expended.

The history of the controversies that the Secretaries of the Navy have had with the naval committees in the last ten years reflects no credit on the disinterested patriotism of the influential members of such committees. Should we have a war, the blame for lack of preparation will fall on the executive—on the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and the officers of the Navy in charge of the various branches. They, therefore, should have greater power than they have had in the past to determine the specific subjects for the expenditure of the amount of money that Congress is willing to furnish for general naval purposes, and to apply it to those needs that their expert knowledge dictates.

I quite agree that naval officers interested in the development of their respective branches of the service will not regard the matter of cost as carefully as Congress will, and should. Their recommendations as to the amounts to be expended are, therefore, to be taken with caution; but when Congress makes up its mind as to how much is to be expended, then it ought, it seems to me, to allow the men who know, some discretion in expending it for the best purpose, subject always to the approval of a responsible administration. Let us hope that the present agitation concerning the inadequacy of our naval defense may lead to a General Staff for the Navy, and that it will be given full opportunity to frame the policy of the Navy in expert matters. The problem of an adequate Navy is a much easier one than that of an adequate Army—easier in point of accomplishment; easier in the determination as to the amount we need, and much more important for our immediate protection.

The second bulwark in defense of our nation is the coast defenses. These are twofold: First, the coast defenses proper, which are fortifications at strategic points on our coast; and, second, such a mobile army as would be needed to meet an expeditionary force landed on our shores where, in the nature of things, there are and can be no fortifications.

As to Coast Defenses

We must first get into our heads clearly what the necessary plan of the coast defense of a country consists of, and what the object of land fortifications must be in such a plan. The fortifications play an important part in our first line of defense —to wit, the naval line of defense on the high seas. The fortifications, with their armament of high-power, long-range guns and the submarine defenses of mines and torpedo stations, are intended to cover and protect every important coast city against the attacks of the navy of the enemy. They relieve our Navy of any duty to protect coast cities against the enemy's navy. But for such fortifications, hostile war vessels might slip by our own Navy and subject a defenseless city to bombardment and destruction or to the heaviest kind of ransom. From such a naval expedition only a comparatively small force could be landed, and a comparatively small force supporting the coast artillery could resist its attack on the land.

Our coast fortifications are criticized because they are not fitted to resist land attack in the reverse. By practicable changes in the mortar and other batteries of these forts they can be given formidable defensive power against their own capture from the land. But it must be borne in mind that their chief military purpose is to defend against naval attack upon coast cities and harbors from the sea. Their sites are not chosen for protecting cities, near which they are constructed, against land attack. That must be the work of the third line of defense, the mobile army.

The second function of fortifications placed at strategic points along the coast, covering not only large cities but every good harbor, is to prevent the landing of an expeditionary force at a place that could be made a protected base of operations for an invasion of the country. In other words, these fortifications are so placed as to compel an invading military expedition to land its troops from an inadequate harbor or an open roadstead along the coast.

A third object of fortifications covering good harbors is to afford a place of refuge for our commercial shipping, foreign and coastwise, for the repair of the ships of our Navy after a battle, and for renewing their supplies of ammunition and other necessaries without being exposed to attack by the enemy's vessels.

These are the three objects of coast fortifications. Because the public has been given a different and erroneous idea, one cannot emphasize too much that coast fortifications are not for the purpose of directly resisting the landing of a large expeditionary force to invade the country. With the tens of thousands of miles of our coast, it would be utterly impossible to build fortifications that would cover and protect every mile of that shore.

Now it is a great satisfaction to be able to say that, except with respect to one or two features which can be readily supplied, our coast fortifications are entirely adequate for every office that any coast fortifications have in modern warfare.

Indeed, it is not too much to say that they are as extensive and as defensive as any coast fortifications in the world. There is only one important place where we need an additional fort, and that is at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay.

The great cities of Norfolk, Baltimore and Washington are amply protected by local fortifications, but we do need a fort built at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay to cover the passage between Cape Henry and Cape Charles. Land has been purchased for fortifications at Cape Henry, which ought to be promptly constructed in order that Chesapeake Bay may never again be used by an enemy to our great disadvantage, as it has been in the past.

Criticism of our coast fortifications has been directed against the range of our guns. I do not feel it necessary to go into this in full, because I do not think it contributes to a layman's understanding of the exact situation to use detailed and technical statements. The high-power, long-distance guns we have in our fortifications are twelve-inch guns. They are mounted—most of them—on what are called disappearing carriages. The gun is loaded and aimed behind a parapet and earthworks; then, by machinery, it is elevated above the fortification to be fired, and the shock and recoil incident to the firing sink the gun again below the fortification, out of sight of the enemy.

Increasing the Range of Big Guns

The range of the gun depends on the angle of elevation, the explosive power of the charge, and the weight of the projectile. By elevating the angle above the horizontal, the distance the projectile will go can be increased materially. By increasing

the weight of the propelling charge and decreasing the weight of the projectile, the range can be increased. The range of the 12-inch guns in these fortifications when built was as great as that of any guns then in use in modern navies. The possible elevation of the guns was 10 degrees above the horizontal, and 5 degrees below the horizontal for the purpose of firing down. In very few of the fortifications is it necessary to fire down. By a very slight change in the carriages the elevation could be increased above the horizontal to 15 degrees, with no range below the horizontal and without at all interfering with the effectiveness of the gun or the carriage. By reducing the weight of the projectile somewhat—not enough to be substantially less destructive to battleships at long ranges—the range of these 12-inch guns can be increased to over 20,000 yards, leaving only 1,000 or 2,000 yards in favor of the naval guns.

If a hostile fleet should station itself at a distance of 24,000 yards from a fortification and accurately drop great shells from its 15-inch guns into the fortification, and strike the guns of the fortification, it could reduce it without any effective defense; but practically that is not the way it works. At a distance of 20,000 yards a fortification on the horizon presents a very small mark, and when the guns of the fortification at the time of their discharge are only a few seconds of time above the parapet they form scarcely any mark at all, and very much less than the deck and sides of a great battleship.

Second, the accuracy of aim at that distance depends on the length of the base line on which the calculations of the range are made. The length of the base line that may be had on a naval vessel, as compared with the length of the base line that those firing guns in land fortifications have, is so much less that the hits of the mark from land at those long distances are several times as many as from the deck of a naval vessel. More than this, the platforms of the naval guns are unstable because of the waves of the ocean, and this decreases the accuracy of fire. The waste of most costly ammunition by battleships at that distance, as compared with effective hits, would be so great and the damage done so little that the advantage in point of range which a fleet with 15-inch guns would have over a fortification with 12-inch guns at 15 degrees elevation would really be a negligible factor.

It is suggested, however, that a fleet might fire at a point beyond the range of the coast fortifications over the fortifica-

tions into a city, without being exposed to any fire themselves. There are only a few points along our coast where this would be possible, and this could be easily prevented by putting in one or two 16-inch guns, as is now proposed, at such points. The expenditure of $2,000,000 or $3,000,000 in replacing some of the older guns by 16-inch guns in some of our largest fortifications would remove the slightest ground for the criticism that has been made as to the range of our coast-defense guns.

Our Lack of Ammunition

The fire control, which is the complicated mechanism for electrical and other communication by the commanding officer to the officers in charge of each gun and battery—so that the whole fire of all the guns of a group of fortifications can be directed by one mind—is substantially complete, and lacking only in that all these communications are not submarine and thus removed from the possibility of interference by the enemy. The mines, torpedoes and submarine defenses for the fortifications are quite up to European standards.

Among the alarmist views in respect to our coast defenses we frequently find a reference to, and an emphasis on, the ease with which, when the howitzers of the Germans were brought into action, the Belgian fortifications at Liège and Antwerp were overcome and destroyed, as an evidence of what could be done with respect to our fortifications. This alarm is wholly unjustified. The Belgian fortifications were fortifications that were unfitted and not intended to withstand the fire of more than 6-inch guns. They had no resemblance to our coast fortifications. It is quite doubtful whether 44-centimeter, or 16-inch, guns were ever used on the Liège fortifications. All the damage done could have been inflicted by 12-inch howitzers, and it is probable that nothing larger was there used.

Instead of wondering at the ease with which those fortifications were destroyed, competent artillery experts wonder at the delay such fortifications were able to effect in the movements of the Germans on their advance toward Paris, and raise the question why, with the knowledge the Germans had of those fortifications, they were not ready with proper artillery to reduce them in much less time than they did. There was not the slightest resemblance between those Belgian forts and the coast defenses that guard our great cities and harbors.

The attacks made by the fleet of the allies, with the heaviest

naval artillery, on the forts at the Dardanelles, and the inability to take those forts by naval attack, have a strong tendency to demonstrate the difficulty the heaviest fleets must encounter in attempting to destroy proper coast fortifications. The coast fortifications in the Dardanelles are said not to be so strong as our coast fortifications; and yet the English and French, with the strongest fleet ever gathered together, have thought it wise to give up the naval attack and resort to the landing of an army supported by the fleet.

The criticism of our coast fortifications is therefore quite unfounded. The truth is, we have done better in the matter of our coast fortifications, in keeping up to the modern standard of defense, than in any other branch of our defense. Our coast fortifications are far more complete and much more easily brought up to date than our Navy or our Army.

We are, however, lacking in personnel in our coast fortifications. The carefully worked-out plan of a competent military board requires that we shall have a force large enough to man all our guns in our insular and canal fortifications in the regular coast artillery force, and that we shall have enough men to man half our guns in the fortifications of the continental United States, with the purpose to secure the other half from coast-artillery militia. We lack 632 officers and 10,000 men in our regular coast artillery to satisfy this plan.

Of course we lack, also, a full complement in our coast-artillery militia; but if we secure the regular force, as we should, it would probably not be difficult to make up the complement of the coast-artillery militia should war come on, because there is a substantial number of men in the coast artillery who do not have to exercise great skill. Clearly, however, we should at once proceed to recruit our regular coast artillery.

This present deficiency has been caused partly by the fact that we now have very formidable coast defenses to be manned by the regular coast artillery at Corregidor, at the mouth of Manila Bay, in order to protect that as a naval base; at Pearl Harbor, near Honolulu, as an outpost of the Panama Canal, and at the canal itself.

We are lacking in ammunition for our guns in coast defenses. The Coast Defense Board of 1906 recommended that we should have ammunition enough for two hours' firing in our insular and canal coast fortifications, and for one hours' firing in those of the continental United States, on the theory that in the

United States we would not need to have continuous firing at many places at once; and from proper centers of supply we could meet the emergency.

The allowance was based upon the estimate of the time which would elapse from the moment that the leading vessel of an attacking squadron would come in range to that when the last vessel would pass out of range, in an attempt to run by. The supply was based on the most rapid rate of fire practicable in action, which for a 12-inch gun is taken at about one round for every forty seconds. It is hardly conceivable that such a rate could be continued for two hours, so that the supply would in reality be enough for much more than two hours' firing.

There is a difference between authorities in this matter; and General Weaver, chief of coast artillery, as a matter of caution, thinks we ought to have enough for two hours' supply in the United States for each gun as well as in our insular and canal defenses. We now have on hand of the amount recommended by the Coast Defense Board a full supply for the cannon already mounted in our insular and canal fortifications and 73 per cent of the supply for the United States proper.

It takes many months to make such ammunition, and we ought to lose no time in making the needed appropriations to supply this need at once. Failure to provide the proper ammunition in time of peace, when its preparation needs so long a time, is inexcusable.

Indeed, it ought to have been made before; but, unless military defenses are in the limelight of politics, it is easy for appropriation committees and administrations to save money by ignoring the persistent and warning recommendations of expert chiefs of bureaus on such humdrum items as ammunition.

The Question of the Mobile Army

I now come to the question of the mobile army. Confusion has existed in the minds of some laymen with reference to the difference between that part of the Army needed to use and make effective our coast fortifications and that part of the Army which would be required to resist an invasion by an expeditionary force of the enemy landed on our shores after our Navy had been impaired or destroyed. This is due partly to the absurd arrangement that until recently obtained, by which the command of the mobile army and the coast artillery stationed

within a territorial division is in a major-general of the mobile army. The two branches should be separated and the coast artillery put under a brigadier-general and a major-general of the coast artillery.

This reform was in part effected by a general order of February, 1913.

The mobile army is that part of our regular Army which is capable of transportation for use on the field from any point in the United States to any other point in the United States; if necessary, to any point in our insular or canal possessions; or, indeed, to a foreign country when an invasion of that country becomes part of our defense. The coast artillery is an immobile force, in the sense that its proper place and duty are in the coast fortifications, attending to the discharge of the fixed artillery. Of course it can be moved from one fortification to another; but it is a perversion of the object of its creation to use it as infantry in a mobile army.

The mobile army is made up of infantry, cavalry and light or field artillery, united in units in a proportion that military experience and science have shown to be most effective in battle. The ordinary military unit in a war is a division of from 20,000 to 25,000 men. The largest part of this division is made up of infantry, less than 10 per cent of cavalry, and guns of the light artillery in the ratio of something more than three guns to a thousand men of the infantry and cavalry, with the needed artillery force to handle and fire them.

This mobile army is to be used as our last line of defense against invasion. It is not so important in the first stages of war as the Navy and the coast fortifications, because of the risk that the foe would run in attempting to send an army across the ocean in troopships while our Navy was free on the sea, and while we have, as part of our coast defense, submarines and torpedo boats with which to sink the unarmed transports.

The length of time it must take the fastest fleet of troopships and a convoying fleet of naval vessels to come from Europe or from Asia to our shores would greatly increase the risk and the exposure of such unarmed transports. It would be dangerous for any considerable force to land on our open shore without maintaining their communications, by which supplies might be renewed from time to time from their home ports.

Thus, with an active Navy such as we ought to have, the practical difficulty of an invasion by a formidable expeditionary

force coming across either ocean would postpone any attempt until after our Navy had been met and practically demolished.

The alarmists speak of our long line of open coast, where any foe might land an expeditionary force, count up the number of men that could be sent on the largest transports, assume that they would cross as easily and as quickly as one of the great ocean liners could run from Southampton or Liverpool to New York with a boatload of immigrants; and thus that an army of 100,000 well-armed, well-equipped and well-trained men could be landed on our coast before we could turn round. Such a picture can only be drawn by one who ignores conditions that must always be present.

Fortifications Worth Manning

The unfairness of such a picture, however, is no reason why we should not take reasonable steps to have an Army sufficient to meet any expeditionary force likely to be landed, should our Navy meet severe reverses and we be limited to such resistance to landing as we could give by mines and submarines, or to such embarrassment as we could effect by raids of the few naval cruisers left to us on the line of communication to the home ports of the enemy.

What kind of an army could we oppose to such an expeditionary force?

The limit of the regular Army now permitted by law is 100,000 men. That includes not only the coast artillery but also the so-called Philippine Scouts, consisting of some 4,000 Filipinos, officered by Americans and fitted to do duty only in the islands. Since the limit of 100,000 was fixed conditions have greatly changed; and the limit should be changed.

We have built great fortifications at Corregidor, at the mouth of Manila Bay; at Pearl Harbor, near Honolulu; and on the Isthmus of Panama. If these fortifications were worth constructing they are certainly worthy of manning; and I have referred to the addition to the coast artillery, needed for these and other purposes, of 10,000 men and 632 officers. But, besides the coast artillery companies for the guns of the fortifications, new garrisons of the mobile army must be maintained to make the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Canal effective. The number of men needed for this purpose has been determined by the General Staff.

The Secretary of War, in his annual report for 1914, shows

that the regular Army, on June 30, 1914, consisted of 4,701 officers and 87,781 men. Of these, 758 officers and 17,901 men belong to the coast artillery; and 1,008 officers and 18,434 men belong to the staff, technical and noncombatant branches of the Army. This leaves a mobile army of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men. When the proper garrisons of coast artillery and of the mobile army are placed in the Philippines, in the Hawaiian Islands and on the Isthmus of Panama, the troops left in the United States will be 12,610 of coast artillery and 24,602 of the mobile army. This latter, as the Secretary of War most pertinently points out, is not much more than twice the size of the police force of the city of New York. For the continental United States, with its population of near 100,000,000 people, this is a very small force.

The Secretary of War recommends that this mobile force be added to by enlisting 25,000 more men, raising the continental mobile force to 50,000. Certainly this is a very moderate increase and one sorely needed. If we added also the 10,000 men needed for the coast artillery it would require an increase of 35,000 in the regular Army. This is none too much. My own judgment is that this increase ought to be made at once, and that the limit of 100,000, to which the President may by order increase the Army, should be made to apply only to the mobile army of infantry, cavalry and field artillery, and to exclude the coast artillery and the Philippine Scouts.

How Could We Raise the Men?

In time of war, with these increases in our regular Army made by executive order, we should have a mobile force of 75,000 regulars and 120,000 of the National Guard in the continental United States. The Board of Army Officers, appointed to report on a proper organization of our third line of defense estimated that we should need, roughly, an army of 500,000 men. We have small arms enough for an army of half a million men and ammunition enough.

How could we raise the remaining 300,000 men of our third line of defense? Some effort was made in the second Congress of the last administration to provide for a reserve of men trained in the regular service. It has proved an entire failure and has attracted not more men than enough to furnish a dinner company for Congressman Gardner. The Secretary of War proposes to substitute for the plan that has not suc-

ceeded one by which, through discharges into a reserve by the Secretary, of competent enlisted men who have satisfactorily served a year with the colors, a body of trained men in reserve can be created, and their places in the active regular force be supplied by new enlistments. It seems to me that this is a plan which might work, and that it ought to be tried. Mr. Garrison has evidently given much study to the matter and would not have made such a recommendation unless it was approved by the men of lifelong military experience at his side.

The great defect in all the armies abroad, and especially in those countries where a standing army is not maintained, is the lack of officers. There is not the slightest reason why, by a comparatively economical expenditure of funds, we should not increase our supply of officers to educate an army of citizens in a national emergency. By a reasonable expenditure at West Point we could double the size of the classes at that admirable military academy. The education and privileges the cadets enjoy would enable us at once to fill up the quota.

Then, it would not be unwise to establish another military academy in the far west, under the control of the War Department. Graduates could be divided into those who would become permanent officers and those who might be permitted to go into the reserve after three years of service with the colors. In the course of ten years we would have a supply of army officers who, with the militia officers, would furnish a sufficient force to drill, discipline, prepare and command men in a volunteer army.

We should have a National Council of Defense, with the President at its head, and with the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, and their respective chiefs of staff, and the chairmen of the proper committees of the House and the Senate as members. Such a council, by its investigations and reports, would give Congress a basis on which to act. If it were a permanent body it would gradually establish itself in a position of influence; so that our development would not be haphazard and would proceed with due regard to economy, on the one hand, and efficiency on the other.

From this summary review it seems to me clear, therefore, that what should be done is practical and within our reach if we adopt the policy at once, or within a reasonable time after consideration, and conform consistently to that policy in our legislative provisions.

First, we ought to take immediate steps to bring the Navy up to the point it would have reached had the policy recommended by the Naval Board not been departed from. This is of primary importance. So, too, is the supplying of the needed personnel to man the ships. This is the line of all others that we must strengthen, and this is the line with respect to which we have a certain measure—and that is a standard of equivalence with every navy in the world except that of England.

Second, we should fill up the comparatively small gaps in our coast fortifications. This is, of course, important; but it is so easily within our immediate reach that it does not call for emphasis. The additional 10,000 coast artillery men, however, are of prime necessity and should be provided at once.

Third, the enlargement of our regular Army to give us 75,000 effective men in the mobile army in the continental United States, the creation of a reserve as suggested by Secretary Garrison, and a substantial increase in officers by enlargement of West Point and the establishment of a new academy in the West, are all steps that commend themselves as matters of exigency.

There is no occasion for alarm. Indeed, I think alarmist articles weaken the force of the argument in favor of reasonable preparation. The statements are so extreme that the public either disbelieve them or say: "If it needs such elaborate and expensive preparation it is impossible for us to make it, and we'll take the chances."

A League of Peace

I am as strongly in favor of peace as anyone and just as anxious to secure it. A man who is not in favor of any armament at all and is, therefore, a so-called pacificist, is no more in favor of peace than I am. The only difference between us is as to the best means of maintaining it. I am just as strongly as any pacificist in favor of settlement of international controversies by an arbitral court for justiciable issues, and a commission of conciliation for political and nonjusticiable issues. I am in favor of a league of peace, by which the leading countries of the world shall agree not to enter into any war except after they have submitted the justiciable issues fairly and fully to an arbitral court, or the nonjusticiable issues to a commission of conciliation.

Such a league would benefit mankind so much that, if it

could be brought about, I would be willing to depart from our valued traditional policy of not entering into European controversies, and would advocate the United States' becoming a party to such a league, with a provision that, if any member of the league went to war with any other member of the league before submitting the issues between them to one tribunal or the other, all the other members of the league bind themselves by united forces to defend the member attacked.

I think the moral effect of such a league would be greatly to restrain the disposition to go to war. Our relation to world peace is sufficiently close to justify us in becoming a member of such a league and backing it up. Of course the league ought to embrace the great powers of Europe and this country. It would not be necessary to embrace the less powerful countries; but when such a league was formed the smaller countries would be glad to avoid the danger of oppression by joining it.

The great opportunity for the establishment of such a league is in the state of mind in which the dreadful horrors of the present war, after the war is over, will leave the participants. They will look with more favor on any plan to make war less likely than ever in the history of the world. We shall be much more influential in leading the other nations into such a league if we are in a state of proper national defense. It is not necessary for us to become a military power and to develop militarism in our people—indeed, it is impossible for us to do so; but we may, by only a moderate provision for our own defense, give weight to our voice in a real and effective peace-promoting league.

Scientific American 105: 512. December 9, 1911

Importance of the Command of the Sea. A. T. Mahan

The lesson for the United States is plain. In the strategic position before mentioned, in remoteness from Europe, in the rivalries of European nations, we still have a local and international advantage for preponderance in American waters; but it is not so great as to confer certainty without reasonable provision for insuring command of the sea. In the Pacific, which is equally our coast line, and to which the future mostly looks, we have no similar advantage. Much as I dislike and reject the phrase "supremacy in the Pacific," it is true that we there have

duties which in case of disputes will require the presence of naval force adequate to command. Duty to the mutual support of our two chief coasts dictates full control of the Panama Canal, which from the military standpoint is the key to any broadly-planned system of preparation for national defence.

But obligation is no less on account of the Philippine Islands. Having assumed control of these under imperative circumstances, we are bound in honor to support an undertaking, our fitness for which is attested by results. To them we are responsible for the maintenance of conditions under which material prosperity can advance, and their dissimilar and discordant inhabitants reach a homogeneous civilization and political development which will enable them to govern themselves. To Cuba, though independent, we owe by specific guarantees the maintenance of a like internal security. These national and international functions can be discharged, certainly, only by command of the sea. The Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean, with the great controlling stations, Porto Rico, Guantanamo, the Canal Zone, and Hawaii, depend upon this command, the exponent of which is the navy, and in which ships and stations are independent factors. To place the conclusion concretely and succinctly, the question of command of the sea is one of annual increase of the navy. This question is not "naval," in the restricted sense of the word. It is one of national policy, national security, and national obligation.

Scientific American. 110: 252-3. March 21, 1914

The Price We Pay for Self-Sufficiency and Unpreparedness.
J. Bernard Walker

The day of undisciplined levies and extemporized navies has gone by, never to return; for the trend of naval development in the past few years has been such as to put a heavy premium upon preparedness and a heavy discount upon the mere possession of the raw materials of war. It takes three years to build a battleship and another year to get it into efficient fighting condition; it takes four years to produce an efficient gunner or petty officer, seven years at Annapolis and aboard ship to bring a junior officer up to full efficiency, from twenty to twenty-five years to produce a captain equal to the command of a battleship, and from twenty-five to thirty-five years to produce an

admiral equal to the enormously complicated and difficult task of carrying a huge modern fleet successfully through a naval campaign. The naval wars of the future will be short, sharp and decisive. They will be decided just as soon as the far-flung screens of scouts and cruisers have got in touch with each other, and have brought their respective fighting lines of dreadnoughts together. When that has been done, the fate of the contending nations will be a matter not of days or even of hours, but of minutes. The battle of Tsushima, which brought Russia to her knees, was won in forty-five minutes from the firing of the first gun.

Scientific American. 110: 343-5. April 25, 1914

Need of a Council of National Defense. J. Bernard Walker

The spirit of international aloofness in which the United States had worked out its destiny during the first century of its existence was dissipated by the unforeseen outcome of the Spanish war, whose successful military activities moved our frontiers a thousand miles eastward into the Atlantic and westward five thousand miles to the very doors of Asia. The country, so far from deploring the new conditions, not only frankly accepted them, but immediately proceeded, both in its diplomacy and by the increase of its naval and military forces, to make secure its position as a great world power. It reaffirmed, most strongly, the Monroe Doctrine, commenced to build and fortify the Panama Canal, boldly advocated and put through the policy of the Open Door in China, and became in the Pacific the leading exponent of the doctrine of Asiatic exclusion. Contemporaneously with this great enlargement of its foreign policies, the United States made haste to provide the means for their enforcement, building up its navy so rapidly, that, within half a dozen years, it had become the second naval power in the world.

In the year 1905, when we had reached the zenith of our diplomatic influence and naval power, the appearance of the dreadnought produced a revolution in the rating of naval strength and threw our twenty-three first-class battleships into the second line. At this very time, when other nations began to accelerate their naval construction, building upon dreadnought lines, the

United States, with that fatal lack of continuity of plan and purpose for which it has paid so dearly in years gone by, began to slacken its activities—the falling off being shown by the fact that whereas, from the Spanish war of 1898 to 1905, we had built an average of four armored ships per year, from 1905 to the present time, during the dreadnought era, we have built at the rate of only one and a half armored ships per year. As the result of this neglect, we have sunk to the position of a third rate naval power, there being one first rate power, Great Britain, with 42 dreadnoughts; one second rate power, Germany, with 26 dreadnoughts; and three third rate powers, the United States with 12, France with 11, and Japan with 10 dreadnoughts built and building.

The gravity of the present situation is aggravated by the fact that, during the period of decline of our Navy in relative strength, we have asserted our ambitious foreign policies with a definiteness and in an uncompromising spirit, for which no parallel can be found in all the history of the republic.

Scientific American. 111:502. December 19, 1914

Hysteria and Common Sense

We are reminded that a fear has been expressed in high quarters that, if we begin the discussion of this question at the present hour, our attitude may be misconstrued by the warring nations of Europe, as having in it something of a menace, or as at least suggesting that we think our entrance into the conflict is not an altogether remote possibility.

In reply to that, it is sufficient to impress firmly in the minds of the public that the insufficiency of our naval and military forces has been long and intimately known to everyone of the leading powers of the world—better known to some of them, indeed, than it is to many people, and possibly to many Congressmen, in this country. If we set about strengthening our Navy by making it a little better balanced than it is, and bringing our Army up to the very modest strength and numbers which would be sufficient for purposes of defense—the only comment that this movement would excite among the naval and military men and the diplomats of Europe would be an expression of surprise that we had not done this necessary thing many years ago.

Scientific American. 112: 158-9; 178-9. February 13-20, 1915

The United States an Undefended Treasure Land

We have shown in the previous chapter that, in order successfully to meet an invasion, the United States require, in the early stages of the war, a mobile force (regulars, militia, and their reserves) of 500,000 men: whereas, as a matter of fact, we possess only 90,000 such troops today.

We now direct attention to the fact that we are without adequate artillery guns or ammunition for this combined regular and militia force, and it will be years, at the present rate of progress, before we accumulate the guns and ammunition necessary for this combined force at war strength. The estimate on which the Department has been working is for 1,292 guns, and 634 of these guns are actually completed; also 226 others are under contract. Of field artillery ammunition, there is only a small percentage of the total amount required.

Lack of Field Artillery Guns and Ammunition

We have in the hands of troops, or stored, 634 completed guns. We have under manufacture or contract, 226. These guns will probably not be completed for at least a year and a half. In other words, the number of completed guns is a little less than half the total number deemed necessary for the field force of 500,000 men, and provides no guns whatever for the coastguard troops or new volunteer organizations which will be required in addition to the 500,000 field force. Of ammunition, we have, made and under contract, approximately 30 per cent for the entire project of guns (1,292). Half of this is under manufacture or contract, so that there is not more than 15 per cent actually completed. For the guns on hand and under manufacture we have, of ammunition on hand and under manufacture, about 41 per cent; actually on hand, approximately, 20.5 per cent. For the guns actually made (634) we have 27 per cent of the ammunition necessary. For the guns now in the hands of the regular Army and militia we have about 44 per cent of the ammunition necessary. It should be remembered, however, that the guns in the hands of the regular Army and militia at the present time are less than half the guns required for these forces when properly equipped with guns, even under our scheme for the assignment of guns and ammunition; which is in both instances

far lower than in any of the great armies today, and the present war has indicated, in the case of one great power at least, that the consumption of ammunition has exceeded twice their maximum estimates, and that the proportion of artillery will, in future, be increased.

At the rate of even last year's appropriations, which were the largest made for field artillery guns and ammunition, it will take between eight and nine years to complete our present modest estimate for guns and ammunition, and the necessary equipment in the way of ammunition trains and other accessories.

Present Sources of Officers for Volunteers

The present sources for volunteers are the following: First, men who have had service in the regular Army or militia and are still of an age fit to bear arms. Second, men who have graduated from military schools maintaining a course in military instruction under regular Army officers. Third, approved graduates from the military instruction camps for college students. Fourth, men who have qualified for appointment as officers of volunteers through examination. All of these sources at present, with the exception of the graduates of the military schools, are limited.

Summer Camp Training of Officers

It is hoped to greatly increase the number who will be available through training at the summer camps for college men. Last year there were about seven hundred students at these camps, and their record of performance was so excellent that there is every reason to believe these camps will be a most valuable source of supply for volunteer officers. In the first place, the men who attend these camps go because they are interested. This is shown by the fact that they pay their own expenses. They receive five weeks of intensive training, during which they get about as many hours of actual work as the average militiaman does during an average enlistment.

Scientific American. 110: 360-1. May 2, 1914

The Problem of Our Navy: Making the Navy an Economic Asset. Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy

Can the Navy Be Made "Practical"?

If a way could be found to convince this portion of our people that the Navy is not merely an expense, but an economic asset to the country and a good business investment of the taxpayers' money, it would go a long way toward a solution of the situation, and would do much to win them from a position of active objection to one of absolute encouragement of a proper naval construction program. The greatest economic loss to the country from the Navy, be it necessary or unnecessary, lies not in the money spent, but in the 50,000 men taken from gainful industrial pursuits; for the money spent on the Navy, it must not be forgotten, goes back again into the taxpayers' pockets, to a very large extent. The Navy is not like the rich American who goes abroad to spend his money, but the funds appropriated are used to pay American workmen and American merchants and American manufacturers, and is, in time, distributed among other American citizens, so that, in the end, practically all of it gets back into the taxpayers' pockets from which it came; but if the country loses the productive services annually of 50,000 men, it is a real economic loss without compensation. Now, it is practically universally admitted by students of economics and political economy that the best investment a great and powerful nation like our own can make is in the education of its young men, particularly along industrial lines, and that the nation which has the most efficient and well-trained citizens, skilled to use their heads as well as their hands, is most certain to win in the fierce competition for the world's industrial supremacy.

If, therefore, it is necessary to make our Navy not only a proper protection to our country, but an economic asset as well, if we would gain universal support to its proper upbuilding, and if the real economic waste of our Navy at present is in the men withdrawn from industrial pursuits to man our ships, why cannot the result aimed at be achieved by taking these men during the time they are in the service of the Navy and training them to the highest degree, so that on their return to civil life they will become a hundred-fold more efficient industrial units than they were before?

Scientific American. 112: 192. February 27, 1915

Preparedness the Only Sure Guarantee of Peace

The assumption that the victors in the great war now being waged in Europe will emerge broken and exhausted is the deduction of ignorance and unwarranted by the experience of the past. Was the North exhausted by the civil war in the sense of being unready for further military effort? Quite the reverse—her population had increased and her host of well trained veteran soldiers, her ample equipment, and munitions of all kinds made it practicable for her to speak in no uncertain terms to France concerning Mexico. Does anyone suppose that had the North at the commencement of the civil war been as strong, as experienced, and as well prepared as she was at the end, that the South could have offered effectual resistance?

Does Russia show, at the present, exhaustion as a result of the war with Japan? Every soldier and all intelligent laymen know that Russia, from the military standpoint, greatly benefited by that war, and that today she has better equipment, arms, organization, and morale than before. Servia, small in territory, poor in resources, fought Turkey, then Bulgaria, and almost without a breathing spell has waged a remarkable campaign against the great forces of Austria—and so on ad infinitum.

The pacificists ask who is to attack us. The same type of people asked the same question in England a year ago. We are not urging preparation for a war with any particular people; we are rather urging preparation against war with any and all people.

Scientific American. 113-38. July 10, 1915

The Navy's Most Pressing Need.

If a layman were to ask any of the high ranking officers of our Navy what is absolutely the most pressing need of the United States Navy today, he would unhesitatingly reply "Our most urgent need is more officers and men, particularly the former."

The highly technical character of the modern fighting ship, filled as it is with weapons of the nicest precision calling for most expert handling if they are to be at all effective, has raised

the personnel to a point of importance as an element in the winning battles which it never before held in all the history of naval warfare.

A modern battleship costing $15,000,000, and capable, if ably handled and fought, of putting an enemy out of action in a brief quarter of an hour, if it be under-manned and under-officered, or if its officers, fresh from the naval academy, are lacking in sea experience, may easily have its efficiency cut down 75 per cent.

One of the most able and enthusiastic of the officers of the Atlantic fleet, speaking of the shortage of officers and of the fact that very young men from Annapolis, because of this shortage, are filling positions on the ships which should be filled by officers of higher rank and long experience, stated to the writer that, in this respect, the Atlantic fleet at the present hour is fully 40 per cent below the standard of full efficiency.

"A rather strong statement," you say. Nevertheless, it is amply sustained by a comparison with conditions in other navies —in that of Germany, for instance, where we find that there is one officer to every nine enlisted men, whereas in our Navy there is only one officer to every seventeen men. Last year, moreover, with a total number of enlisted men of 61,000 Germany possessed 2,615 warrant officers, whereas our Navy, with about 52,000 men, had only some 700 warrant officers. The German navy, furthermore, had 40 flag officers last year, as against 18 in the United States Navy, and she had a total of 351 captains and commanders as against only 182 in the United States Navy.

For information as to the fatal shortage of men, amounting to some 18,000, we cannot do better than turn to the testimony of Admiral Badger, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic fleet, as given recently before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. In answering the question regarding the number of officers and men needed to fully man all the ships of the Navy for war with navy crews, the Admiral stated that there are required 64,000. Not all of these would be with the fighting fleet, however, for 6,849 would be required for the hospitals; prisoners' guards, traveling, etc.; the insular force; navy yards and shore stations; radio stations; recruiting stations; training stations; station ships and for manning navy yard tugs, etc. Adding these 6,489 to the 64,000 required for the ships of the Navy, gives a total of 70,849 men. At present there are on the roll 52,293 men, and the difference, 18,556, represents the addi-

tional enlisted men required fully to man all ships with Navy crews.

On the subject of shortage of line officers Admiral Badger testifies that on January 1, 1914, we had 1,783 line officers on the active list. He stated that to officer the fleet for war and provide for the necessary shore establishments, without any provision for casualties, 2,716 line officers are required. The difference, 933, represents the present shortage of line officers. The shortage of staff officers is in proportion.

And be it remembered in the presence of these figures that it takes ten years to make a naval officer of all-round efficiency.

So now, gentle reader, follow very closely what Admiral Badger has to say as to Administration policy: "The number of men needed for the Navy depends very largely upon the policy which the Administration may decide upon in administering the Navy—how many ships it is proposed to maintain in commission ready for war and how many ships are to be kept in material condition in reserve, ready to be used in case of emergency. If the policy of maintaining all the ships of the Navy available for war of the first and second line is adopted, then we are short of men in the Navy now. Those ships of fighting value held in reserve should, in my opinion, have nucleus crews of such size as not only to be able to keep the ships in good material condition, but also to permit of such organization and drill, including target practice with guns and torpedoes, as will keep them thoroughly trained for immediate service in war."

Seven Seas. 1:22, 43. July, 1915

A Navy Unprepared. Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N

At the annual alumni dinner of the United States Naval Academy, Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N., reiterated, in even more positive terms, the statement that he had made before the House Committee on Naval Affairs last winter that the United States Navy was unprepared for war with any great power.

The Admiral said that American naval officers had seen the battle-cruiser, the scout, the submarine, the airship, the aeroplane and the mine developed by foreign navies whose officers and men were trained in the use of these instrumentalities of warfare, but

the United States Navy had not developed them and officers and men were untrained in their use and tactics. Other navies had built up great organizations of highly trained reserves, but the United States had none worthy of the name.

One of the most important statements he made was that while the American Navy was as good in gunnery as it had ever been, its European competitors "have accomplished feats greater than any we have ever attempted." He declared that all naval officers, American and foreign, knew that we had no tested war plans, no tested organization for war, no proper system of communications, no tested mobilization scheme.

We must make the laymen realize that the naval profession has developed greatly within the last ten years in Europe, because of the imminence of the awful war for which her navies strenuously prepared; while we of the United States, feeling secure behind the bulwark of the ocean, have not seriously prepared, and have therefore dropped behind in the march of naval progress and have been, in fact, outstripped. We have seen the battle-cruiser, the scout, the submarine, the airship, the aeroplane and the mine being developed by foreign nations into effective instruments of war, while their officers and men have been efficiently trained in their use and tactics; but we have not developed them into effective instruments of war ourselves; and therefore our officers and men have not been efficiently trained in their use and tactics.

We have observed the formation of great organizations of highly trained reserves, but have gotten none ourselves worthy of the name. We have admiringly noted the wonderful work of the general staffs, but have provided no general staff or similar agency ourselves, though the recent creation of the office of Chief of Naval Operations is a step in that direction—that should have been taken fifteen years ago. We have no tested war plans, as all naval officers know, American and foreign; no tested organization for war, no proper system of communications, no tested mobilization scheme.

Seven Seas. 1: 13-14. July, 1915

We Need Battle-Cruisers. Robert Wilden Neeser

If the recommendations of the General Board of the Navy had been followed by Congress, it would have been possible for us likewise to build battle-cruisers for our Navy when the type first came out without imperilling our rank in battleship strength. But the refusal of Congress to listen to expert advice retarded the development of our fleet along the most advanced lines, until today we find ourselves in a position really critical. We do not own a capital ship that could keep up with the

German cruiser Bluecher, and yet the Bluecher was lost in the recent North Sea action because she was too slow. Our fastest ship of the battleship class in the United States Navy today, built or building, is the Wyoming. Her speed is 21.22 knots. Our fastest large ships are in the armored cruiser class, the North Carolina being able to make 22.48 knots. Yet today the British navy has the Queen Mary, carrying eight 13-inch guns, with a speed of 35.7 knots; the German navy has the Seydlitz, carrying ten 11-inch rifles, with a speed of 29 knots; and the Japanese has the Kongo, carrying eight 14-inch rifles, with a speed of 28 knots. The fastest American capital ship that could make a fight against the slowest of these foreign capital ships would be outclassed by a speed of about 7 knots, or about 8 statute miles, per hour.

Is it not time that the American people realized the great inferiority in speed of their capital ships and *compelled* proper action by the representatives in Congress?

Sunset Magazine. 34: 245-52

Can the Pacific Coast Be Made Secure Against Invasion?

Holden A. Evans

The present coast defenses will protect the coast if the enemy is sufficiently obliging to attempt to land at the few places where we have fortifications, and in no other way. It is almost a certainty that in time of war the great guns that are mounted at the important ports will not fire a shot. The enemy will know the exact location of each fort, of every gun and will take good care that none of his ships comes within range of these guns. He well knows that a naval attack on land fortifications is hopeless and he will take no risks when he knows that he can land unopposed a few miles away. When a landing has been effected every fortification can be captured by a small force attacking it in the rear.

General Story, recently chief of artillery of the Army, has stated regarding coast defenses:

> The sole function of such fortifications is to defend a port against direct naval attack. Against an enemy powerful enough to land, the coast fort has no defensive value and may even prove an element of weakness, as did Port Arthur to Russia.

In accordance with the rules of The Hague Convention, undefended cities cannot be bombarded. The fortifications placed at the principal seaports only make these cities subject to bombardment and are of no value in repelling a landing force of the enemy.

On the Pacific coast there are more than a score of places where the enemy can land unopposed with perfect safety, can take San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle without a shot being fired from the fortifications built to protect the water entrance to these cities.

Armed Invasion Easily Accomplished

An enemy cannot land when opposed with any considerable force; the advantage is all with the troops opposing the invaders. Twenty-five thousand well equipped men, properly placed on shore, can prevent the landing of a hundred thousand. To do this, however, they must be on the ground when landing operations begin. With the long coast line and the many places where a landing can be safely effected, it will be difficult to oppose the enemy unless every point is protected. No one can tell where the enemy will attempt to strike. With a good system of spies operating across the Canadian border it seems certain that such an attempt will be made at an unprotected point. The transportation of men in numbers north and south along the coast line is extremely difficult, even with the railway facilities available. In time of war the railroads on the coast cannot be depended upon, as it is easy to destroy railway transportation for weeks or even months, by the destruction of tunnels or bridges with a few pounds of dynamite. To prevent invasion by means of an army will require a force at least equal to the invading force in the Washington-Oregon district, and the same in both the San Francisco and Los Angeles districts. This will require a trained army of not less than 450,000 men. At the present time there are but about 8,000 regular troops in all the Pacific coast states. The organized militia numbers about 5,000. Therefore a total of 13,000 men will be available on the coast to repel invasion. An enemy can, within five weeks of a declaration of war, land 150,000 trained men. In six months' time after the declaration of war this country cannot mobilize sufficient men on the Pacific coast to prevent the landing of 150,000 men. By the time that

such a force can be mobilized the whole Pacific territory from San Diego to Seattle will be in the hands of the enemy, and it will take years, thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars to regain that which we have so easily lost.

If our naval strength in the Pacific is overwhelmingly greater than that of the enemy, no attempt will be made to invade the Pacific coast. Any such attempt will only invite destruction. If the enemy's naval strength is equal or but slightly inferior to ours no attempt will be made to invade the coast until the fleet of the enemy has destroyed our fleet.

Unpopular Review. 3: 223-37. April-June, 1915

National Defense

In my opinion, the Pan-European war does not increase, but diminishes our war risk. All the belligerents will emerge exhausted, and disinclined to try conclusions with a nation potentially as powerful as we are. The appeal for rational military preparedness is not made in view of new alarm. It is simply a plea to do what we always ought to have done. The war merely presents conditions when the military needs of the country are more vividly realizable than usual, and opportunity to break with a tradition of complacent and ignorant negligence, an occasion to take a vital interest out of the realm of small politics and rule of thumb, into that of genuine polity.

The risk against which we must provide is in briefest terms that of a gigantic and damaging raid. Any nation or coalition that had approximately our naval power could, with average good luck and good management, land an army at any one of twenty unprotected harbors on our coast. The maximum force, in my opinion, that could so be transported would be something more than 100,000 men, a small European army. This implies more than a hundred large transports safely convoyed. Despite current alarmist statistics, no nation except England is able, or likely to be able, to launch a single expedition of much greater magnitude than 100,000. It would take about four days to put such a force aboard transports, about eight days for it to cross the Atlantic, and five or six days to effect a landing. In less than three weeks from the issuing of orders for invasion, the invading army could be moving on one of our coast cities. Of

course such an invasion is theoretically possible only for a foe at least our equal in naval power. Yet practically it might well be impossible to effect in time the correct tactical concentration of our entire Navy. There would also be difficulty in leaving our Pacific possessions and the Panama Canal entirely denuded of naval defense. In short, a navy somewhat weaker than ours could, under proper preparation and by choosing its moment well, successfully convoy and land an invading army.

If any nation ventured the raid, what is our present defensive provision? The standing Army is roughly 85,000 men, of whom at most 30,000 might be available as a mobile army of defense, the rest being tied to forts or posts or assigned to oversea service. At most, this miniature defensive army could hope to engage and occupy as many of the invaders. It would be very lucky to do as much as that, and avoid a decisive and destructive action. Upwards of 70,000 of the invaders, then, would be free to pursue the raid, reckoning only with a handful of scattered and half-trained militia regiments and with a terrified and helpless populace. A trained force of 70,000 men could quickly overrun the richest portions of our seaboard, successively sacking our great commercial cities, or putting them to ransom. What was done in Belgium could be repeated on a vaster scale in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and tide-water Pennsylvania. It could be done more easily than it was in Belgium, for the United States could maintain no such organized resistance as Belgium offered. Our chief cities are absolutely vulnerable from behind. New York could expect no such respite as Antwerp had.

Such operations would be essentially a raid. From its vastness, the United States is as unconquerable as Russia. Yet the misery, humiliation, and loss of all sorts that such a raid would bring to our land is frightful to contemplate, even in imagination.

The risk is entirely too great, cost of insurance entirely too small, to justify delaying it a day.

If the risk is correctly stated as a prolonged raid by an invading army of some 100,000 men, our needful military insurance is readily calculable. We need a mobile defensive army large enough, at best to prevent such an invasion, at worst to keep it within narrow limits during the first months, while a volunteer army is being organized. A well-trained defensive army of 125,000 men would be enough to give us such respite.

To these must be added at least 60,000 men for forts, posts, and distant duty. A standing Army of 185,000 men would be our normal minimum provision against possible war. It will be recalled that the retiring Chief of Staff, General Wotherspoon, recommended as a proper number for the active force 200,000 men. That represents merely a prudent margin over the theoretical minimum figures suggested in this article.

In any case, what this nation needs is not great armies, but simply a defensive force sufficient to stem a modern invasion. Anything less than that is a sheer futility, a half measure; anything more than that would bring a danger of militarism and infidelity to our best traditions. In case of a great or prolonged war we shall always have to depend upon volunteers, as England does in like case. The standing Army is merely to give us a breathing space so that the interval between enlistment and efficient training shall not bring disaster.

How long that interval would be it is difficult to calculate. England, with her frequent wars and excellent military traditions, hopes under the most favorable conditions to make the raw recruit fit for the firing line in six months. As a matter of fact, she is hardly doing as well as that. I believe that the United States could make volunteer armies of a tolerable but mediocre type in a year.

World's Work. 29: 413. February, 1915

Lessons of Our Past Wars. Frederick Huidekoper

Our past wars have demonstrated that at the opening of hostilities on each occasion (1) the Regular Army—which is necessarily the nucleus for the formation of subsequent forces—was entirely too small to meet the requirements of the country; (2) the organization of the Army was defective, often lamentably so; (3) there existed no reserves of trained men in order to raise the Army to a war footing; (4) no plans had been prepared to create and organize an army commensurate with the probable needs; (5) there was a noteworthy absence of military training among the recruits available; (6) the enlistment was invariably for too short a period and never for "the duration of the war;" and (7) there was always a dearth of equipment of almost every sort necessary to meet the needed increase not only in the Regular Army but also in the volunteers or militia.

World's Work. 29: 417-19. February, 1915

The Army As It Is

In his most recent report, the Secretary of War describes the mobile army of the United States as about twice the size of the police force of New York City.

An Ex-secretary of War has also just pointed out that, even with Mr. Garrison's proposed addition of 25,000 men, the whole mobile army of this nation could be comfortably seated in the Yale Bowl at New Haven and still leave one third of the seating capacity unoccupied.

Before the House Military Committee, General Wood declared in December that we had at present only enough field artillery ammunition in the country to serve all the guns through one full day's action. By noon of the second day they would all stand idle.

These statements are picturesque and striking. They are easily proved true.

Going into the subject more in detail, we find that no sufficient provisions have been made to supply the Army with field artillery guns and ammunition, and that it will be years before even our present very moderate estimates are completed. These estimates provide only for guns in the smallest proportion that has been adopted by any first-class nation; that is to say, the War Department is asking for only 3.19 guns per thousand rifles and sabres, whereas European nations run from 4 to 6.5 guns per thousand rifles and sabres, and the great use of artillery in the present war will probably increase this amount. The force estimated for is only 500,000 men. The estimate of artillery for this force does not provide a single gun for volunteers, and its completion is years away and has proceeded under a haphazard policy depending only upon annual appropriations which are not regular in amount, so that the work is going forward by halts and faltering steps. No provisions whatever have been made for ammunition trains. The heavy siege artillery is practically without ammunition. The guns which went to Naco in December went with only a small fraction of their field allowance of ammunition.

In the United States there is not in existence to-day a single heavy field mortar of the type that is playing such a conspicuous part in the present campaigns in Europe. We have not even adopted a type for such a mortar, although the Ordnance Depart-

ment has had the subject under consideration for years. The policy has been rather like that followed in the case of the 16-inch coast defense gun, which was completed in the late '90's, test-fired in 1903, and lay on the beach at Sandy Hook unprovided with a carriage, without even a design for a carriage, until 1912.

And yet it is in coast artillery that we are best prepared—if one may use the expression where there is so little preparation of any kind—but even this force has behind it a small and entirely inadequate reserve of coast artillery militia. The regular force itself has been considerably reduced by transfer of organizations to the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama.

In coast artillery, as well as in field guns, we are without sufficient ammunition. It would be necessary to ship some of our fifty batteries from coast to coast in case of serious operations on either ocean, and even when the guns have been transported and ammunition has been provided most of our coast armament is actually inferior in range and power to the armament which can be brought against it by modern ships of war.

So much for material. Now as to personnel. Owing to the imperative demands in the maintenance of overseas garrisons, the drains on the Regular Army have been such that, in the United States proper, the "mobile army"—that is, the army which can be moved from place to place and which consists of the engineers, cavalry, artillery, and infantry but does not include the coast artillery—was reduced, on June 30, 1914, to 1,495 officers and 29,405 men. This is only a few thousand men in excess of the smallest force of regulars maintained in the country at any time since the middle of 1861. Yet our population has trebled since that time. And at this moment there are no soldiers of the mobile army in their permanent barracks in all the vast extent of territory between Buffalo on the east and Seattle on the west, between the Canadian border on the north and the vicinity of the Mexican frontier on the south, with the sole exception of three batteries of artillery at Fort Sill and a small troop of cavalry at Fort Riley. All the other troops of the mobile army are in the field owing to various exigencies, and the permanent barracks are virtually abandoned for the time being.

Back of this regular army establishment we have a state militia of approximately 120,000 on paper. Its actual strength is about 103,000 or 104,000, and its efficient strength is not more than 60,000. It is only partly provided with artillery, largely

without cavalry and auxiliary troops, and in many states is so poorly organized and constructed as to be of almost no military value. It is entirely unprovided with reserves. No steps have been or are being taken to provide a National Guard Reserve.

Notwithstanding all the temporizing measures of a constantly varying military policy, the composition and strength of our land forces are still inadequate for even the normal continuing purposes of its peace organization.

Various plans have from time to time been drawn up by Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Staff for the reorganization of the land forces of the United States. A particularly able plan was formulated in 1912, but no steps have yet been taken to put it into operation.

NEGATIVE DISCUSSION

President Wilson's Annual Message to Congress, December 8, 1914

National Defense

The other topic I shall take leave to mention goes deeper into the principles of our national life and policy. It is the subject of national defense.

It cannot be discussed without first answering some very searching questions. It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that: and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack? We have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in times of peace.

Allow me to speak with great plainness and directness upon this great matter and to avow my convictions with deep earnestness. I have tried to know what America is, what her people think, what they are, what they most cherish and hold dear. I hope that some of their finer passions are in my own heart—some of the great conceptions and desires which gave birth to this Government and which have made the voice of this people a voice of peace and hope and liberty among the peoples of the world, and that, speaking my own thoughts, I shall, at least in part, speak theirs also, however faintly and inadequately, upon this vital matter.

We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities can say that there is reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory

is threatened. Dread of the power of any other nation we are incapable of. We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce or of any other peaceful achievement. We mean to live our own lives as we will; but we mean also to let live. We are, indeed, a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none. Our friendship can be accepted and is accepted without reservation, because it is offered in a spirit and for a purpose which no one need ever question or suspect. Therein lies our greatness. We are the champions of peace and of concord. And we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought to earn. Just now we should be particularly jealous of it, because it is our dearest present hope that this character and reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations. This is the time above all others when we should wish and resolve to keep our strength by self-possession, our influence by preserving our ancient principles of action.

Never a Large Standing Army

From the first we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. We never have had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army. If asked, Are you ready to defend yourselves? we reply, Most assuredly, to the utmost; and yet we shall not turn America into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves. There is another sort of energy in us. It will know how to declare itself and make itself effective should occasion arise. And especially when half the world is on fire we shall be careful to make our moral insurance against the spread of the conflagration very definite and certain and adequate indeed.

Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the only thing we can do or will do. We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, right American policy, based

upon our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and manoeuvre, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value. It is right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for mere health's sake, if for nothing more. Every means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a method smacks of true American ideas. It is right, too, that the National Guard of the states should be developed and strengthened by every means which is not inconsistent with our obligations to our own people or with the established policy of our Government. And this, also, not because the time or occasion specially calls for such measures, but because it should be our constant policy to make these provisions for our national peace and safety.

More than this carries with it a reversal of the whole history and character of our polity. More than this, proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble. This is assuredly the opportunity for which a people and a Government like ours were raised up, the opportunity not only to speak but actually to embody and exemplify the counsels of peace and amity and the lasting concord which is based on justice and fair and generous dealing.

Navy Our National Defense

A powerful navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defense; and it has always been of defense that we have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall tell us now what sort of navy to build? We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past; and there will be no thought of offense or of provocation in that.

Our ships are our national bulwarks. When will the experts tell us just what kind we should construct—and when will they be right for ten years together, if the relative efficiency of craft of different kinds and uses continues to change as we have seen it change under our very eyes in these last few months?

But I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There is no new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it because some among us are nervous and excited. We shall easily and sensibly agree upon a policy of defense. The question has not changed its aspects because the times are not normal. Our policy will not be for an occasion. It will be conceived as a permanent and settled thing, which we will pursue at all seasons, without haste and after a fashion perfectly consistent with the peace of the world, the abiding friendship of States, and the unhampered freedom of all with whom we deal. Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense. We are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be adequately done.

I close, as I began, by reminding you of the great tasks and duties of peace which challenge our best powers and invite us to build what will last, the tasks to which we can address ourselves now and at all times with free-hearted zest and with all the finest gifts of constructive wisdom we possess. To develop our life and our resources; to supply our own people, and the people of the world as their need arises, from the abundant plenty of our fields and our marts of trade; to enrich the commerce of our own states and of the world with the products of our mines, our farms, and our factories, with the creations of our thought and the fruits of our character—this is what will hold our attention and our enthusiasm steadily, now and in the years to come, as we strive to show in our life as a nation what liberty and the inspirations of an emancipated spirit may do for men and for societies, for individuals, for states, and for mankind.

America and Her Problems

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant

The Navy

It can be clearly asserted that the danger for the United States does not lie in the Army or in excessive expenditure, but rather in being carried away by the consequences of an organization which, copied from that of the divided states of old Europe, is in no way called for in the new world. The danger is in trying to outstrip other countries in naval power. I do not propose to repeat what I have so often said on this point; but it is clear that unless there is some reasonable explanation of the incredible departure from good sense to which the military powers of the old world have given way in building so many battleships (too big for their ports and also for their crews, which are becoming more and more difficult to obtain, while at the same time these vessels are defenseless against submarine explosions and are exposed to attack from aerial craft) it is still harder to understand why the United States should have caught the fever.

Protected by Two Oceans

The United States has two oceans to protect them against any attack and against all possibility of the landing of a hostile force, which is impracticable, even in Europe. De Tocqueville wrote long ago—and geography has not changed since his day—as follows: "The great good fortune of the United States is not that they have discovered a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great wars, but that they are so situated as to have no reason to apprehend wars for themselves. . . . The new world is so well placed that man has still no enemy but himself in it." The United States are still better protected by their political federation than by their geographical position, and they have thus a duplicate and impregnable stronghold that no enemy from afar can affront.

A Race to Ruin

The Americans have now developed a keen interest in what they originally considered bad, and have embarked on the new course with all their usual ardor. They did not confine themselves to copying the English dreadnoughts and superdread-

noughts, but set their hearts on something still bigger. Ten years age we were told that the maximum tonnage of a battleship would be 14,500. They have doubled this figure, and are now resigning themselves to giving their two newest ships a displacement of 28,500 tons; but, for battleships of the future, they are planning to go up to 35,000 and 40,000-ton vessels, to cost $20,000,000 or more apiece. In vain do the most eminent naval constructors, headed by M. Bertin, the "father" of the Japanese fleet, raise their voices against the folly of building ships that are too large, pointing out that "a few inches too much draft may prevent these ships from gaining shelter or entering a passage or dock for repairs near the seat of action"; proving that the most experienced commanders can neither maneuver them nor even save them in case of serious danger, and that absolutely nothing gives them any protection against torpedoes and submarine mines, the use of which in warfare has been greatly developed.

"Ships That Are too Big"

The Americans are carried away by a mistaken spirit of emulation and are making it a point of honor to build these moving four-mile targets, manned by 10,000 young fellows and costing $200,000,000. They are spending money freely on these targets. Their annual naval estimates exceed $150,000,000, the exact figure for 1913-1914 being $154,801,377. They remain deaf even to the appeals made by their own admirals, who are alarmed by the insecurity of these battleships in peace as well as in war, and are still more alarmed by the responsibility of commanding such vessels—an undertaking that is beyond human powers and even beyond possibility. The late eminent adviser, Admiral Mahan, constantly uttered his warning cry: "Where is this to stop?"

Expenditure. Dissatisfaction

It certainly is demoralizing. Far from painting the picture in too dark colors, I am toning down the sentiments of revolt and the charges that were spontaneously made, in my hearing, as I came into more and more direct contact with the people. I am not referring to the claims made by interested parties or to the oft-repeated assertion that the government was starving education to keep its dreadnoughts afloat, or to the contrasts drawn between its refusal to provide funds for roads, canals, forests,

flood prevention, education, hygiene, etc., and its readiness to spend thousands of millions on an apparently powerful Navy. I will merely cite one fact that occurs to me.

Ports for All

It was in New York on May 22, 1911. Mr. Meyer, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were guests of that influential body, the Economic Club, at its great annual dinner, attended by more than six hundred people. This dinner was a prelude to several speeches, including the Secretary's and my own. I was greatly surprised to hear him reecho the criticisms I have everywhere heard directed against what M. Raymond Poincaré once called leaks in the navy department—an expression which has unfortunately remained merely platonic. In his speech, which was fully reported next morning in all the newspapers, Mr. Meyer said, in substance: "I have pointed out that quite a number of our ports and arsenals are useless, but in vain. I have asked for the abolition of the navy yards at New Orleans, Pensacola, Port Royal, New London, San Juan, Culebra, Cavite and others that are a drain upon our resources without being of any use for defensive purposes; but these yards are still in existence." All this is perfectly well known in the United States, where four large ports—two on each ocean—would be sufficient to shelter all the American fleets: Narragansett and Norfolk on the Atlantic, Bremerton and Hunter Point on the Pacific. "Local interests take no account of these facts, and fight to have their own yard or help their friends to have one. A navy is being built so as to have yards! They are even being built in the colonies. The one at Cavite, in the Philippines, cost over $10,000,000 and is useless, there being no bottom for anchorage." I did not fail to mention all these expressions of dissatisfaction in my speech, and never was I more heartily applauded.

The Navy and the Policy of Intervention

The American Navy is the inevitable outcome of the mistakes apprehended by Washington and of a policy which has gradually lost sight of its origin and has become a policy of intervention, diametrically opposed not only to the interests but to the traditions of the United States. A powerful American Navy cannot remain in idleness. Continual waiting for a war that always has to be avoided will end by making it lose all patience. It will not endure an unnatural state of existence which is more

objectionable than anything to the American temperament. It cannot be placed on the same footing as the navy of an older country. What happens to the navies of younger countries at critical times? Have we forgotten how some of the Russian warships, after Tsushima and Mukden, cruised about the Black Sea spreading terror far and wide, and the Brazilian battleships that fired their first shots against the forts at Rio de Janeiro? All this is not the result of mere chance, but of paralyzing activity that is eager to expend itself. I cannot be expected to admire the United States and believe in their future and, at the same time, to shut my eyes to what may be fatal mistakes on the part of their government. I cannot see how American dreadnoughts can serve the cause of progress, but I see only too well how much harm they can do, and the complications and disasters they can bring about, with the help of the yellow press, against the will of the American people.

The Lesson of the Present War

What has taken place during the first eight months of the war has a signification deserving of careful attention. Big battleships have been of no use, either to England, France or Germany, and still less to Russia. Not a single great naval battle that could demonstrate the usefulness of big navies has been fought.

The Colonies. Imperialism and Its Vicious Circle.

To these objections the admirals and generals reply that they have colonies to protect. Quite so; and here we are in the middle of the vicious circle of an embryo imperialism. The need for a great navy to defend their new possessions began to be invoked by Americans from the time when they repudiated their own Monroe Doctrine and went outside their own continent to carry into other countries the policy of intervention they had shut out of their own. Having driven the Spaniards out of America, they established a footing for themselves in Asia, and, from the perpetration of this first mistake, date their assertions of the need for a more powerful navy to defend their new possessions. This pretext has now become valueless.

No great power, not even England, can have enough fleets to go to the rescue of her colonies, dominate maritime commerce and secure the empire of every sea. I have often explained my views on this subject. Not by their fleets, but by peace can the United States or France keep their colonies.

America and the New World-State

Ralph Norman Angell Lane

Are the military nations the prosperous and virile ones? Turkey is the most militarized nation in Europe; England the least. Which order of principles seems to have worked out the best? And on this continent has the progress been to the unwarlike and unadventurous Yankee or to the Spanish-Americans already referred to—the peoples who have had a ceaseless training in warfare and should possess in abundance "the manly and adventurous qualities"?

Nor can it be said that the authorities are altogether on Mr. Roosevelt's side. Herbert Spencer has for some time—about sixty years that is—enjoyed something of a reputation as a sociologist. He is supposed to know something of the operation of social laws, of the development of man and society, and the relations of one to the other. He may not, perhaps, be the equal of Mr. Roosevelt on those matters, but he has at least this in his favor: that while Mr. Roosevelt was wielding his terrible wooden sword in the nursery, while Mr. Roosevelt was indeed as yet unborn, Herbert Spencer's name was pronounced with respect by men of learning the world over. How does this veteran specialist's opinion agree with that of Mr. Roosevelt, who deems that the "unwarlike nation is bound in the end to go down"? Spencer says:

> Social progress is to be achieved, not by systems of education, not by the preaching of a religion, but only by cessation from antagonisms. Advance to higher forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism.

Christianity and International Peace

Charles Edward Jefferson

This year the government is asking for $148,589,786. But according to the plans of the Naval Board our Navy is yet but a baby. Every naval expert confesses that it is totally inadequate to our needs.

Last year the Army cost us $94,000,000. Next year it is to cost us $106,000,000. And this does not include the cost of fortifications and other things which an army must have. So that today we are spending over $250,000,000 a year for military

purposes, far more than we are spending for anything else. Did you notice the items in the national budget recently laid before Congress. We are asked to spend this next year:

On our judicial establishment	$ 1,240,000
On foreign intercourse	4,607,000
On the legislative establishment	7,641,000
On Indian affairs	9,533,000
On the Panama canal	19,000,000
On the Department of Agriculture	20,706,000
On the executive establishment	31,846,000
Or a total of	$94,573,000

Not so much on seven great departments of our government as on our Army establishment alone. And if to the Army appropriation you add that for the Navy, you use up a considerable part of all our income. So that we are handicapped in all our efforts to do constructive work for the social and industrial betterment of our people. When we ought to be spending scores of millions of dollars on our roads and canals, on our deserts and swamps, on our farms and public buildings, and when we ought to be increasing the number of our federal judges, and paying our ambassadors adequate salaries, and erecting in every foreign capital an ambassador's residence which would be an honor to our republic, and entering upon a national campaign for educating the negroes of the South, and for stamping out tuberculosis throughout the country, and for strengthening the agencies for increasing the health and happiness of our people, we are already, in time of peace, spending a quarter of a billion dollars every year upon our Army and Navy, and this is a mere bagatelle compared with what the military and naval experts want to spend.

Let us not be deceived by loud talk about our unpreparedness. It is our good fortune that we are unprepared. Do not let us be ashamed of our little Army. Its diminutive size is a crown of glory. How proud we should feel that we have the smallest Army of any great power in the world. Let us not shed tears when our Navy slips down from second place to third place, and let us not be in terror if it slips from third place into fourth, and from fourth into fifth. It is not a disgrace to be the lowest in the list.

Let us beware of coveting military efficiency. The first effect of it would be to make nations afraid of us. It is the worst fate which can befall a nation, that other nations become

afraid of it. Fear passes inevitably into hate, and the hate of its neighbors is the one thing which no nation can afford. We have enough unfortunate handicaps already without adding another. We are large. We have an immense country, with a vast population and with enormous resources. We have a tendency to brag and to strut. We let the American eagle scream too much. We are commercially ambitious and aggressive and pushing, and a complete suit of armor would only intensify our native traits. We are an inflammable people. We have great cities which readily catch fire. We have demagogues in Congress, and jingoes in possession of some of our papers. It was not many years ago that in many of our cities mobs cried out like wild Indians: "Remember the Maine!" We cannot afford to run the risk of being prepared. It would be dangerous for us to be able to strike at the drop of the hat. We never want to be able to issue ultimatums. We do not desire our government to be geared up for war. We must keep it in a condition of unpreparedness to shed blood. It was the preparedness of Europe which pushed it over the precipice into the abyss.

They say it would take us months to get ready to meet a foe. This is our safeguard. While we are getting ready we shall have time to talk with our enemy, and after a good frank conference, a way out of the difficulty is likely to emerge.

For the sake of the world, then, as well as for our own sake, we cannot afford to go on building an ever bigger Navy, or begin to agitate for the doubling of our Army. Our only hope of leading the nations out of the present dilemma is to set them an example. We cannot expect them to lay down their arms so long as we are buying new ones.

Foundations of a League of Peace

G. Lowes Dickinson

A Real European Partnership

Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said, "The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has yet been made

toward that great and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. The idea of public right: what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relations of states, and of the future molding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the small nationalities—each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan states, they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbors—more powerful in strength as in wealth—exactly as good a title to a place in the sun. And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for grouping and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either today or tomorrow, but, if and when this war is decided in favor of the allies it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship.—*Extract from an address by Hon. H. H. Asquith, at Dublin, September 25, 1914.*

A League of Peace Based on Treaty

From many quarters has come the suggestion of a "league of peace." Mr. Roosevelt has proposed it. Mr. Asquith looks forward to it as coming "immediately within the range, and presently within the grasp, of European statesmanship." And it was advocated, virtually, by Sir Edward Grey when he said:

> If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany will be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. (White Paper, No. 101.)

But, it will be said, what is the use of relying on treaties? This raises the question of the sanction of the treaty; a question of great importance, and one which, unfortunately, divides those who believe in and desire peace.

The Sanction of the Treaty

It will be impossible, I believe, to win from public opinion any support for the ideas I am putting forward, unless we are prepared to add a sanction to our treaty. I propose, therefore, that the powers entering into the arrangement pledge themselves to assist, if necessary, by their national forces, any member of the league who should be attacked before the dispute provoking the attack has been submitted to arbitration or conciliation.[1]

Military force, however, is not the only weapon the powers might employ in such a case; economic pressure might sometimes be effective. Suppose, for example, that the United States entered into such a league, but that she did not choose, as she wisely might not choose, to become a great military or naval power. In the event of a crisis arising, such as we suppose, she could nevertheless exercise a very great pressure if she simply instituted a financial and commercial boycott against the offender. Imagine, for instance, that at this moment all the foreign trade of this country were cut off by a general boycott. We should be harder hit than we can be by military force. We simply could not carry on the war. And though, no doubt, we are more vulnerable in this respect than other countries, yet such economic pressure, if it were really feared, would be a potent factor in determining the policy of any country.

Limitation of Armaments

Given a league of peace, a limitation and reduction of armaments might follow. It might, indeed, be introduced even if no such league were formed. For economic exhaustion might lead the powers, after this war, to attempt seriously the limitation which was the immediate object of the first Hague conference, but which was rejected as impracticable. It is most desirable that they should do so. Yet it seems clear that whatever basis of limitation was laid down, there would be plots to evade it on the part of one or another power, so long as there is no security against sudden and unprovoked attacks. Such security might be given by a league of peace. I do not see how it could be given otherwise. Nor would a mere limitation of

[1] It is in this case only that the powers would be pledged to employ force, if other means fail. As will be seen below, it is not proposed that they should bind themselves to employ force to insure the performance of an award by the court of arbitration, or the adoption of a recommendation of the council of conciliation.

armaments, in itself, prevent such attacks. It would make war less destructive; it could not make it impossible, or even improbable. Desirable, therefore, though this measure may be, it would seem that it would naturally follow or accompany, rather than precede, a league of peace.

In any case, governments should cease to employ private armament firms. I am aware that there are technical and economic reasons to be urged against this course. But I believe them to be outweighed by the fact, now sufficiently proved, that the private firms deliberately encourage the growth of armaments, in order to get orders for their goods.

Intercollegiate Debates, 1909

Increased Navy

Even though war should come, our present naval strength would be sufficient to cope with any fleet which might be brought against us. In case of war we should be compelled either to defend our coast from attack or to meet another navy upon the high sea. But our fortified harbors are already amply protected by forts and mines, and our unfortified coast cities are by agreement of the powers already adopted, not to be bombarded. Taking into consideration the fact that our Navy is now larger than any other in the world except Great Britain's and that the Navy we now have would be available as an aid to our coast defenses, it is evident that we do not need a larger Navy to protect our coasts. It remains then to compare the present fighing strength of our Navy with that of the largest fleet which any other power might send to meet us on the high seas. This comparison shows that we could amply defend ourselves.

The world is now in a transitional stage as regards naval architecture. The ultimate type of war vessel has not yet been reached. Common business policy demands that we should tarry until something more definite has been achieved. Besides, the money is badly needed elsewhere. Irrigation, inland waterways, the public health, all demand the expenditure of vast amounts of money. But most important of all, the United States should refrain from further strengthening her Navy at

this time, as an example to the world at large. So long as the great powers continue to vie with one another in the building of dreadnoughts, there can be no surety of world peace. This country should at least try the experiment of refraining from increasing her Navy in the hope that eventually sanity might come to other nations.

Memorandum of Points in Opposition to the Increase of the Army and Navy of the United States at the Present Time.

American League to Limit Armaments

1. Military Necessities of the United States

A. Thanks to the geography of our location, separated from any of the great military nations by thousands of miles of ocean, we are protected by nature from attack. To land a force of 250,000 men upon our shores is a herculean task for any nation even if we had no navy.

B. Our population which is drawn from the very flesh and blood of Europe is the last upon which any nation of Europe wishes to bring disaster and death.

C. Our commerce and our trade are desired by every nation. In 1913 our exports to Europe amounted to $1,479,074,761, and our imports from Europe amounted to $892,866,384, while in 1914 our exports to Japan amounted to $51,205,520, and imports from Japan amounted to $107,355,897.

D. Freedom from political alliance: We have avoided all alliance which would entangle us in the political intrigues of the world.

E. Our history has been that of a leader in peace and arbitration. For a hundred years we have had no wars except those in which we were the aggressor, except only the civil war, and in that time even with our long Canadian boundary undefended there has been no war with England, despite many causes of irritation including the Alabama claims, the Trent affair, the Venezuelan difficulty, the Newfoundland fisheries and the establishment of almost every mile of the boundary line itself.

F. Our disinterestedness in the world grab for colonies. We have not been in competition with the nations whose popu-

lation has grown too great for their borders and who must find an outlet for their surplus.

2. *Our Preparedness Today*

Admiral Fletcher, who is the head of our Navy and Secretary Daniels, our Secretary of the Navy, have both testified that our Navy is efficient. (The battleship Texas in recent target practice, made eight consecutive hits on moving targets at 30x20 feet at 8,000 yards.) As Secretary Daniels said in his recent speech at the launching of the superdreadnought Pennsylvania:

> There never was a time when the Navy was so powerful, so ready, so efficient as now. Nor has there been a year when the fleet has given so much time to target practice, maneuvers, war games and practices as the present year. Skill, modern adaptation, new tactics, are being carried out day and night. The motto of the Navy today is "training, training and more training; practice and more practice." Nothing else keeps ships and men fit. Today they are fit and ready.

Our Army, though small, is efficient and well trained. Its record in the Philippines and in the recent occupation of Vera Cruz is one of which any country might be proud. Health and sanitation are on a very different basis than during the war with Spain.

General Goethals says, "The coast fortifications of the United States are all right and among the best and even General Leonard Wood has to admit that the fortifications at Panama are 'adequate.'"

3. *Our Expenditure Today Is Ample for a Much Greater Efficiency.*

A. The recent Congress appropriated:

For the Navy	$151,000,000
For the Army	103,000,000

According to Arthur W. Allen, a writer for the World Peace Foundation of Boston, Mass., our expense per soldier is $1,300 as against expense by any European nation per soldier of $400. With less than 13 per cent of the number of men Germany had in her army in 1911 and 1912, we spent 53 per cent as much as she did.

B. We maintain useless forts and navy yards: The case of Fort D. A. Russell at Cheyenne, Wyo., is an example. It has

cost up to 1911 a capital investment of $4,925,000 not including maintenance and repairs. This fort is distant

	Miles
From Canada, the nearest point on the railroad	1,084
From Puget Sound	1,463
From San Francisco	1,266
From Los Angeles	1,304
From El Paso, Texas	837
From Galveston	1,230
From New York	1,912

In the words of ex-Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer, "The United States has more than twice as many first class navy yards as Great Britain which has a navy twice the size of ours. We have three times as many navy yards as Germany which has a navy larger than ours."

C. An increase in armament such as is suggested would not insure us against invasion. Ex-Secretary of War Stimson says, "We have 21,000 miles of coastline. If we were to undertake to fortify that coastline so that nobody could land upon it, we would have the entire American people doing nothing else except standing upon their border and spending all their money for that purpose."

4. *Why Increase Our Armament NOW?*

A. To quote from President Wilson in his message to Congress, "Who shall tell us what armament to build now?"

B. Europe is working out experiments on a most magnificent scale for us which will enable us to determine with some accuracy what is the most effective sort of armament.

C. Every day in the papers one sees arguments either for or against battleships or submarines or aeroplanes or dirigibles or mines or torpedoes.

D. Any day a naval engagement in the North Sea may leave us the first naval power in the world. Then why not wait?

E. The Navy borrows its system absolutely from the European nations, and as between officers and men, there is an absolute system of caste which is totally at variance with democratic institutions.

5. *Against Whom Are We to Arm?*

A. No sane nation arms for the pleasure of arming. The advocates of increased armament hint at great dangers, but can

they show them? Are we to build armament against Japan? If so, why not against Japan's ally, Great Britain, and demand the greatest navy in the world? Why not a hundred battleships and a million men under arms?

B. We demand a bill of particulars before we will embark on an increase of armaments. As John Haynes Holmes says in an address in New York: "The thing for the militarists to do is to really get down to business, to defend a standing Army of a million men and the building of the greatest navy the world has even seen. Then we will really believe that you believe in your gospel of force. We will believe you yourself realize the absurdity of the whole situation and not that you are only making a big noise and want to keep up your own baffled and discredited state of mind."

6. The Result of Armaments

A. "Armaments are a challenge," says W. Morgan Shuster. If we arm, another nation arms and so we reply with more armament and the mad race goes on, one arming against the other and neither achieving permanent advantage but both paying the bill.

B. Armaments beget war: To quote King Albert of Belgium:

> This war was unavoidable. It had been postponed several times within the last few years and if it had not been for England's efforts it would have come at the time of the last Balkan crisis. Germany had been piling on armament for years, had been building up a war machine so perfect and so powerful that at a given time it was bound to start itself. When you have built a monster ship you cannot continue piling on weight all the time or the day will come when the vessel will slip off the ways of her own accord. The thing has happened in more than one shipyard.

Congressman Gardner, whose speech in Congress started all this agitation for increased armaments says, in rebutting the pacifists' great argument that a man armed with a revolver going about is the very man who gets into trouble: "It is true he is the very man who gets into trouble, but he does not get into trouble because he carries a revolver, but because he is a trouble maker and because he is looking for trouble and because he is a troublesome sort of man."

Is the United States that kind of a nation, "a trouble maker," "a looker for trouble," "a troublesome sort of nation"? But we might like to try our armament if we had it.

C. As the chief neutral power, the United States is in a

unique position to influence the councils of the nations. If we increase our armaments at this time when the nations of the world are using up their armaments, and if, in the councils of the nations we desire to ask them to limit armaments, will they not be justified in suspecting our sincerity? A material increase in armaments for the United States is a material decrease in her moral influence.

7. Graft and Commercialism in Armament Business.

We are never free of the suspicion that commercialism is behind this agitation for increase of armaments: Congressman Clyde H. Tavenner in his speech on the floor of Congress, showed that the United States paid 20 per cent more for its supplies from private armament makers than it could make them for in its own arsenals. Philip Snowden in the English House of Parliament, has shown the close relationship of the armament makers in all of the nations of Europe with interlocking directorates and stockholders; lobbies and agencies maintained in all the capitals and stockholders in armament factories sitting in the Houses of Parliament, in the Reichstag and in the Chamber of Deputies. (Ask your opponents to explain the presence of H. A. du Pont of the du Pont powder family on the Committee on Military Affairs of the U. S. Senate.)

8. International Law

The United States is devoted to the development of international law: With the leadership which we have shown the nations in submitting controversies of vital importance to arbitration and to the Hague tribunal, we have a record of confidence in international law and in its development to control the relationships of nations.

9. Our International Position Today

The influence of the United States as a world power has grown, not by our reliance upon our Army and our Navy, not by our sending round the world a white squadron, not by our wars which for the last hundred years have all been wars of aggression against weaker opponents, but (1) by our trying to establish a diplomacy of frankness, (2) by our withdrawal of our troops from Cuba after we had twice occupied that island for police purposes, (3) because we paid helpless Spain $20,000,000 for the

Philippines, (4) because we returned the Boxer indemnity to China which they are using to educate their young men in America, (5) because we have refused to interpret the Panama Canal treaty to our special advantage, (6) by our support of the Hague tribunal, (7) because we have refused to profit by the chance to grab Mexico, (8) because we have spent ourselves and our money in relieving suffering the world over, (9) because by the hands of the multitudes of men and women from all the countries of Europe who have come to us to avoid the military burdens of Europe, we are forming links in the lasting chains of friendship and explaining the principles of democracy.

Alfred Nerinex, burgomaster of Louvain, speaking of America's swift aid to his people, said: "The most powerful army in the world cannot Teutonize Belgium, but America armed with bread is Americanizing Belgium."

In the words of Congressman Swager Shirley:

> The American people in the council of nations will desire always to lead, but never to drive, and in just the proportion that they are unwilling to drive, so are they determined not to be driven.
>
> No military policy that seeks to make us so strong that we may compel what we cannot invite will ever meet with the approval of our people.

The militarists have had control all through the world's history and have brought the world to the worst situation in which it has ever been. Pacifists could not possibly do any worse, so why not give them a chance?

Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. 1910

Opening Address. Nicholas Murray Butler

There is one type of citizen that must be mentioned, because the type is numerous, influential, and important. This is the type which holds the view that, of course, international arbitration is a thing greatly to be desired; of course we must all hope for the day when that at present distant, impracticable, and wholly praiseworthy ideal shall be reached; but that, until that day—which is probably to be the Greek Kalends—we must continue to tax our great modern industrial nations, struggling as they are under the burdens of popular education and of economic and social betterment, in order that death-dealing instrumentalities may be increased and multiplied and the sev-

eral nations thereby protected from invasion and attack. This procedure, so the curious argument runs, is to hasten the coming of international arbitration and to promote it. Civilized men, it appears, are to be shot or starved into agreeing to arbitrate.

This point of view requires for adequate treatment, not the arguments of a logician, but the pencil of a Tenniel or the caustic wit of a Mr. Dooley. Look at the situation of the world today as this type of man presents it to us. Of course, the United States is a peaceful nation; of course, Great Britain is a peaceful nation; of course, Germany and France and Japan are peaceful nations; but, therefore, because they propose to attack nobody they must so strengthen their defenses, so multiply their navies and increase their armies that nobody can successfully attack them. Who, pray, is left to attack these peaceful and law-abiding nations if, as we are assured by everybody—both leaders of governments, the molders of public opinion and the substantially unanimous press of the world—they do not propose to attack each other, unless it be an army of white bears from the newly discovered North Pole or a procession of elephants and camelopards from the jungles of Central Africa? The gullibility of mankind was never more conclusively demonstrated than by the widespread acceptance of this huge joke, which, unlike most other jokes, has to be paid for at a literally stupendous price. Children must go untaught, sanitary inspection and regulation must go unprovided, better working men's dwellings must be postponed, provisions for recreation and enlightenment must be put off, conditions accompanying labor, poverty, and old age must go indefinitely without amelioration, in order that in this twentieth century men and nations who, looking in the glass, call themselves intelligent and practical, may support, maintain, and propagate this stupendous joke! Either the whole world is being deluded by a witticism of cosmic proportions or some important persons are conspiring to tell an awful lie.

I am one of those who look for the simplest motives in explanation of action or of conduct. My impression is that somebody makes something by reason of the huge expenditures in preparation for war. Have you ever noticed that about the time that the appropriations for military purposes are under consideration in the Congress, in the House of Commons, in the Chamber of Deputies, or in the Reichstag, or just before such

a time, hostilities are always on the point of breaking out in two or three parts of the world at once? Just at these times war prophets begin to see visions and to dream dreams, and the poor, gullible people rush off to their cyclone cellars and shout timorously to their representatives to vote at once and as much as possible in order that great ships and guns and forts may be built to protect them from their fears. We have done of late some helpful and illuminating legislative inquiry in this country. It might be worth while to have the same sort of ability that has so brilliantly exposed to our repelled and astonished gaze other forms of political chicanery and graft, make some measurement of the sincerity and disinterestedness of the lively type of patriotism which accompanies these military and naval debates the world over. Is the propelling motive for them to be found in economics or in psychology? My strong impression is that while both of those admirable sciences are represented in the make-up of that propelling motive, economics is not always the less important of the two.

Letter to Congressman Tawney, March, 1910

Nicholas Murray Butler

I write to thank you for your courageous and statesmanlike utterance, printed in the New York Sun of this morning, in regard to what I can only describe as a preposterous proposal to have the United States government build the largest and most powerful navy in the world. At a time when the minds of reasonable and instructed men the world over are turning more and more toward the judicial settlement of international differences and the cultivation of international good will through steadily increasing commercial, financial, and educational relations, it seems little short of madness to ask to have public money voted to multiply huge engines of war and destruction. We now have a Navy which is ample for defense, and it never should be used for any other purpose. On every side we are faced with insistent demands for the improvement of the social conditions of the great mass of the people, to satisfy which will cost large sums. If these demands are successfully met, however, the results will repay their costs tenfold. To divert public funds from these important purposes, to continue the outworn

game of playing at war without actually fighting, seems unworthy of the representatives of our modern democracy. I sincerely hope that the House of Representatives will set its face like a flint against the craze for a big Navy and turn its attention rather to that legislation which will curb privilege, more securely establish political and social justice, and open the way to a larger and greater comfort for the mass of our population.

"Must We Now Have a Larger Army and Navy?" Address Delivered at Columbia University. January 15, 1915

Dr. Stephen S. Wise

Instead of guarding and defending ourselves against Japan, let us prepare to treat Japan with the respect that is her due and not continue a policy of needless affront as against a proud and honorable people. Instead of building up a new defense and security against possible attacks by other nations, let us learn how to treat nations in such ways as shall be just to them and worthy of ourselves. Let us have no patience with these incendiaries who are infinitely more menacing to American life and honor than all the so-called yellow perils. We have had seventy-five years of unbroken peace with the neighboring and friendly nations to the south, and ours must be the inflexible determination that nothing shall mar the peace that obtains between us. We have inaugurated a series of friendly relations that may be permanently binding if but we remember that these must rest upon an attitude of mutual respect and forbearance. Littler though the Central and South American republics be than is our own, these are entitled to our complete respect and good-will, and it behooves us to remember that nations are called on to behave themselves like gentlemen, especially towards the weaker, even as are individuals.

We would warn the American press against the folly and the madness of plunging into a militaristic program at this time, and urge that the newspapers of the land bear themselves with the strength and dignity which marked their conduct during the Mexican crisis of the spring of the year. The schools and colleges must not move our youth to share those dreams of military glory, which in their results are proving an unutterable

curse to European lands. Will the churches dare to point out the true path of American greatness and, in despite of the armament manufacturers and the partisan politicians and the bigger-America Chauvinists and the anti-moral jingoists, will they dare to cry peace when there may be peace and not join in that cry of war at this time which may do most to launch us upon the seas of bloody strife?

The argument that we must not suffer ourselves to lapse into the position of China on the one hand nor of Luxembourg and Belgium on the other is too contemptible to be considered. An analogy that parallels our own position with that of China or Belgium is an intolerable insult to American self-respect. Belgium and Luxembourg, forsooth, surrounded on every side by great armed countries, feeble and half-armed little semi-military camps to be likened to our own mighty if not invulnerable position!

Unnecessary our words ought to be after the high and noble utterance of the President of the United States as against a new policy of military defense and security. But one must speak because a group of men, whose program is to the unreasoning insidiously attractive, seems determined to proceed in an enterprise which, if unchallenged, will commit us to a policy, militaristic in its matter, imperial in its aim, and permanently subversive of every principle of our American democracy.

The present war is the answer, and no other answer is needed, to those who argue in the spirit of the supremely pernicious maxim that if one wish for peace one must prepare for war. The world-war is no accident. It was not precipitated by any chance shot, nor is it the result of any blundering diplomatic negotiations. This war is, save to the wilfully blind, the inevitable and long-foreseen result of ceaseless war preparedness. One must marvel at the wisdom and statesmanship which have succeeded in averting this war for so long, in the face of the military camps into which the Powers of Europe had been transformed.

Lightly men speak of expending two or three hundred millions of dollars annually in addition to our present outlay upon our naval and military establishments; and yet the same military propagandists would be the first to cry out against the rashness of undertaking any measures of social welfare, howsoever beneficent these would prove to be, if their prosecution entailed one tithe or one-hundredth of the outlay which they

propose. Not the most radical social dreamers of England would have dared to propound any schemes, howsoever serviceable and beneficent in their promise, which would have involved over a generation the expenditure which England has incurred in less than half a year.

As for the ravings of those men who would lightly drag us into wars for which there were no reasons, we must put out of our hearts the notion that, because a people is different from ourselves, we may treat it with disrespect and even with contempt. The supercilious and scornful tone must be avoided in every reference to Eastern peoples, the so-called Asiatic races. If any peoples on earth have the right to speak of others in tones of scorn, it is the Asiatic people who now behold European and Christian nations wage bloody, bootless war upon one another as if they were nothing more than barbarians.

There are deep problems of national policy and idealism involved in the change which is proposed. If our national ideals and policies are to be altered, then let this be done deliberately and advisedly and not as a by-product of a war-engendered spasm of militarism against which it is our duty to guard ourselves in the spirit of national dignity and national self-respect.

A martial and imperial policy such as will be the inevitable result of the newly proposed war-preparedness is irreconcilable with the basic principles of our American democracy. War is the pastime of kings and the plaything of dynasties. War-preparedness has long been an imagined insurance against the overthrow of warlords. There is no room in democracy for war passions and military ideals. Our democracy will not be real until it is shared by the nations of earth. We shall not be truly and completely democratic until we have done that which in us lies in order to help other nations of earth to free themselves from the yokes of despotism and imperialism and militarism.

The concern of a democracy is not with the lessening of the power of other peoples, the coveting of their markets and the seizing of their territories. We have no concern with the nations of earth save so to live with them upon the terms of friendship and good-will and serviceableness as shall irresistibly commend the democratic ideal to all the peoples of earth.

The American people may be swept off their feet for an hour

by the terror which it is sought to excite in their breasts. But the day of reckoning will come—not with another nation but with ourselves. The high counsels of the President may be neutralized for a moment by the clamor that is resounding in the interest of big armies and navies, but the hour of reasonableness and righteousness must return. The American people will not permanently prove unequal to themselves, and, though we were false for a day to the true ideals of our democracy, we shall yet see that the true greatness of nations lies in that perfect self-conquest alone, which blesses a nation and makes it a source of blessing to all the peoples of earth.

Pan-Americanism

Roland G. Usher

We are defended at present by our strategic position, the principal factors of which are the subtlety and delicate balance of European alliances and relationships rather than our actual geographical location, factors not easily supplemented by armies and navies and for which armament is a poor substitute. Were it more probable that a radical change would take place as a result of this war in the European balance of power, armament would be more justifiable. It seems likely that the vanquished will be beaten and humiliated but not crushed and that the balance of power will not be more changed than in 1815 or in 1870—and neither of these events produced a situation dangerous to the United States. That armament will be indispensable to our national integrity seems unlikely and disarmament in the near future for that reason appears to be comparatively safe. To this consideration we should add the fact that political control of the present territory of the United States is not as yet advantageous to any European nation or coalition in the settlement of its disputes in Europe and would be hardly essential to the extension of its authority elsewhere.

Our danger of invasion is really slight and disarmament comparatively safe, because the victor would lack the motive for invasion rather than the power. He will be seeking markets in undeveloped territory which will furnish him an opportunity for the investment of capital and for an increase of the productive and consumptive capacity of that community at an entirely abnormal rate. Such a field the United States will not present.

We are now so late in commencing the elaborate preparations indispensable to the conduct of modern warfare that ten years of effort would scarcely put us in a condition to meet the victor of this present war. If he is exhausted by the struggle, he will not be capable of aggression and we shall need no defense; while the great force to ensure the accomplishment of any legitimate ambitions which the United States may cherish will be unnecessary because he will be in no position to oppose. If, on the other hand, as it seems more probable, his army and navy are not only extraordinary in size but unusual in efficiency, any attempt at aggression would be futile for the United States because the war will probably not last long enough to permit us to complete adequate preparations.

The Preparedness of America: An Address at the Meeting to Organize a League for the Limitation of Armaments, December 18, 1914

Nicholas Murray Butler

When we are told in terms of most vivid eloquence that we must be prepared for war, I ask "For what war and for war with whom?" Are we to be prepared for war with the Dominion of Canada, our neighbor to the north? If so, how shall we set about better protecting the long, invisible line that separates the Dominion from the territory of the United States, extending over more than three thousand five hundred miles, than we have been doing for one hundred years? We have protected it so thoroughly that a century of peace has marked the relations of the two peoples on either side of this undefended line. How better can we protect our valuable commerce on the Great Lakes than by adhering with rigid insistence to the terms of the Rush-Bagot agreement, now nearly one hundred years old, by which we limited ourselves to an armed force on the lakes of two small and long since antiquated gunboats?

But if we are not to be prepared for war with Canada, are we to be prepared for war with Europe? If so, with what nation in Europe, and why are we to prepare just now? There would have been some theoretical force five years ago in the argument that we should be prepared to defend ourselves against invasion from across the sea; but to-day, when our friends in every land are bleeding to death before our eyes, when the na-

tions of Europe are exhausting their manhood, impoverishing their resources, destroying their commerce and their trade, bankrupting their treasuries and using up the raw materials of armaments in the construction of the completed instrumentalities of death—why, when the nations of Europe are about to be reduced to helplessness through exhaustion and starvation should we arm ourselves against any one of them? Who is this invisible, this unknown, this unheralded enemy against whose attack we are to prepare ourselves at such great expense? As practical men and women dealing with facts and facing the realities of politics and of life we ask our militaristic friends for a bill of particulars. Are we to arm to the teeth and draw our resources away from that needed social and industrial improvement which thrusts problems upon us on every hand in order to expend them upon useless armaments against nobody?

And whose suspicions are we to arouse? When the whole world is looking to us and when the wise men of every nation are saying to America, "You at least are free from the curse of militarism, you at least are in a position to exercise moral suasion and moral leadership," shall we at such a moment climb down from that high position of consequence in order to prepare ourselves to take part in the terrible turmoil of physical conflict and public murder? I say, no.

In a famous book, Mr. Herbert Spencer traced the history of civilization from a period of militaristic to a later period of industrial organization and life. He indicated just what had happened in the world as mankind made this progress and he pointed out in what ways men had advanced and how they had acquired wealth, intelligence, comfort and manifold privileges by shedding the old clothes of militarism and putting on the garments which belong to a life of free and competitive industry. We do not wish to go backward; we do not wish to turn back the hands on the clock of progress and return this nation of ours to the earlier and cruder militaristic stage of civilization. We wish rather to pass on into a new and third stage which opens before us as we speak.

As Mr. Spencer traced the progress of civilization from militarism to industry, so to-day we can almost see the progress of civilization from industrialism to the stage of a new and higher morality, to a new and higher conception of international conduct and to an enforcement by reason and morality of those high

standards of judgment and action that mark the civilized man in every country in the world.

For a contest to gain the position of leadership in that movement, this nation is prepared. For such a struggle America is armed. By confining our Army and Navy—sufficient, competent and well furnished—to the proper limits of their activity in a democracy, we shall then keep ourselves free to build that great structure of wisdom, justice, amity and peace on which the continuance and advancement of civilization absolutely depend.

Social Forces in England and America

H. G. Wells

And if too big an army is likely to be a mere encumbrance in war, it is perhaps even a still graver blunder to maintain one during that conflict of preparation which is at present the European substitute for actual hostilities. It consumes. It produces nothing. It not only eats and drinks and wears out its clothes and withdraws men from industry, but under the stress of invention it needs constantly to be rearmed and freshly equipped at an expenditure proportionate to its size. So long as the conflict of preparation goes on, then the bigger the army your adversary maintains under arms the bigger is his expenditure and less his earning power. The less the force you employ to keep your adversary overarmed, and the longer you remain at peace with him while he is overarmed, the greater is your advantage. There is only one profitable use for an army, and that is victorious conflict. Every army that is not engaged in victorious conflict is an organ of national expenditure, an exhausting growth in the national body.

The actual naval weapons are these smaller weapons, and especially the destroyer, the submarine, and the waterplane—the waterplane most of all, because of its possibilities of a comparative bigness—in the hands of competent and daring men.

For some years there seems to have been a complete arrest of the British imagination in naval and military matters. That declining faculty, never a very active or well-exercised one, staggered up to the conception of a dreadnought, and seems now to have sat down for good. Its reply to every demand upon it has been "more dreadnoughts." The future, as we British

seem to see it, is an avenue of dreadnoughts, and super-dreadnoughts and super-super-dreadnoughts, getting bigger and bigger in a kind of inverted perspective. But the ascendancy of fleets of great battleships in naval warfare, like the phase of huge conscript armies upon land, draws to its close. The progress of invention makes both the big ship and the army crowd more and more vulnerable and less and less effective. A new phrase of warfare opens beyond the vista of our current programmes. Smaller, more numerous and various and mobile weapons and craft and contrivances, manned by daring and highly skilled men, must ultimately take the place of those massivenessess.

We need a new arm to our service; we need it urgently, and we shall need it more and more, and that arm is Research.

And it is because I feel so keenly the want of such a service, and the want of great sums of money for it, that I deplore the disposition to waste millions upon the hasty creation of a universal service army and upon excessive dreadnoughting.

Story of Our Navy

William O. Stevens

In 1898 we laughed at the pitiable shooting done by the Spaniards, but the wiser officers shook their heads at the small percentage of hits made by the American gunners and declared that we must do better. To this problem the keenest minds in the service have been devoted ever since that war, with the result that modern American naval gunnery is probably not surpassed anywhere. It is estimated that in 1914 the "man behind the gun" shot 1,000 per cent better than in 1898.

War and the Ideal of Peace

Henry Rutgers Marshall

Did I, as an individual, find living at some distance from me a first-class prize-fighter, marvellously efficient but at the time thoroughly exhausted, it would surely appear stupid for me to take my time and energies from the pursuits for which I seem fitted in order to devote myself to the attempt to become

what could not at best be more than a second-rate prize-fighter, merely because of fear that the first-rate prize-fighter might regain his strength and at some future time run amuck and do me an injury. It seems to me that it would be equally stupid for our nation to take similar action for similar reasons.

What to Do After the War Is Over

Havelock Ellis

It is difficult to understand how it has come about that militarism has succeeded in maintaining its credit so long, for its fictions are so transparent. Putting aside the claim that war is a good thing in itself, even a great moral force—a claim that could only be made in a civilization which was but a veneered savagery—the chief excuse for military armaments has been that they were a safeguard against war. It is scarcely a plausible excuse. If any one really believed that such a method is the best way to prevent war, he will be able to believe it no longer. After this war any one who puts forth so simple-minded a notion will only meet with ridicule.

Militarism has been deprived of the only support having even the faintest pretence of plausibility which it ever possessed. Today it must have become clear, even to the most fanatical admirers of militarism, that the world can no longer be run on militaristic lines. The natural evolution of social order must be allowed to run its natural course. There can be no doubt as to what that course is. In our early societies, when two persons quarreled, they fought out their quarrel, and the strongest won, whether or not his cause was just. That method was so flagrantly unreasonable and disorderly that it was abolished, and the two antagonists were compelled to bring their quarrel into a court of justice, to be decided according to law, and thenceforth the force was no longer behind the antagonists, but behind the court. But it is just as unjust and as disorderly for two nations to settle their quarrels by force as for two individuals. The natural evolution must be allowed to proceed, and nations, like individuals, must bring their quarrels into an international court. That is the aim we now have clearly before us.

The one great fact which this war has brought home to us is that under modern conditions a war is not the mere private

concern of the nations that choose to fight. It is the concern of the whole world. In old days two nations could fight while the rest of the world looked on unconcerned and went about their own business. It is so no longer. The non-belligerents suffer only less severely than the belligerents. Look at Holland. Look even at the great and powerful United States. There is no dominion in the civilized world, from Canada to Australia, which is not suffering severely from this European war. Yet they were never consulted about it. Nobody asked their consent. Clearly a monstrous injustice has been committed against the whole civilized world.

NOTE—The supplanting of the rival national armies and navies by an international police force has in recent years become one of the most constant demands of the world's peace party; and the present crisis gives urgent emphasis to this demand. The necessity of any appeal to such power to enforce international decrees, when any real federation of the world is once effected, will of course be rare and slight. The results of the 400 or more international arbitrations of the last century have all been faithfully accepted and observed. When nations have become civilized enough to refer their disputes to arbitration and the courts, they are civilized enough to ensure respect for the verdicts; and Mr. Root, in his address on "The Sanction of International Law," shows clearly how the great and growing sanction is enlightened and developing public opinion. The late Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court emphasized the sufficiency of non-intercourse as the compulsion in any possible exceptional case; and his statement, which follows, is of distinct interest in the present connection:

"It is sometimes objected that there is provided no power to compel obedience to the awards of the International Tribunal. Will it be possible ever to make the nations agree that force shall stand behind the award of arbitrators and compel the nations to yield obedience? I notice that in the program which is being prepared for the coming interparliamentary conference there occurs this provision, as something which it is hoped to see adopted: 'The armed forces of all the nations represented to be at the service of the congress for the enforcement of any decree rendered by the Hague court, according to the treaties of arbitration.' Well, it may be that this will be secured. There is one precedent for something of the kind. When the various diplomatic representatives were in danger in Peking, you know the English, the Americans, the Russians, the Japanese and the Germans combined their military forces and sent them to the rescue. So it is possible that some provision will be made by which there can be a union of the forces of the different nations to compel two disputing nations, first to submit their controversy to arbitration, and then to abide by that arbitration.

"But suppose that this is not done—for certainly it is not to be expected that the nations will agree that any one nation shall be a sort of international sheriff or marshal to execute the process of any court; the independence and equality of the nations forbid such an expectation, at least for a generation. It would be very difficult to create a scheme by

which the mingled forces of the various nations could be brought together whenever an emergency of the kind that I suggest arises. But is it not possible that there may be a compulsion which the nations cannot resist, which will be potent enough to compel every nation to submit its disputes with other nations to arbitration, and to abide by the award? Our good friend, Dr. Edward Everett Hale, told us years ago, in that story which rang through all the country, of the terrible position of a man without a country. Now, if the nations in the coming conferences at The Hague shall agree that any nation which refuses to enter into arbitration with a nation with which it has a dispute, or which refuses to abide by the award of the arbitrators selected in accordance with the provisions of the Hague convention, or some other convention, shall be isolated from all intercourse with and recognition by any other nation on the face of the earth, can you imagine any compulsion which would be more real and peremptory than that? If all the other civilized nations would say to such a nation, 'From this time forward, until you submit this dispute to arbitration, we will withdraw all our diplomatic representatives, we will have no official communication with you, we will forbid our citizens from having any business transactions with your citizens, we will forbid your citizens from coming into our territory, we will make you a Robinson Crusoe on a desolate island,' there is no nation, however mighty, that could endure such an isolation, such an outlawry, as that would be. The business interests of the nation would compel the government to recede from its position and not longer remain an outlaw on the face of the globe.

"Such a procedure would involve no military force, no bloodshed on the part of the other nations. The only military force, the only bloodshed that might follow, would be in case the nation thus outlawed attempted to attack some of the other nations, when they would all unite in resisting it. The very fact that it was outlawed would place it in a position where it would have to submit; it would be compulsion, as real as a compulsion of a marshal with a writ in his hands. In some such way as this the force which stands back of the court within a nation might possibly be exercised by the nations upon any nation that refused to enter into arbitration or abide by its decisions."

Extract from Letter to Lord Castlereagh, March 21, 1816, Containing a Reiteration of the Proposal for Disarmament on the Great Lakes, First Made by Mr. Adams, January 25, 1816

John Quincy Adams

It is the sincere wish and, so far as depends upon them, the determined intention of the American government that the peace, so happily restored between the two countries, should be cemented by every suitable measure of concilation and by that mutual reliance upon good faith, far better adapted to the maintenance of national harmony than the jealous and exasperating defiance of complete armor. The undersigned mentioned to his lordship

the incident of an American merchant vessel having been fired upon by a British armed vessel upon Lake Erie. The increase of naval armaments on one side upon the lakes during peace will necessitate the like increase on the other and, besides causing an aggravation of useless expense to both parties, must operate as a continual stimulus of suspicion and of ill-will upon the inhabitants and local authorities of the borders against those of their neighbors.

The moral and political tendency of such a system must be to war and not to peace. The American government proposes mutually to reduce to the same extent all naval armaments upon those lakes. The degree to which they shall be reduced is left at the option of Great Britain. The greater the reduction the more acceptable it will be to the President of the United States; and most acceptable of all should it be agreed to maintain on either side during the peace no other force than such as may be necessary for the collection of the revenue. The undersigned may confidently hope that this proposal mutually and equally to disarm upon the American lakes will be received and entertained in the same spirit in which it was made, as a pledge of intentions sincerely friendly and earnestly bent upon the permanent preservation of peace.

Advocate of Peace. 71: 32-5. February, 1909

Thirty Reasons Why Our Navy Should not Be Enlarged

1. Because we have fought foreign foes, English, Spanish, and Mexican, only six years in the 125 years since the Revolution. In every foreign war we made the first attack. With less danger from attack than any other nation, we are now spending more for past war and preparation for future war than any other nation in the world.

2. Because our extent of coast line has little relation to danger from attack. The second Hague conference has provided for immunity from bombardment of all unfortified towns and from levying contributions by threat of bombardment.

3. Because the Hague conference also provided for arbitration of disputes over contractual debts, thereby removing excuse for our keeping a navy to prevent forcible collection of such debts of South America to Europe.

4. Because a navy is less needed than ever to protect South

America, as it is now perfectly capable of a defensive alliance among its nations to repel any wanton attack from outside. Reasons which made the Monroe doctrine neccssary when there was a "Holy Alliance" and the weak South American republics were unconnected by telegraphs or railroads have no application when modern communications, soon to include the Panama canal, and enormously increased population, wealth, and mutual friendship make them now far from eager to continue our overlordship. With the price of a few torpedo boats we might secure by education and diplomacy a federation of South American states.

5. Because there is no danger from China, a peace-loving nation friendly to us. Our return of the indemnity has done more to promote peace with her than anything else could do.

6. Because of an excessive unhealthy reliance on force in our country in recent years, which calls attention away from the real foes at home to suppositious foreign enemies. Its spirit fills the newspapers with reckless, unfounded suspicions and accusations, distorting historic statements, promotes constant talk about war and preparation for war, of mancuvers, promotions, and technical details, and makes us blind to the real sources of our greatest loss of life and property.

7. Because our threc foreign wars since 1781, which lasted only six ycars, cost in life, all told, in battle, nothing comparable with our reckless slaughter by accidents every year in time of peace. The $60,000,000 increase of the Navy asked for last year, if spent in fighting disease, ignorance, waste, and wickedness at home, probably could save as much life and property as all our foreign and civil wars have cost. In five years we have lost alone by fire, largely preventable, $1,200,000,000. In four years we have killed, by accident, largely preventable, 80,000 more than were killed on both sides in the four ycars of civil war.

8. Because we are already spending over 65 pcr cent of the nation's revenue in payment for past war and in preparation for future war and have but one-third of our national revenue left for judicial and executive departments, coast guard, lighthouses, quarantine, custom-houses, post-offices, census, waterways, forestry, consular and diplomatic service, and all other constructive work.

9. Because we have increased our expenditure for defense 200 times during a period when our population has increased only 22 times, our coast line perhaps 3 times, and our danger from attack not at all.

10. Because we are protected by nature as is no other country and have not the excuse for a great navy which England has nor for a strong army which Germany has. Our wealth is as great a protection as our geographical position. We supply our own necessities and are not dependent, as many nations are. General Sheridan said that no nation on the continent of Europe had sufficient ships to spare to bring over enough soldiers to carry on one campaign so far from its base of supplies.

11. Because we shall need no navy to protect the Philippines if we but ask the nations to pledge preservation of their autonomy when we grant them their independence. No nation could refuse or would dare wantonly break such a pledge made to the world. The neutralization, in this manner, of exposed places is one of the most successful methods of preventing war which we can further use. The pledge between the United States and Great Britain to remove battleships and forts from our Canadian border has, since 1817, secured peace at no expense on over 3,000 miles of frontier. Without this pledge we should probably have had war. So long as this line is unguarded we shall never fight Great Britain.

13. Because, in spite of our strategic position and the fact that Europe largely depends on us for food, we are spending for defense more than France and only $36,000,000 less than Germany and only $66,000,000 less than Great Britain, which has possessions to protect around the globe and is unable to feed herself except by imports.

14. Because labor put into the construction of armaments could be better employed to increase our insufficient railroad capacity, and as many men could be employed in making rails and engines, of which we have too few to move our crops, as in making armor plate and instruments of destruction.

16. Because, as was unanimously agreed at the arbitration conference in 1904, in Washington, attended by a great body of our most eminent public men, there is no question of "honor" or "vital interest" which can not be arbitrated, except, of course, that of autonomy, which can be secured by international pledge, and in our case is beyond menace. Some of the smaller nations have already agreed to arbitrate every question. There is no excuse for increased armaments until we have at least tried to get the great powers to pledge themselves to arbitrate every question with us.

17. Because we can secure far greater safety by expending on a peace budget a small amount every year—say one dollar out of every thousand voted for armaments. This method was recommended by the Interparliamentary Union and is worth more even than the ounce of prevention, which is worth a pound of cure. Courtesy and good will are more powerful than explosives in preventing war.

18. Because a national arrogance is growing in our country; and bumptious talk about our being "master of the Pacific," though there are ten other nations bordering on it, is leading a part of our press and people to insult and irritate other people with the sense of impunity in our impudence which a huge navy lends. We, as well as other nations, have found easy euphemisms to ease our consciences when using our military power to further our own ends. We shall be far less likely to be hotheaded and rash and to rush into needless war if we do not increase our Navy. It is naïve conceit to say that we are so peaceful and just that we can never be tempted to wage a needless war. Said Secretary of State Sherman concerning the Spanish war: "We could have adjusted our difficulties without the loss of blood and treasure." Said Congressman Boutelle: "President McKinley, if Congress had left the matter to him, would have secured everything we wanted in Cuba without the sacrifice of one drop of American or Spanish blood."

19. Because our Navy is already so large as to incite other nations to increase theirs. Our naval increase was quoted last year in the French Assembly as an argument for a French increase. This senseless rivalry is driving certain would-be customers of ours toward bankruptcy.

20. Because increase of our Navy does not increase respect of foreigners for us. Respect can be given only to moral qualities. Our indifference to lawlessness and our civic corruption are well known abroad. We have no more moral influence than we had 30 years ago, when every monarchy in Europe was being sapped by our democracy. Plutocracy and militarism make us talked of and dreaded, but not respected. Many, perhaps, are glad that we are being hampered in our race for commercial supremacy by saddling ourselves with the old world's military burdens.

21. Because our dignity no more depends on battleships than upon light-houses or fire engines. We should feel pride if we

are safe enough to dispense with a few. A European city built of stone rejoices that it does not need our costly fire apparatus. A large navy is a confession of conscious weakness or timidity.

22. Because increase of the navy is an implication that new dangers are in sight and old friends are to be suspected. It arouses rivalry and irritation with other nations. The two nations today who are the most armed are in the most danger of fighting. Just as Germany's and England's increase of naval power mutually irritates each other, so Japan's military skill has stirred the emulation of our jingoes, masking themselves under the conceited plea that we are par excellence the peaceful people of the world and can do no wrong with our Navy.

23. Because "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" ought to be more and more the controlling motive of nations as of individuals. A navy is but a small element in our defense even from foreign foes, to say nothing of defense from our far greater domestic dangers to life and property. We have been secure from attack with our fleet at the antipodes.

24. Because the demand for it comes chiefly from those who ignore the new substitutes for war and whose military training fits them only to kill enemies, but not to prevent friends becoming enemies. They understand explosives, but not human nature or politics or diplomacy or the methods which have produced the astounding bloodless revolution in Turkey; or the demand comes from the class which supplies implements of war and surreptitiously keeps up war scares which the gullible voters make profitable to them.

25. Because declaration of nonintercourse embodied in treaties is a feasible and far more powerful force. We would better spend our energy in studying this new agent, advocated by Justice Brewer, of the Supreme Court, and other able men, now made possible by modern conditions of communication and politics. If one tithe of the $60,000,000 asked for were spent on an educational campaign for a pledge of nonintercourse from England, France, and the United States against any nation which attacked one of them and refused to arbitrate, it would do more to keep the world's peace than all their navies. Were two of these strong nations previously to make public their signed agreements to withdraw diplomats and stop commerce upon wanton attack on the third power, no nation would ever attack the third. The declaration would suffice. This is a totally different thing

from the old-fashioned embargo declared by one nation on another after war began. Even the unorganized Chinese boycotts, not backed by the Chinese government, made us remove injustices and more recently coerced Japan. If in fifteen years 400,000,000 organized Chinese refuse to buy goods if they are ill treated, the greatest navies will avail nothing to get their markets.

26. Because new inventions in all probability will make existing armaments useless before Japan, even if she wanted to attack us, could recuperate from her financial drain sufficiently to do so. Airships may make battleships useless.

28. Because every enlargement of the Navy draws men from constructive work. It keeps them always on the outlook for the trouble which alone could give them the sense of being of real service and importance and getting promotions and honors. Advocates of large navies are notably skeptical about other methods than force for promoting peace and draw the attention of the public away from the quiet and effective to the old-fashioned methods which tickle eye and ear with noisy and spectacular effects.

29. Because by lowering excessive tariffs and thus promoting commercial fraternity we could do more for peace than through intimidation by armaments.

30. Because we have not the faintest ground to suspect there will ever be a war again with England so long as our northern frontier is free from her fortifications; nor with Spain, whose interests hereafter can not cross ours; nor with any of the other nations with whom we have always been at peace and who could fight us only at a range of thousands of miles from their base of supplies. We are especially secure, as Europe is dependent on us for a large share of her food supply, and the Orient has everything to lose and nothing to gain by attacking us. "The Yellow Peril" is a psychological obsession of a few scaremongers who do not read Oriental languages or respect people who have not white skins, but who translate their suspicions into statements which are not facts, and help create the very hostility that would excuse their cry for an increased navy.

Congressional Record. 50: 5942-5. November 20, 1913

Suspension of Naval Construction. Charles S. Thomas

The real causes of our vast naval equipments are sordid ones and ignoble altogether. We have builded and are building navies in obedience to a public opinion created and stimulated by the interests which fatten upon public expenditure through the suggestion of international differences, the circulation of war rumors, and comparisons of the relative naval strength of nations. Commercialism has laid its hands upon national rivalries, both actual and potential; upon national ambitions and possibilities; upon the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power; upon the antipathy of the races; upon the conflict of democracy with absolutism; upon the opposing religions of neighboring peoples; upon the jealousies or rival cabinets, and capitalized them all. It has issued its common stock upon the passions and ambitions of men as an asset. It has divined the policies of monarchies and of republics and entered the possible results in its ledgers. It has formed and organized a war trust and sold or distributed its securities where they would not only receive but bring substantial returns. It manufactures and sells all sorts of articles designed for the wholesale slaughter of men, for the devastation of countries, and for the making of widows and orphans. It reaps harvests of gold by clearing the way for other harvests of blood and tears. It owns gun factories, armor-plate factories, dynamite factories, powder factories, shipyards, and naval supplies in every country of the world that has a seacoast and a treasury.

It has placed its dollar mark upon patriotism and levied its toll impartially on both hate and fear. It treats all countries alike. With the assemblage of every Congress it warns the United States of Japan and points to our unprotected Pacific coast. With every meeting of the Japanese Parliament it whispers of American ambition and points to our unprotected Pacific coast. With every disturbance in Central or South America it predicts European intervention and reminds us of our inferior Navy. With every such disturbance it urges European intervention and suggests our inferior Navy. It inspires German animosity toward England and French animosity toward Germany. It secures contracts for two battleships from the Argentine Republic as a reward for disclosing the plans of American battleships it had constructed.

On the 18th day of last April Dr. William Liebknecht astonished the German Reichstag by exposing the association of the Krupp and war munition companies of Germany with the creation and circulation of war rumors; laid bare their relation to the making and selling of guns, of gunpowder, and war supplies; the interest of French officers and business men in the specific enterprise; the financing of leagues, societies, and publications which clamor for more battleships and armor plate to shield the nations against impending dangers, carefully shaped and groomed for the purpose; leagued them with great financial interests within and without the empire; exposed the alliance of cabinets, legislators, and newspapers with great armament concerns to quicken the market for their wares by inciting disputes and appealing to patriotism. "Patriotism," said old Dr. Johnson, "is the last resource of a scoundrel." This definition is altogether too narrow for twentieth century big business war enterprise that hungers for public appropriations. Patriotism has become its constant resource.

But, Mr. President, Dr. Liebknecht's greatest service is that he has lifted the curtain upon a vaster alliance between the war syndicate and political, public, and private interest than that which he so fully exposed. He riveted public attention upon two concerns and their associated policies, and in so doing he stimulated public inquiry into the conduct of similar and kindred enterprises everywhere. And this has revealed a union of practically all who deal in munitions of war that is world wide in its scope. By the system of interlocking directorates they are intertwined with each other and act upon the principle of each for all and all for each. They know no country, no creed, no language, but with the arms of Briareus this combination reaches out and embraces them all.

Congressional Record. 52: 99-110. December 10, 1914

United States Preparedness for War: Debate in Congress

Mr. Sisson. The illustration at our very door between the United States and Canada is an evidence of what may be done. Because under a treaty over a 100 years old two little boats are maintained by the United States and two small boats maintained by Canada of a type 100 years old have been rebuilt several times there is not a fort on the Canadian border, but we

peacefully transact our business one with the other. If this succeeds between Canada and the United States, with over a 3,000-mile coast line, why not apply the principle to all nations?

I find no reason now why we should hasten to increase the Army or increase the Navy. On the contrary, if we have an enemy on earth, I do not know it. But if we had an enemy sufficient to justify a great increase of the Army or of the Navy, then this is certainly not the time to make the increase, because if the war critics are right about it this war will continue at least a year.

Congressional Record. 52: appendix 103-5. January 15, 1915

The War Terror; Extension of Remarks of Edward W. Saunders, in the House of Representatives, January 15, 1915

The report has been circulated time and time again in the newspapers and magazines by men who should have known better that we are without any reserve supplies of war material. Outside of the rifles that are in the hands of our regular troops and the organized militia we have in reserve to-day in our arsenals, ready for immediate use, 850,000 rifles. The regulars and the militia have 150,000, making a total of 1,000,000. For these rifles we have in reserve and ready for instant use 206,000,000 rounds of ammunition. We have, it is true, not enough field artillery guns and ammunition; but we have in use with the Army and in reserve 860 such guns, and almost enough ammunition to supply them.

In addition to this we are now making big appropriations—bigger than ever before—for the field artillery, and it is estimated by the Chief of Ordnance of the Army that if we continue these appropriations at the rate on which we had begun long before the European war started, we shall have accumulated in five years the guns and ammunition to meet any emergency. We have also on hand 1,300 quick-firing guns, and, according to plans already laid down, we shall appropriate in the immediate future the money for enough of this type of gun to be ample. Then, as the complement to all this, there are in reserve the necessary clothing, harness, camp equipment, etc., all of which can be thrown into immediate use under the excellent plans for distribution now in vogue in the War Department.

A consideration of the amount of money we spend each year

on our Army shows conclusively that we can not be unprepared for war. The Committee on Military Affairs appropriated for the fiscal year that will end June 30, 1915, $101,000,000 for the maintenance of the Army. The fortification expenses carried in the fortifications act, handled by the Committee on Appropriations, were $5,218,250, and the sundry-civil act gave $643,000 for armories and arsenals and $805,428 for military posts. All this runs into a large total, so large that the economists complain of the burdènsome taxation made necessary by the maintenance of any military establishment at all.

There is a reserve force in the United States; that is, a body of men who have had military training and could be utilized in time of emergency. In the first place, there will be after 1916 at least 15,000 men discharged from the Army each year after having served their four-year terms of enlistment, and approximately that number are being discharged each year now after the expiration of their three-year terms (the term was lengthened from three years to four in 1912). This means that every year there are being returned into the body of civilians 15,000 men who have learned military tactics and seen military training; in other words, expert soldiers. In the organized militia there are about 120,000 men, and at a conservative estimate it can be stated that 20,000 of them, after serving their full term of enlistment are discharged each year. This provides an annual total of 35,000 men who return to civilian life each year after having been trained as soldiers in the Regular Army and the State militia.

But there is still another source whence come young men who have had good military training. I refer to the military schools and colleges. These—without reference to the high schools in which military training is a feature—turn out each year at least 26,000 who know about fighting, drilling, and marching. They bring the annual supply of trained soldiers in this country up to 61,000. The product of the .military school or college does not get so thorough a training, of course, as is given at the West Point Academy, but it is thorough enough to make soldiers out of them in a very short time.

After all, therefore, we are not so poor in actual military reserves as many would have us believe. It can be safely asserted that the United States contains more men ready to go to war with military training behind them than is the case in any other country where compulsory military training does not obtain.

Congressional Record. 52: appendix 195. January 26, 1915

Carl Schurz on Peace and War

As an American citizen I can not contemplate this noble peace mission of my country without a thrill of pride. And, I must confess, it touches me like an attack upon the dignity of this Republic when I hear Americans repudiate that peace mission upon the ground of supposed interests of the United States requiring for their protection or furtherance preparation for war-like action and the incitement of a fighting spirit among our people. To judge from the utterances of some men having the public ear, we are constantly threatened by the evil designs of rival or secretly hostile powers that are eagerly watching every chance to humiliate our self-esteem, to insult our flag, to balk our policies, to harass our commerce, and even to threaten our very independence, and putting us in imminent danger of discomfiture of all sorts, unless we stand with sword in hand in sleepless watch and cover the seas with warships and picket the islands of every ocean with garrisoned outposts and surround ourselves far and near with impregnable fortresses. What a poor idea those indulging in such talk have of the true position of their country among the nations of the world!

A little calm reflection will convince every unprejudiced mind that there is not a single power, nor even an imaginable combination of powers, on the face of the globe that can wish—I might almost say that can afford—a serious quarrel with the United States. There are very simple reasons for this. A war in our days is not a mere matters of military skill, nor even—as it would certainly not be in our case—a mere matter of preparation for the first onset. It is a matter of material resources, of reserves, of staying power. Now, considering that in all these respects our means are substantially inexhaustible and that the patriotic spirit and the extraordinary ingenuity of our people would greatly aid their development in the progress of a conflict; considering that, however grievous the injuries a strong hostile navy might inflict upon us at the beginnig of a war, it could not touch a vital point, as on land we would be immensely superior to any army that could be brought upon our shores; considering that thus a war with the United States, as a test of endurance, would, so far as our staying power is concerned, be a war of indefinite duration; considering all these things, I am justified in

saying that no European power can engage in such a conflict with us without presenting to its rivals in the old world the most tempting opportunity for hostile action. And no European power will do this unless forced by extreme necessity. For the same reason no European power will, even if it were so inclined, insist upon doing anything injurious to our interests that might lead to a war with the United States. We may, therefore, depend upon it with absolute assurance that, whether we are armed or not, no European power will seek a quarrel with us; that, on the contrary, they will avoid such a quarrel with the utmost care; that we can not have a war with any of them unless we wantonly and persistently seek such a war; and that they will respect our rights and comply with all our demands, if just and proper, in the way of friendly agreement.

In the face of these indisputable facts we hear the hysterical cries of alarmists who scent behind every rock or bush a foreign foe standing, with dagger in hand, ready to spring upon us and rob us of our valuables, if not to kill us outright, or at least making faces at us and insulting the Stars and Stripes. Is not this constant and eager looking for danger or insult where neither exists very like that melancholy form of insanity called persecution mania, which is so extremely distressing to the sufferers and their friends? We may heartily commiserate the unfortunate victims of so dreadful an affliction; but surely the American people should not take such morbid hallucinations as a reason for giving up that inestimable blessing of not being burdened with large armaments and for embarking upon a policy of warlike preparation and bellicose bluster.

I have seen war; I have seen it with its glories and its horrors; with its noble emotions and its bestialities; with its exaltations and triumphs and its unspeakable miseries and baneful corruptions; and I say to you, I feel my blood tingle with indignation when I hear the flippant talk of war as if it were only a holiday pastime or an athletic sport. We are often told that there are things worse than war. Yes; but not many. He deserves the curse of mankind who, in the exercise of power, forgets that war should be only the very last resort, even in contending for a just and beneficent end, after all the resources of peaceful methods are thoroughly exhausted. As an American, proud of his country and anxious that this republic should prove itself equal to the most glorious of its opportunities, I can not

but denounce as a wretched fatuity that so-called patriotism which will not remember that we are the envy of the whole world for the priceless privilege of being exempt from the oppressive burden of warlike preparations, which, when it sees other nations groaning under that load, tauntingly asks, "Why do you not disarm?" and then insists that the American people, too, shall put the incubus of heavy armament on their backs, and which would drag this republic down from its high degree of the championship of peace among nations and degrade it to the vulgar level of the bully, ready and eager for a fight.

We hear much of the necessity of an elaborate system of coast fortifications to protect our seaports from assault. How far such a system may be desirable I will not here discuss. But I am confident our strongest, most effective, most trustworthy and infinitely the cheapest coast defense will consist in "Fort Justice," "Fort Good Sense," "Fort Self-Respect," "Fort Good Will," and, if international differences really do arise, "Fort Arbitration."

Let no one accuse me of resorting to the clap-trap of the stump speech in discussing this grave subject. I mean exactly what I say, and am solemnly in earnest. This republic can have no other armament as effective as the weapons of peace. Its security, its influence, its happiness, and its glory will be the greater the less it thinks of war. Its moral authority will be far more potent than the heavy squadrons and the big guns of others. And this authority will, in its intercourse with foreign nations, be best maintained by that justice which is the duty of all; by that generous regard not only for the rights but also the self-respect of others, which is the distinguishing mark of the true gentleman; and by that patient forbearance which is the most gracious virtue of the strong.

Congressional Record. 52: 2070-2. January 27, 1915

Army Appropriation Bill. William S. Howard

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, it is time for Congress to take "stock," as it were, and investigate the present cost of our military establishment and what the cost would amount to if we followed the program laid down by many of the great so-called military experts and unduly excited Senators and Congressmen.

Recently the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Gardner] has received much newspaper notice throughout the country on account of his insistent demand for a commission to investigate and report to Congress our unpreparedness for war. We need no such commission. The report of such a commission would be worthless. For unless it was endowed with omniscient powers it could not possibly conclude which of the great nations of the earth we were to engage in war and when the fighting would commerce. But, for the sake of argument, let us take one of the great powers of Europe, German, and see what would be the price we would have to pay to prepare to meet her army man for man.

The peace strength of the German army has been kept at a minimum of 620,000 men. Under the German system of compulsory military service between the ages of 16 and 45 years this army cost Germany in 1913, $248,000,000.

Our regular Army, according to the last reports of the War Department, is shown to be 4,652 officers and 80,740 enlisted men, a total of 85,392. The appropriations for the upkeep of this Army will cost the American people for the ensuing fiscal year in round figures $130,000,000. So if we must prepare to meet world power with the strength of Germany's army of 620,000 men, it would cost us about $750,000,000 annually, or a little more than $7.50 per year for each man, woman, and child in the United States.

To state such a proposition is an assurance that the American people would not stand for such tomfoolery.

About two months ago, in a statement to the press, I said that there was but little excuse for us to get excited and nervous. Today we are more secure from war than we have been at any period in 40 years. Practically the whole world is in a death struggle. Europe is daily expending millions of dollars in money, millions upon millions of dollars worth of property is being destroyed, her hillsides are saturated with and her rivers are crimson with the blood of tens of thousands of the very flower of her manhood.

Mr. Chairman, all America stands appalled at the unprecedented cataclysm in which our friends across the water are now engaged. We hope and pray for the speedy restoration of peace, but if that happy condition were brought about this minute, already the bloodiest, most destructive, and costly war the world has ever witnessed has been fought. It will take years of depri-

vation and toil to rebuild the destroyed cities, replace the wasted millions expended for the death-dealing instruments of war, and no man can foresee the day when the payment of interest will end upon the bonded indebtedness of these nations.

Surely no one will be bold enough, in the face of recent events, to seriously urge that preparedness for war is the best insurance against war. Germany and France, England and Russia were all well prepared for war—and they are at war. As has been aptly said, "The breeding of bulldogs in no manner promotes peace in the canine family."

Mr. Chairman, many of the great thinkers of the world have proposed plans for universal peace, and in like manner many have planned preparations to protect against war. So far neither have met with success. It seems that no matter how many international peace conferences we have the nations of the world will not agree to lay down their arms forever and dwell upon the earth in "brotherly love." On the other hand, no nation has yet determined when it had enough battleships or enough armed men to say with confidence, "We are secure against attack." My judgment is that we will see universal peace on earth long before we will ever see the war lords and militarists of the world satisfied with a nation's preparedness for war. It would be a task as impossible as the extinguishment of an erupting volcano with a squirt gun.

If I were called upon to insure this country against invasion by a foreign nation my plan would be along entirely different lines from those of the jingoist. I would prudently and gradually secure my country with the necessary equipment and scatter it through the nation, and keep our gunlock oiled and our powder dry. When this was done, I would turn my attention to instilling in the hearts and minds of my countrymen the glories of peace and the horrors of a war of conquest. I would educate the youth of the land and equip him for a life of usefulness. I would stimulate our commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities. I would encourage the maintenance of American ideals and make secure the blessing of our country for our native countrymen, and thus inspire a patriotism and a courage that would secure our nation against a world of hostile foes—for such a nation is worth a thousand nations composed of tax-ridden slaves and a conscripted and unwilling soldiery.

So, Mr. Chairman, in view of the insistent demand for a com-

mission to report on our unpreparedness for war, and in view of the clamor of many daily papers of the country for a greater Navy and a greater Army, I have thought it only fair to those who pay the bills and who will really do the fighting, if we are ever involved in war, to let them know what the cost of our present war establishment is and how we expend their money.

The cost per soldier in our regular Army is now a little over $1,000 per annum. As I said in the beginning, such an expenditure per man is the most costly of any nation's army on earth.

Now, let us give some items of the expenditures going to make up the stupendous sums we are annually spending on the Army, Navy, and pensions. In the year 1914 we expended for—

Army (including rivers and harbors)	$165,646,297.77
Navy	140,736,536.35
Pensions	172,408,518.29
Total	$478,791,352.41

Congressional Record. 52: 2672. January 29, 1915

United States versus German Navy. Samuel A. Witherspoon

But there is one particular in which the evidence is now much stronger than it was a year ago. At that time we had to rely solely upon arguments and reason. We had very little support in the testimony of experts. It is true that we had the testimony of Admiral Vreeland, who, with a great deal of reluctance, contrary to his own wishes, finally was constrained to admit that the facts show that the American Navy is superior to the German Navy. And that is all we had at that time. Now, I want to call your attention to the fact that three members of the General Board and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet have been before the Naval Affairs Committee in the hearing just closed, and every one of them testified that the American Navy is superior to that of Germany. In other words, I claim that the admissions of experts now unite with facts and arguments and reason to establish the proposition that we already have a Navy so big that it is not necessary to increase it in order to be able to resist the German Navy, and, of course, to resist those which are smaller.

And there is another thing that bears out the very same idea.

You will recall that I pointed out with great detail a year ago how much superior in size the guns on our ships are to those on the German ships. When we were building 13-inch* guns they were building 9.4-inch guns. When we were building 12-inch guns they were building 11. When they built 12-inch guns we were building 14-inch guns. Their guns have always been very much smaller than ours. I asked a very brilliant naval officer to explain why that was, and his explanation was that the German Navy was constructed with a view to having war with its neighbors. He said in that country they nearly always have fogs on the sea and the weather is rarely clear, and necessarily a naval engagement over there would be at very close range, and at very close range those smaller guns are as good as the big one, but nobody would build a ship to fight in such a country as this and equip that ship with those small guns.

Congressional Record. 52: 2685. January 29, 1915

Sir Percy Scott's Letter

The London Times of June 12 published a letter from Sir Percy Scott concerning the "Uselessness of great battleships."

To the Editor of the Times:

Sir: Although I have retired from His Majesty's navy, many people have written and are still writing to me as to whether we should build small battleships or large. My opinion is that we should not be building either. My reason for holding this opinion will be found in a letter I wrote some time ago, and a copy of which I enclose herewith.

I am, yours truly,

Percy Scott.

[In] the letter we find these striking statements:

Now that submarines have come in battleships are of no use, either for defensive or offensive purposes, and consequently building any more in 1914 will be misuse of money subscribed by the citizens for the defense of the Empire.

Under these circumstances I can see no use for battleships and very little chance of much employment for fast cruisers.

The submarine when in water must be kept away from, not looked for.

What we require is an enormous fleet of submarines, airships,

* Probably a misprint for 10-inch.—Comp.

and aeroplanes, and a few fast cruisers, provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time.

If we go to war with a country that is in striking distance of submarines, I am of opinion that that country will at once lock up their dreadnoughts in some safe harbor. We shall do the same.

I do not think that the importance of submarines has been fully recognized; neither do I think that it has been realized how completely their advent has revolutionized naval warfare. In my opinion, as the motor vehicle has driven the horse from the road so has the submarine driven the battleship from the seas.

Congressional Record. 52: 2677. January 29, 1915

A great deal is said against Germany because of her militarism. A great many people criticise that country on that ground. Have we more militarism in us than Germany has? Are we less peaceful than Germany is? If we are not, then we ought to be as good as Germany. Let us adopt the same policy that Germany adopts. Germany states her policy in her laws, and she says in that policy that it is not necessary to build a navy as big as that of any other nation in order to defend herself. She has never tried to build a navy as big as that of England, and she puts it on this ground: She says, "All we propose to do is to build a navy big enough so that any nation that might attack us would know that we would destroy so many of her ships that it would imperil her standing among the other nations as a naval power." That is the policy of Germany, expressed in her statutes. Why can we not be as good as she is? Why must we want the greatest navy on earth? What is it? Is it barbarism? Is it the savage that is in us, or is it the profits that there are in building battleships? Tell me!

Congressional Record. 52: 2722. January 29, 1915

Strength of Our Navy. Cyrus Cline

We ourselves have paid out of the Public Treasury to develop and maintain the Army and Navy from 1901 to 1914 the incredible sum of $3,538,000,000, an amount staggering the imagination. We are the second naval power in the world. Since this world-wide war began England has lost 200,000 tons and Germany

190,000 tons displacement. The statement of Rear Admiral Badger, in a hearing before the Naval Affairs Committee, during the construction of the present bill, on cross-examination by Judge Witherspoon, declared the American Navy to be better, ship for ship, in construction, in activity, and in effectiveness, than the German Navy. That authority convinces me; if it did not, the comparison made by Judge Witherspoon of our Navy with that of the German Navy in the preceding session of this Congress that demonstrated that fact has not been answered and will not be answered.

Congressional Record. 52: 2725-6. January 29, 1915

Usefulness of Battleships. Joseph Taggart

This war has demonstrated that a battleship is not an instrument of national defense and that it is not a weapon of offense in conducting a war under present conditions. The two greatest navies on earth are employed in this war as far as possible. The greatest navy in the world has not knocked one brick off another on the soil of Germany after the war has been in progress nearly six months. The great dreadnoughts of the British Navy have not appeared anywhere near the coast of the enemy. For the first time in the history of Great Britain the British Navy has England between the Navy and the enemy instead of having the Navy between England and the enemy. It has demonstrated that a battleship is the most helpless thing in the world when attack from under warer; on account of its ponderous weight it immediately sinks, and so far it has been more dangerous to the crew than it has been to the enemy. [Laughter and applause.]

Of what use is a battleship near a coast? If it is near the coast of its own nation, it is not as effective as a submarine boat.

If it dares approach the coast of the enemy, it is in immediate danger of being sent to the bottom of the sea. By the inexorable logic of war its place is in mid-ocean. Its function is to protect the commerce of a nation. Its purpose now is to allow a nation to be fed while it conducts a war; and, as far as our Nation is concerned, we could not be starved in any war. But I can not imagine anything that would so effectively lower the cost of living as to have all the navies of the world combined together to shut up the ports of the United States and forbid anything to leave this country. It would solve the problem.

Congressional Record. 52: 2726. January 29, 1915

Possibility of Invasion. Joseph Taggart

Now, in these war colleges where young officers are studying they give to one group of young men the problem of invading the United States from Asia, and they give to another group of officers the problem of defending the United States, and the conclusion is always reached that the final result of such an attempt would prove that it would be impossible for an Asiatic nation to effect a permanent lodgment or to maintain an army on the soil of continental United States. If a foreign army invaded Alaska, it would be almost impossible to maintain it there. The only danger we could encounter would be the loss of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands, and we are trying to get rid of all responsibility in the Philippine Islands. If we do, we will have no place subject to attack in the Pacific Ocean except the Hawaiian Islands. It seems to me that if we should have a war with any nation and the enemy took possession of the Hawaiian Islands we could do as Germany is doing now with the little possession it held in China—just overlook the matter until the final settlement of the war. We would not need to spend our strength in defense of those little islands, but in the final adjustment of any war we might have they would be restored to us if we were successful.

Congressional Record. 52: 2735. January 29, 1915

Does Preparedness Prevent War? Walter L. Hensley

Many people heretofore believed the argument that preparedness prevented war, but since the naval bill was before Congress last year we have had some lessons taught us, one of which is that the doctrine of preparedness in a military way on the part of a nation as an insurance against war and a guaranty of peace is fallacious and silly. History does not record an instance where a nation has been better prepared for war than was Germany at the outbreak of hostilities in the present European conflict. Did preparedness on the part of Germany insure peace? Not by any means. Preparedness on the part of each and all the nations involved in this titanic struggle pro-

duced, naturally enough, a feeling of apprehension, a feeling of nervousness. Each nation was alarmed over the prepared state of all the other nations, and when the first overt act was committed by one of the nations the other nations were seized with fear, and, all nations being prepared, the campaign of slaughter was precipitated throughout continental Europe.

Dr. David Starr Jordan a few Sundays ago, in a lecture here in Washington, declared that he was so certain that this conflagration would break out in Europe that eighteen months prior to actual hostilities he went to Europe and, going from country to country, he studied conditions which, as he saw them, rendered escape from war impossible. He unhesitatingly checks the responsibility of this war up to the military people, and says that preparedness on the part of nations will as certainly eventuate in war, as certainly as will two trains collide when running on parallel tracks at the same rate of speed, the tracks converging at a given point; in other words, that there is no means of escape. There was a time when individuals carried upon their person concealed weapons. It was an approved practice, and frequently men, because of trivial differences, were called upon the field of honor, and their lives went out, where nothing was involved. It was regarded as most honorable and courageous on the part of those who acted in this fashion. We know today that it requires more courage not to fight than it does to fight. We know today that it is cowardice on the part of an individual that prompts him to carry concealed weapons. The people of the nation, when public sentiment was properly aroused, succeeded in stamping out the last vestige of this criminal practice, and I hope and pray that at the conclusion of the present conflict in Europe mankind will be wise enough and courageous enough to turn away from this barbaric practice that prevails in Europe today, and that reason may be enthroned and the criminal slaughter of men, women, and children may be averted forever thereafter. But I was asked a few days ago, "Would you have this nation recede and go backward from the place she now holds in the catalog of nations and become a China?" I answer the question, "No"; but the difference between our state of civilization and the civilization of China is not the difference based upon gunpowder and deadly instruments of warfare, and to me it seems so silly for anyone to so construe it.

Congressional Record. 52: 2741-3. January 30, 1915

Naval Appropriation Bill. Frederick H. Gillett

The first point to determine is the danger to be insured against. While the present European condition safeguards us against immediate attack, yet at the same time it vividly impresses us with the terrible effects of war and how science and invention have so changed conditions that a mighty but unequipped nation is helpless before a relatively small army furnished with modern engines of destruction, which can prevent the most heroic valor and endless numbers ever approaching near enough to inflict injury, and which can mow their irresistible way to certain victory. When the present European war ends is there danger that the victorious weapons will be turned against us? If there is, we can not too quickly begin to train our soldiers by the hundreds of thousands and manufacture artillery and ammunition on a corresponding scale, for if either side shall completely triumph it will possess the fleets of all and could easily sweep us from the sea and land here an army against which our enormous but untrained population would be helpless. Against such an attack the preparations urged by the most extreme and apprehensive advocates of increased defenses would be impotent; we need not to increase, but to revolutionize our whole system. The end of a war does not, as is sometimes suggested, leave the victor weak, but he is generally at the maximum of his fighting power and ready for new conquests, and we must recognize that it is easier to-day than ever before for one nation to be permanent masters of the world. It is not difficult to conceive that if a military power should once establish its supremacy—by a complete victory, for instance, in the present war—it might disarm the rest of Europe, compel the other nations by annual tribute to support its armies permanently with perfect equipment, and thus establish a complete and inviolable despotism until perhaps after long years the demoralizing disintegration of such a military aristocracy worked its own downfall.

But I think that danger is slight. It does not look as if either side was likely to win a complete triumph, and in that case their mutual jealousies and fears will protect us in the future as in the past. And yet it is possible to conceive that if Germany should win and emerge completely master of Europe

she might look across the ocean and see this commercial, helpless people, gorged with the wealth which had accumulated here while European capital was wasted and destroyed; and she might, without even a pretext except lust of power and dominion, send across and tie us to her chariot wheels with the rest of Europe. But, while conceivable, I do not think that danger is probable enough to warrant any expenditure to forestall it. Any ordinary preparation would be wasted; it must be either thorough or none at all. I have too high an opinion of the German character to insure against such an unprovoked aggression.

If, on the other hand, the allies should completely triumph whom have we to fear? Certainly not France. Certainly not Russia. England is the only possible menace. And an unprovoked attack from England is quite as inconceivable as from Germany. England is governed by public opinion. Its great English colonies are dependent only in name. They can separate when they will. She can have no ambition or hope to again annex us to the Crown. She can never become a great military despotism. I do not believe that, if she should be a victor in this war, she would wish to direct her newly developed military prowess against us. At any rate, I would risk waiting till the end of this war before insuring against that danger.

There is, indeed, one prolific source of conflict—the Monroe Doctrine. That has never been acknowledged by Europe; it has no basis in law or convention or natural justice; it is a threat which we publish against a whole hemisphere, and whose only sanction can be in the physical force behind it. Its original purpose, of course, long ago passed away. For generations there has been no danger that any European nation would interfere in South America in order to perpetuate monarchical institutions. I see no justification for it now in law or reason except self-interest and that, when given as an excuse for breach of law, has not of late met much favor. No nation has ever cared to raise the issue with us, but if the prize was great enough or if our weakness was manifest, I can easily imagine that a nation might challenge the Monroe Doctrine and assert that we had no international right to decide what should become of South America. I see but one reason why we should be unwilling to have lands south of us colonized by Europe, and that is fear of a fortified base of operations against us. But England and France and Spain already have such harbors. Against

them, therefore, the argument does not apply. Some of the nations to the south of us seem to enjoy indulging in breaches of obligations and violations of the rights of others, and then hope to go unpunished because the Monroe Doctrine makes us their sponsors and defenders. Such a one-sided doctrine needs revision or abandonment. To me it seems a most probable and prolific source of war.

There is one other possible antagonist—Japan. And I would like to say here that I appreciate how impolitic and unwise it is to discuss publicly our relations with other nations and to treat them as problematical enemies. But if the situation demands discussion and frankness, we can at least be considerate, friendly, and respectful; and I feel like admitting that the danger of collision with Japan lies not with her but with ourselves. The attitude of some of our States has been so contemptuous, has so singled the Japanese out for unfriendly legislation, that you can not blame a high-spirited and powerful people, which has of late given so many proofs of its equality both as a nation and as individuals, if it resents bitterly being treated as an inferior and an outcast. Nor does it seem improbable that if this discourteous and irritating conduct continues it may cause a wave of outraged resentment to sweep the Japanese people into a hostile outbreak. We can not leave those who give just cause for such an attack to suffer alone, and must come to their defense. But in such a war, while I recognize that Japan could put in the field an army which would readily overwhelm ours, yet I believe our navy is superior and that she would never dare attempt a landing on our shores. The Philippines, of course, we would lose. We would not even pretend to defend them outside of our forts. Any warships we had there would steam for home, and it would not take Japan long to overrun the country.

I have never been able to see why we should fortify those islands, for we could never defend them against any strong oriental power. But I should not mourn over their loss, because I have always considered them a burden rather than an advantage. I would gladly sell them now for what they cost us, and the natives would doubtless gladly be sold except for the hope that from us they will some day receive independence. But after the Philippines were lost I can not see that a war with Japan alone would have any serious effect on either combatant. Neither side would dare to send its navy to the distant

home of its enemy, and we could but hurl epithets at each other across the Pacific, only varied by an occasional daring raid. Our Navy is certainly not so weak that it should fear attack in our own waters, and I can not conceive it so strong that public opinion would allow it to go 4,000 miles from home. Against war with Japan I do not think we are unprepared, and I am ashamed to admit that if such a war should come, it would probably be due to the unreasonable and unfeeling conduct of our own people. If we will but be patient and reasonable, and not follow demagogues, the problem of Japanese immigration can be satisfactorily solved through diplomatic channels. Japan does not wish her people to emigrate here, but she does not wish our laws to discriminate against her alone.

There is one other danger against which we must insure, and that is our emotional, self-satisfied, undisciplined spirit, which is constantly inflamed by the flatteries of Fourth of July orators claiming that we can whip a world in arms, and which might blaze up on any slight provocation and drive even a reluctant administration into war. A nation always ready to fight at the drop of the hat ought indeed to be fully armed, and one great benefit from this agitation about our preparedness for war is that it may convince us that it is wise to be less aggressive and belligerent and overbearing and more just and reasonable and pacific in our relations with other nations. It may make us realize that for war we are not a first-class power, and that instead of being able to "lick all creation" there is not a nation with a modern army which, if once landed on our shores, could not march resistlessly all over our continent. If we wish to indulge our tendency to be self-willed and arbitrary and unyielding and dictatorial, then this war teaches us that we ought to begin to spend hundreds of millions a year in military preparations to defend that tendency. Unless we will be considerate and pacific and reasonable, we certainly are unprepared. But I should be glad to have our condition force upon us those commendable qualities.

One branch of our defense is thorough and adequate—our coast protections—and the criticism of it seems to me either blind to its real purposes or misinformed. Coast defenses are meant for a temporary check, not a permanent defense. They are not designed to protect us against an adversary whose army and navy are both superior to ours. Such an opponent, after

demolishing our Navy, has but to land on an unfortified part of the coast and take our cities from the rear. We are protected against a sudden naval raid and nothing more. But against any adversary who does not dare land an army our coast defenses are impregnable. I do not believe a hostile navy would dare to attack them. Here and there may be a weak spot easily remedied and while our guns must keep pace with the increasing power of the guns on battleships, we need not fear that our protected cities are in any danger of assault by sea. An insufficient quota of trained artillerists for a full war basis is their greatest weakness.

I have thus discussed our dangers and our weakness. There is nothing hidden about them. Anyone can see them. They are not novel, though the present war has taught some new lessons. Their imminence and seriousness is a matter on which men will necessarily differ. How much risk you are willing to take will depend on temperament. To insure against all risk, we ought first to have a trained and equipped army of at least 500,000 men, with a reserve of as many more. That involves an annual additional expense just about equal to the present cost of the National Government. It involves conscription and compulsory service and a vast pension list, for the attempt to provide an adequate reserve by the militia has pitifully failed.

I think few persons would think the insurance worth the cost under present conditions. They would take the risk of waiting till the end of the present war. Between that establishment and our present Army, which is small but efficient, and capable of meeting any emergencies which may arise on this continent alone, I see no rational stopping place, unless it is to provide an ample garrison for Hawaii.

With the Navy the question to me is more difficult. With the recent changes in construction and ordnance and the lessons taught by recent naval battles, the efficient force of our Navy is hard to estimate. I think here we can not afford to deteriorate.

If we wish to rank as an equal among the great military powers of the world, and to be absolutely secure against aggression or insult, and to be able ourselves to be domineering and self-willed, then I agree our only safe course is to double our Navy and increase our Army fivefold. But if we are willing to tread the more honorable path of justice and moderation

and forbearance, relying upon the delicate balance of power in Europe to protect us in the future as it has in the past, and hoping that the treaty of peace will effectually curtail and limit future dangers and expenditures, then the appropriations we are this year making for our Army and our Navy are, in my opinion, a sufficient insurance against the risks which we can reasonably apprehend.

Forum. 54: 1-4. July, 1915

Militarism and Sanity. Charles Vale

The ominous conditions that this country is now facing have induced many misleaders of the public to come forward and repeat the blatant nonsense so characteristic of dwarfed minds. We have been told in the past, *ad nauseam,* that war can only be avoided by preparing for it; that elaborate military and naval machines are the sole guarantees of peace; and that the mailed fist, ready at any moment to shatter into dust all the hard-won achievements of civilization, can alone expect courteous attention in the councils of the world. These doctrines have been revived now, in the very shadow of the most convincing refutation that could be given to them. All the nations of Europe had joined, in a greater or less degree, in the terrible race for increased armaments and increased destructive powers. The results of that so-called insurance against war can be seen rather plainly on the map of Europe. But it is probably hopeless to argue with the militarist maniacs. The wars that they prepare for, and invite, lie at their own door; and even they themselves must see, in occasional intervals of sanity, that militarism breeds murder, and that the true patriots are those who, rationally and with full regard to the difficulties of the time, attempt to make such murder less and less probable, by appealing to the only power that can be allowed ultimately to prevail—the power of an enlightened public opinion.

Yet, because many of us believe in peace, not merely as an ideal, a vision, but as an attainable and most practicable basis for international relations, it does not follow that we believe in disregarding the present state of the world and the peoples of the world. It is our duty—the duty of all thinking people—to work steadfastly for the victory of reason over intolerance;

to oppose every attempt to rivet more firmly the fetters of militarism; to demand, as the right of humanity, that the nations shall learn to live together in peace, friendship and comprehension. But it is our duty also, considering the appalling barbarism that has devastated Europe, to make it very sure that our women and children shall not be compelled to bear witness, as so many others have done, to the utter ruthlessness of war and the ultimate price of militarism.

It is not necessary, however, to imitate the professional alarmists and insist upon an immediate reversal of the whole policy of the country and an immediate attempt to build up enormous offensive machines. If, out of all the horrors of this war, any enduring good is to emerge, America must be prepared to help by making it clear to the world that she believes in service to humanity—not as a canting phrase, but as a fundamental principle of her national policy. The conditions of our development have made it easier for us than for any other state or collection of states to ignore racial enmities, old-world prejudices, old-time errors. It seems clearly put before us, as our contribution to the history of this century, to show that the charge of materialism is no longer sustainable; that while the material welfare of the country was being established, there was also taking shape and gaining force a national spirit which, divorced from sentimentalism, creeds and conventions, must fulfil itself in ways that nations have not always understood. We want nothing for ourselves that we are not willing to give to others. We care nothing for the jeers and sneers of those who are enclosed in their provincialism as in a coffin. We have no policy of aggression, no plans for self-aggrandizement. To all who will treat with us on an equal footing, with a similar desire to avoid injustice and promote the well-being of mankind, we offer our friendship and good will, and, if need be, our good services.

It would seem impossible, then, for us to become fatally imbroiled with any state not guilty of deliberate and unpardonable provocation. We have it in our power, without recourse to war, to exert such pressure as should ensure redress and prevent the repetition of hostile acts. But even if the worst should happen, and the conditions of our day and the crudity of militarism should involve us in armed conflict with another country, there is no need for hysteria or ranting. Naturally,

the militarists, having done everything possible to make war more probable, will attempt to transfer the blame to those who have worked for peace, and the cry will go out to the heavens, "If we had had an enormous Army and an enormous Navy, peace would have been ensured."

That absurd contention has already been dismissed. We do not want an enormous Army and an enormous Navy. It is an *efficient* Army and an *efficient* Navy that we require; and if the money that has been voted in the past had been properly expended, such an Army and Navy would now have been at the service of the country, not as a menace to other nations, but as an adequate police force. No country has a right to maintain a standing army of greater strength than would be needed for home defense. It would seem, in the light of recent events, that no country is justified at present in maintaining a standing army of less strength.

With such an Army and such a Navy as a basis, and with proper coast defences, the exigencies of war times could be left safely to the spirit which war arouses in men. It is not the magnitude of preparations, but the efficiency with which they are carried out, that counts in such a country as this. The military lessons of the war have been noted: the importance of aircraft and submarines, the use of mined waters, the dominance of the big gun, the development of the trench, the necessity for organization, for adequate supplies. So long as it is popular to think in terms of murder, it is well to think also in terms of efficiency. But efficiency does not mean lavish expenditure and panic-stricken efforts to repair the administrative failures of government departments. It does not mean that the truths of pacifism are to be disregarded. Rather, men's minds will be drawn increasingly to the questions, By whom and by what are such preparations made necessary? Why should man need to arm against his brother, as against a wild beast? Why should the world still endure the degrading tyranny of militarism and the militarists?

If this terrible war does not result in the overthrow of militarism as it has been understood for at least the last half century; if the law of the jungle is to prevail over the law of civilization; if mankind still sees in murder the only ultimate means of settling differences of opinion; if nations are to regard their own interests as dominant and the interests of the rest of the world as negligible; if the mediæval ambitions of individuals

or castes are to dominate these new times and nullify modern knowledge and aspirations; if butchery, lust and vandalism are the true marks of the twentieth century, and every people may fashion its own god in its own image:—what, then, will be left for humanity? It is not pleasant to contemplate more militarism, with its crushing exactions; more murder, with its broken hearts and desolated lives; more raping of women and mutilation of children; more drowned babies, maimed and tortured men, and exhausted and devitalized countries.

It is unbelievable that the human race will submit to a recurrence of such barbarism and that force will still be allowed to triumph over right. It is the destiny of these United States to stand now, not for merely national interests, but for the just principles of international morality. Every step that is taken should be taken with reference to the final goal—the elimination of militarism as the nightmare of the world, and the return of mankind to the ways of sanity and peace.

Forum. 54: 147-54. August, 1915

The United States and War. Charles Vale

Merchants no longer conduct their business after the fashion of the middle ages. Nations should no longer control their affairs on similar anachronistic principles.

Misunderstanding is at first almost inevitable: bullies and jingoists cannot appreciate any creed or any practice except their own, proved a thousand times and a thousandfold to be pernicious. They will repeat their vacuous sneers and gibes, directed against any individual or any nation with enough intelligence to estimate correctly the cant of the day, and the lies and cowardice of the militarists. For there is no courage in sending millions of men, who have or should have no quarrel whatever with each other, to mutilation, blindness, death. Sooner or later, wars end: their products, the blind, the maimed, the insane, linger on. When the pawns have done their work, the jugglers of words, the diplomatists trained in evasion instead of truth, will begin their task of redrawing maps with delicate precision. All this, the jingoists assert, is virile, inspiring, and, of course, inevitable. It is only inevitable while the world is ruled by fools and shams, while the figureheads of nations

wear gaudy and absurd trappings, and the people, without volition or common sense, are massed into murder-machines.

The rational pacifist is not a mere idle dreamer, though some dreams have changed the course of history considerably. He is not inconsistent because, while working for peace and for the spreading of the ideas that will bring peace, he recognizes that an instantaneous revolutionary movement is scarcely probable. He is therefore willing to extend the police idea to national and international polity: he is willing, and desirous, that this police force should be made as efficient as possible. But he is not willing to continue the ludicrous system of nations under arms, of the crushing burdens of militarism during the period of suspense that is miscalled peace. He invites—there are several millions in this country alone who support the invitation—all the nations of the world to cease being quarrelsome children, deriving their ideas of personal and national glory from the nursery legends of dead centuries, and to begin to behave as grown-up people. He suggests that the mere accident of being born within certain boundaries need not tie a man down to a slavish subjection to the policy of any local state, because it happened to have the honor of containing his birthplace: in other words, he need not pander to his personal conceit or ignorance and call the pandering "nationalism." The pacifist suggests finally that it is worth while to make as strenuous efforts to secure enduring peace as the militarists have made to ensure the probability of war.

In the meantime, the American pacifist has himself been invited to reflect upon the condition of the United States Army and Navy. If he had had his way and self-styled civilized countries had attempted to adopt his ideas, the condition of any army or navy would not greatly matter. But as the militarist has had *his* way rather generally, with the inevitable result of complete disaster, the condition of a national police force *does* matter. But it is as a police force only, a force to prevent and not to initiate crime, that the United States Army and Navy must be considered. Regarded from that standpoint alone, neither the Navy nor the Army is adequate, especially in view of the perplexities that may at any moment be resolved into an acute crisis. But both can be made, and should be made, efficient, without approximating even remotely to the standards of European militarism.

Independent. 57: 972-4. October 27, 1904

The New Navy. Charles E. Jefferson, D. D.

To many it is a cause for boundless rejoicing, the joy of the nation and the pride of the New World, but some of us cannot help asking whereunto this thing is going to grow. We have increased our naval expenditures 700 per cent. within eighteen years, and the tree is yet green. Our Navy as planned already outranks that of all countries except England and France, and the end is not yet. The experts are all agreed that we must push ahead of France, and bolder spirits claim that we must surpass England. To stand second to England will demand an annual naval expenditure of $200,000,000. Our naval expenditures thus far are not half that sum, but already Congress is obliged to cut down its appropriations for rivers and harbors and for public improvements, and must haggle sometimes for years over the price of a piece of land to put a public building on. We cannot eat our cake and keep it too, nor can we spend $200,000,000 a year on a Navy and have it left for something else.

Then one wonders sometimes just what we want such an enormous Navy for. Of course, the steel kings want it, and so do the manufacturers of armor and projectiles and ships. There is probably a slight profit in battle ships at $8,000,000 apiece. A hundred millions a year is a plum of fair dimensions, and that the sight of it should quicken patriotism is not surprising. Then the naval experts want it, for they have a laudable professional pride in pushing our Navy to the head of the procession. Editors of a certain sort want it, for it lends itself easily to graphic treatment and money-making headlines. And the great crowds of barbarians in all of our cities want it, just as they want many another thing which it is not good for them to have. But why sensible, patriotic Americans who understand the genius of their country and who have read history even a little, and who want our Republic to escape the entanglements and delusions which have wrought havoc with the greatest empires of the past—why they should want to surrender the policy which we followed for a hundred years with success, and adopt the policy of governments which are being slowly crushed by the weight of their armaments, this is, indeed, a puzzle.

One cannot help wondering how it comes that Americans

with all their education are so easily gulled. For instance: when men say that a great navy is just as essential to a nation as a police force is to a city, one wonders that anybody can be so dull witted as not to see the fallacy. There are not many of us who go with Tolstoy in saying that all use of force is wrong and forbidden, for crazy men and drunken men and thugs must sometimes be coerced into action which they would not of themselves have preferred. And as bandits can carry on their depredations on water as well as on land, every nation should do its part in policing the highways of the sea. But every sane man knows that we are not just now building up a naval police force. We are building up a fighting Navy, a Navy not for capturing pirates, but for fighting the biggest navy afloat. We are not thinking of pirates, but of Russia, of Germany, of England, and of France, our neighbors in the family of Christian nations!

One wonders also at the Quaker-like language of these naval enthusiasts. "A large navy is the most potent means of securing peace," says one. "It is essential to the maintenance of peace," says another. "Preparedness for war is the best possible guarantee of peace," says a third. This is the gospel being preached by our President, by many Senators and Congressmen, and by a host of eloquent talkers, who succeed in deceiving even the elect. But why be hoodwinked by a falsehood so transparent? All history proves that the way to preserve the peace is to prepare for peace. This was the doctrine of our fathers, and they refused, therefore, to fortify the Canadian frontier or to fill the lakes with men of war. Their policy has worked well. It is the custom of every Government to compel its citizens to go unarmed. The men in Sicily and Kentucky who prepare to fight always fight. It is only when men cease to carry dangerous weapons that they are able to preserve the peace. Napoleon III would not reduce his army—he prepared for war. Bismarck also prepared for war, and war came. Japan prepared for war, so did China—they fought, Russia has been adding to her battleships, so has Japan—they are using them. A nation cannot fill its belt with bowie knives and revolvers without wanting to see what they will do. When we get our Navy up to the desired size we will use it. Some one will insult us, step on our toes in some of the markets of the world, the barbaric press will shriek, the blood will boil, and there will be war!

Before we had a navy we never knew the sense of fear. We walked unarmed among the nations of the earth, and people of all lands were our friends. Now that we have our battleships we are in a state of chronic alarm. We are suspected, feared, and in many quarters hated. We listen breathlessly to hear what far-off critics are saying about us. We read each day in magazine or paper of some new and fearful peril. We know not what a day may bring forth. We have whetted our sword in the ears of the nations, and have said to our neighbors, "If you want a scrap, come on!"

And this is the nation from which the world had expected better things, republics which influenced and led the nations without a navy for a hundred years, which defended the Monroe Doctrine against France and against the British Empire, not by might nor by power, but by the potent spirit of a great people who dared to do justly and to love mercy.

Independent. 82: 241-4. May 10, 1915

Is Anything Wrong with the Navy? Park Benjamin

The condition of the Navy has recently been set forth by the Secretary in a letter to President Garfield of Williams College. We have in active service 225 vessels of all characters and 101 vessels in reserve. We have under construction and authorized 77 vessels, namely, 9 dreadnoughs of the most powerful kind, 23 destroyers, 38 submarines and 7 auxiliaries. We have largely increased the number of mines on hand and in process of manufacture. We have increased torpedoes by 90 per cent, and we shall soon have very much greater facilities than at present for constructing these weapons. The enlisted strength of the Navy is at the maximum figure allowed. There are no better guns than those which we have. Aviation in the Navy is being developed, with an appropriation of $1,000,000 in its support. War plans have been formulated and will be put in practice and a Chief of Operations, now regularly created by law, will hereafter perform the substantial functions of a General Staff.

Preparedness, however, does not depend upon the absolute condition of a navy, but upon its relative condition with respect to other navies, with one or more of which there is an

assumed possibility it may be called upon to contest command of the sea. This brings in the time element, and a comparison of conditions not existing at some indefinite, but at some particular and fixed, period.

At the moment of this writing the German fleet is locked up in its harbors by the English fleet, which, as a consequence, is itself locked up. The French fleet, which has played but little part in the present war, is engaged in neutralizing the Austrian fleet and incidentally helping in the attack on the Dardanelles forts. The Russian fleet is shut up in the Baltic and in the Black Sea. The Japanese fleet has been withdrawn to Japanese waters and will stay there. Other fleets are of inconsiderable relative strength.

Taking facts as they are, there is no navy in existence today so situated as to be capable of successfully competing with our own. Nor will this condition be changed materially by the long anticipated battle between the British and German high sea fleets; for the mauling which both will get will still leave our naval strength greater than that of the victor; and this will continue until the latter by new building regains his former power.

Present need for building any more enormously expensive battleships than have been provided for is not apparent. The shipbuilding facilities of this country appear to be sufficient to enable us to turn out vessels of any kind quite as rapidly as can be done abroad. Therefore in the time which the victor may require to bring his fleet back to normal condition, it is not clear why we cannot *then* increase ours, either correspondingly or to whatever extent may be found necessary.

The war has not solved completely a single one of the pressing naval problems, although in various ways it is leading toward possible solutions. It is not certain that it will leave the battleships of today the most formidable of fighting ships—or that another type of vessel may not arise as different as the turreted monitor was from the iron-plated steam frigate. The war efficiency of the submarine, in the face of the failure of the German invisible blockade, is more in doubt than ever. The repulse of the British and French fleets by the Dardanelles forts, through the agency apparently of gunfire, is striking at the roots of many preconceived notions. It is becoming doubtful whether these great armored structures require the penetra-

tion of projectiles to put them out of action, or whether they can be practically destroyed by impact of tremendous shells which may not pierce their armor. Nothing but the actual tests of war can settle such issues as this. And if they are to be settled by this war the time cannot be far distant. It does not seem prudent, therefore, that by shouts of "unpreparedness" we should be stampeded into constructing a Navy not in accordance with the relative conditions which exist now, not in accordance with whatever relative conditions may be brought into existence as the outcome of the present war, but with those which obtained before this war began, and which may never be reproduced.

Independent. 80: 392. December 14, 1914

The Armament Flurry

It is time to use such sense as God has given us. When our population was three million, or five million, or ten million, of fifty million, we feared no nation on earth. We were never attacked. It is a historical fact that we forced every war we had. Now, however, with one hundred million people and one hundred and fifty billion dollars of wealth, with Europe locked in a death struggle and the only military power in Asia doing everything in her power to hold our friendship, it is suddenly declared that our security is endangered and we are asked to accept the great illusion that armaments are our only protection against this peril.

There are many reasons why there is less need of increasing our armaments now than for a number of years. We shall mention but three:

1. All the powers that could do the United States any harm, except Italy, always our friend, are engaged in war. Those nations, with the exception of Japan, will have to recuperate a long time before they can become dangerous to us. Japan has shown itself eager to be our friend; the only danger in that direction will come from our own actions. As the great nations of the world are sedulously cultivating our friendship, it is inconceivable that they will change their attitude over night and make war on us within a time sufficiently near to demand preparation for it at this minute.

2. If we increase our armaments now how shall we go about is? Shall we build battleships? There is not a little reason to think the battleship is a thing of the past. Japan has just announced that she will build none this year. Shall we build forts? Forts no longer protect men. Men have to protect forts, as witness Verdun. Shall we build submarines and aircraft? Possibly, but no wise man would advise plunging in this respect until the lessons of the war have become more evident.

3. The United States now seems destined to play the most important rôle at the end of the war in the great reconstruction of civilization that must follow. The Powers that seem most likely to win declare their intention of demanding some sort of disarmament. Will the United States then jeopardize her great influence at that supreme hour by losing her head now? If we refuse to be stampeded our example will encourage Europe to go much farther toward disarmament than it otherwise would. Moreover, the sincerity of any peace proposals we then make will not be impugned.

The United States should go to the Peace Conference prepared to announce to the world that we are ready:

First, to join in an international agreement for the limitation of armaments, or if the nations are not ready for that,

Second, to join a League of Peace provided at least two other of the Great Powers will join with us, the League agreeing to reduce its armaments to the point where its combined forces are slightly larger than those of the greatest outside nation or alliance likely to attack it and to use its armaments to maintain international treaties and the decisions of international courts and parliaments.

If either of these alternatives is adopted the United States will then be in a position to decrease her armaments. If, however, the world is not yet ready to limit armaments and the proposals of the United States are spurned, then and then only will it be in order for the United States to determine whether her security demands the further expenditure of hundreds of millions for armaments and the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of young men from fields and factories to the barracks.

Literary Digest. 49: 1160-1. December 12, 1914

Should We Prepare for Attack?

[In] an editorial in the Springfield Republican, the transportation of England's Canadian contingent is used as the basis of the argument. Says the Republican:

Thirty-five transports had to provide for men, horses, artillery, and equipment, while a large fleet of war-ships was necessary to provide a safe passage over the sea. The expedition was highly favored by the fact that no enemy fleet was to be encountered before it could be landed on the other side. Now, with all the effort made, how many soldiers were thus transported under these exceptionally favorable conditions? Only 32,000 men.

One does not need to be a military man to see that many times 32,000 soldiers would have to be quickly landed on our coast to make an invasion in the least worth while to an oversea Power. . . . A large hostile army approaching our shores in a large fleet of transports could not possibly be missed on the high seas by our fast scout cruisers, and it would be exposed to deadly attack by swarms of our submarines before it could even sight land. . . . So it seems a sound conclusion that the invasion of the United States on either ocean by a hostile army strong enough to be an appreciable factor in campaigning, difficult as it has been under any conditions, must hereafter become a task more formidable than military science has ever contemplated.

The military lessons of the present war, so far as they have been developed, do not emphasize the insecurity of the United States. It has been pertinently said that every European Power now at war will be so exhausted when peace arrives that it will not desire more fighting on a costly scale for years to come. And an invasion of the United States would be one of the most costly of military operations.

Some of the demands of men like General Wotherspoon, Admiral Blue, and Congressman Gardner are perfectly logical, the Republic agrees. But it thinks our people are still "willing to take a chance on war for the sake of maintaining their position as a people whose ways are the ways of peace. In the present situation they see how the theory that war is prevented by preparing for it has broken down. The Evening Post takes its stand with the President—

For he sees how ineffective—how hypocritical—would be our appeal for peace, our offer of good services, our pointing the way to disarmament, if we were to make that appeal fresh from new concessions to the armament ring, fresh from voting more hundreds of millions out of the pockets of the people and into those of ship-contractors and manufacturers of supplies.

To approach the European combatants thus with new weapons in our own hands would be to fling away our moral position. . . . The

menacing growth of our Navy has been cited both in the Reichstag and in Parliament as one excuse for piling more burdens upon British and German taxpayers, by building more and more battle-ships. To our mind this is not only not the time to inquire about our preparedness for war, it is the time to refuse to vote a single additional ship, and to lead the world toward disarmament by beginning to disarm ourselves. The high example to be set by such an action would make a thrilling appeal to the victims of the war—certainly to enlightened consciences in every quarter of the globe.

Nation. 99: 647. December 3, 1914

The "Preparedness" Flurry.

That President Wilson intends to keep his head in the present flurry over our "preparedness" for war is gratifyingly apparent in the news from Washington. It has been quite evident that the present conflagration in Europe is to be made the excuse for a wild raid on Congress for more soldiers, more sailors, and more ships. Witnessing the total breakdown of the militarist pretension abroad, that large armaments insure peace, we hear from our Navy League, our alarmed Gardners, our gun and armor makers, our Roosevelts, and our jingo generals, that we, too, must imitate the folly of Europe, even though it is now drenching its soil with blood. At the very moment when the "most senseless of wars" is endangering civilization itself, we are told that the United States must check its internal development, rob industry of hundreds of thousands of workers, and pour forth treasure by the hundred millions—just as if everybody could not now see that the European armaments were certain to have brought on a conflict, had there been no other cause.

That some of the people behind this movement are sincere, if too badly frightened to think straight, appears from the list of New Yorkers who have recently joined together to demand an inquiry as to our preparedness for war—to see if we are really "safe." No such inquiry as they and Congressman Gardner seek is necessary. The facts as to our preparedness for war are easily ascertainable. They are contained in the reports of our Secretaries of War and Navy, our Presidents' messages for years past. They can be obtained from those officials at any time. The Navy League is so sure that it has them all that it knows just what to advise, both as to Army and Navy. Every

military attaché in Washington has the whole story at his disposal. Information is not the object of Congressman Gardner, however it may be with the New Yorkers who are suddenly desirous of having more light on our situation. He wants to have Army and Navy officers appear before committees of Congress to give testimony as to what they think ought to be done, which is like asking protected manufacturers battening on the Treasury to write their own tariff schedules. If this prevails, we shall be in for an inquiry of the utmost sensationalism, at which our generals will dispute whether we shall have 205,000 or 500,000 regulars, and our admirals whether we shall have fifty battleships or two hundred and fifty submarines.

Fortunately for the country, the President is not to be stampeded. With courage and far-sighted statesmanship he lets it be known that he should regard any such inquiry as ill-timed. He does not put it on the ground of keeping your head when your neighbors are shooting one another. He puts it on the far nobler ground that before this country lies the greatest opportunity that has ever come to it, or perhaps to any country—the opportunity of playing the leading part in bringing the war to a close. Never before did a greater possibility of usefulness open before an American statesman than that which looms before Woodrow Wilson. That he is of stature to seize the opportunity when it presents itself, this stand he is taking clearly proves. For he sees how ineffective—how hypocritical—would be our appeal for peace, our offer of good services, our pointing the way to disarmament, if we were to make that appeal fresh from new concessions to the armament ring, fresh from voting more hundreds of millions out of the pockets of the people and into those of ship-contractors and manufacturers of supplies.

To approach the European combatants thus with new weapons in our own hands, would be to fling away our moral position. Never has the United States stood higher morally in the world than today; this is attested by the way our good opinion is sought by both sets of allies. If it is to live up to the greatness of the hour, it must go to the warriors not with the news of a slavish imitation of the wicked policies which have driven some to the verge of moral and material ruin and others beyond it, but with a readiness to lead in the other direction. The menacing growth of our Navy has been cited both in the Reichstag and in Parliament as one excuse for piling more

burdens upon German and British taxpayers, by building more and more battleships. To our mind this is not only not the time to inquire about our preparedness for war, it is the time to refuse to vote a single additional ship, and to lead the world towards disarmament by beginning to disarm ourselves. The high example to be set by such an action would make a strong appeal to the victims of the war—certainly to enlightened consciences in every quarter of the globe.

Surely, it is a cause for the utmost thanksgiving that the occupant of the White House sees and senses this, and is ready to bear if need be the criticisms of little minds who can see nothing more in all this horrible suffering and carnage, this breakdown of Christianity, than the need of preparation for slaughter. We are convinced that the President has only to state the case for the people to rise to him as they have risen whenever he has made a plea for justice and humanity. The American people are thinking about what all this means. Hundreds of thousands have fled to this country to escape the burdens of militarism; they have no desire to shoulder new ones here. There are plenty of men in public life, too, who will rally to the President's support. There is Congressman Walter L. Hensley, of Missouri, for instance, a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, who is openly stating his belief that this is no time for an inquiry; that the lesson of the European struggle for us is that we should refrain from building more battleships and weapons of destruction. But it is the hour for all who feel thus to make themselves heard.

Nation. 99: 676. December 10, 1914

Invasion

No nation could possibly land 100,000 men here, save after weeks and months of preparation. Probably only England, with her great sea-power, could accomplish this at all. It was shown by a prominent British writer in the war scare of 1909 that to move a force of 200,000 German soldiers to England, with all their guns, ammunition, horses, forage, transport, wagons, and food supplies for three weeks, would take every ship in the German merchant marine, including all those in service in Asian and Australian waters, and that the speed of this impossible fleet could

not be much over twelve miles an hour. What such an undertaking would be across 3,000 miles of water, any one can figure out from the weeks it took the Japanese to transport their army to Manchuria and for us to send a few thousand men to the Philippines.

New Republic. 1: 22. December 19, 1914

Mr. Herrick on Armament

Without entering into the arguments advanced for increasing our Army and Navy, I wish to state three propositions that the present war has proved so far as it has proved anything: first, the one sure way to precipitate war is to prepare for it, a truth that psychologists have long been aware of. Europe prepared for war intensively for two generations—it was only a question of time when it got war. If we want war with Japan we are doing our best to bring it about, and have been especially since the anti-Japanese agitation, expressed in certain timorous legislation in California. Second, armaments, no matter how up-to-date, are always out of date unless immediately employed, and give their possessors merely a paper advantage over an imaginary foe. As Mr. Wells urged on his countrymen before the outbreak of the war, "dreadnoughting" is both an expensive and delusive game, while intelligence, technical skill, and invention are perpetually changing the terms of warfare. Third, a final decision—to use the current military phrase—is the one result modern war does not produce. War has apparently degenerated from tactics through massed force to the decision by physical exhaustion—its logical conclusion. To speak any longer of the "arbitrament of arms" is as silly as to speak of a trial by combat or other medieval fantasy.

Apart from the waste and the folly of Germanizing our Army and Briticizing our Navy, I dread especially the influence of all this armament agitation on the spirit of our people, which has already too heavy an alloy of materialism and youthful arrogance in it. The possession of an improved military toy must inevitably rouse all the football pugnacity of young America: we should hear more of "Take Mexico—on to Panama!" and next, "Take Canada—on to the North Pole!" Meanwhile would be forgotten our one noblest reason for existence as a nation, which

is to offer a reasonable opportunity to the unprivileged of all peoples for self-development, to create and educate a great democratic state, to solve finally the knotty social problems involved in property ownership, and in doing so to explode the delusion of a narrow, arrogant nationalism which masquerades as patriotism.

New Republic. 3: 188. June 26, 1915

Cost of Battleships

"A first-class battleship, fully equipped, will cost next year about $15,000,000. Such an amount would build and equip trade-schools at $75,000 each in how many cities?" This problem from the new war arithmetic compiled by Professor David Eugene Smith suggests a novel and ingenious use of mathematics for propaganda purposes. You present all the tragic data of war and waste in the form of arithmetical problems to your school children, and then rivet the facts and their significance into their minds by making them solve the problems. The ironic contrast between the utilities and pleasures of civilization and the cost of scattering metals and men in fragments over a continent must be wholly deadly. One of these problems will enrage both the pacifist and the militarist. It is the one that tosses off the fact that in 1914 our Army and Navy cost us exactly as much as Germany had spent the previous year on hers. The pacifist should be scandalized that our militarism costs us as much as the world's worst militarist, the militarist that we got so little for our money.

New York Times. January 31, 1915.

Training That Hat has no Goal.

John Casper Branner, President of Leland Stanford University

The great difficulty about military instruction is that it leads either nowhere or to trouble. Other branches of instruction lead men into useful professions and careers, and students pursue their studies with eagerness and with the knowledge that they are learning something of practical value to themselves and to mankind. In the case of military training, unless the students

take up the work seriously, it is a deadly grind from start to finish. It has not the attractiveness of either a career or a sport. If they go into it as a career for life, they must inevitably look forward to "the day" when they can demonstrate their ability to do something that nobody wants done.

New York World. July 28, 1915

Increase in Army Strongly Opposed by Chairman Hay

Representative James Hay of the House Committee on Military Affairs [July 27] advised the World that he was opposed to a great increase in the Army, and he intimated that he would block the President's plan of strengthening the service if it proposed a comprehensive reorganization.

"I have not found among the people any real demand for changing our present policy of providing for national defense," Mr. Hay said. "Many of our people came to this country years ago to escape militarism and enforced army service. I do not believe that there are many men in Congress who would vote for a measure providing for conscription. That sort of a proposition is out of the question unless we are actually facing a threatening enemy.

"Ever since the European war commenced, the militarists in this country—those who advocate a big standing Army and the consequent expenditure of tremendous sums of money for military purposes—have been clamoring that the United States is in danger of attack and invasion by an enemy. Granting that war may confront us, are we helpless, unprotected and unprepared? I do not think so.

"During the last ten years the appropriations for the support of the military establishments of this country have amounted to the grand total of $1,007,410,270.48, almost as much as is required to pay all other expenses of the government. During this period Army appropriations have annually been from $70,000,000 to $101,000,000; the Military Academy appropriations from $673,000 to $2,500,000 a year; for fortifications from $4,000,000 to $9,300,000; for armories and arsenals, from $330,000 to $860,000; for military posts, from $320,000 to $4,380,000; by deficiency acts, military establishments from $657,000 to $5,300,000, and for Pacific railroads transportation

and the enlisted men's deposit fund a total for the ten years of 11,999,271.

"In spite of this showing of the great expense of maintaining a small army, the militarists keep up their clamor that this country be saddled with a great standing Army. There is not the slightest need of such an establishment, but if there were some slight indication of trouble with a fully equipped great power, would the people of this country be ready to embark on a policy that would mean the permanent maintenance of a regular standing Army of 500,000 men? It would cost this country, at a conservative estimate, $600,000,000 a year to maintain such an establishment."

Mr. Hay believes that a serious proposition to provide a standing Army of 500,000 men would meet with great disapproval throughout the country.

"What we need is a force sufficient for defense," Mr. Hay added, "and it is the part of wisdom to have such a force with the least expense and the least burden upon the people. We have not the compulsory military service that obtains in every country and continental Europe, and therefore it would be an enormous, if not impossible, task to raise, under our system, an army of 500,000 men in time of peace.

"The expense of $600,000,000 a year would necessitate immediate imposition of burdensome taxes far in excess of anything this country has ever known except during the civil war. For this reason alone—the heavy taxes—it would be impossible to increase the Army appreciably without changing our military system."

Mr. Hay declared that he would like to see an adequate reserve, so that in time of trouble there would be a large number of men prepared to enter the Army fully trained for war.

"But," said he, "in a country where military service is not compulsory the method of providing a reserve is an extremely complex problem. It is proposed to have short enlistments, and thus turn out each year a large number of men who will be trained soldiers. I am convinced that under our system of military enlistment it is impracticable to accumulate, with either a long term or a short term enlistment, a dependable reserve force of fairly well trained men. To use our Army as a training school would destroy the Army as such and fail utterly to

create any reserve that could be depended upon as a large body of troops."

Mr. Hay thinks that it would be impossible for this country to model after the Swiss plan. "Switzerland has compulsory military service and it is useless to attempt to fashion ourselves upon a system that cannot be introduced here—a system that is repulsive to the genius and traditions of our people," he said.

"With our present system of four years' enlistments it is hard enough to keep the Army up in size desired, about 85,000 men, and it is easy to see how much harder it would be to recreate practically a whole Army every year, or to get enough recruits to take the places made vacant by the expiration of the enlistments every twelve months.

"The short enlistment, according to an overwhelming sentiment in Congress, is impossible and vicious."

Outlook. 110: 496-9. June 30, 1915

Pacificism and Preparedness

World Peace Foundation Conference

The World Peace Foundation has been conducting a conference at Cornell University under Mr. Norman Angell's guidance, and the Post correspondent thus summarizes its conclusions:

1. Adequate defense is not something absolute. It is a function of the Power against whose probable aggression we wish to defend. For this reason, discussion of defense first and foremost requires a definition of policy for which defense is demanded.

2. Since nations are now fighting in groups, since war itself has become internationalized and dependent on international understandings and treaties, the standard of adequate defense must be at least one surpassing that of some one of the present alliances or that of some contemplated new grouping of Powers.

3. Any considerable increase in armaments might prove a challenge which might lead to a coalition of Powers to avert and, if need be, anticipate the dangers suspected to lie in our militarism.

4. The ineffectiveness of the forces of either of the alliances in the present conflict to put a check upon the other's violations of international law should convince us of the inapplicability of militarism to the solution of our issue.

5. Further, the issue caused by the violation of our own neutral rights and those of others, as a result of policies against which we have

protested, renders it impossible for us to join either side without first coming to a certain understanding.

6. The situation and the very nature of our demands upon both sides require some international organization, some agreement between ourselves and other nations as to what international law is and is to be, and eventually the creation of some deliberative body for the purpose.

7. To enforce such a plan it may well be necessary to contribute our share through the means of arms and other forces.

8. Should our armaments prove too inadequate a contribution, then would be the time to increase, for only then could the determinate degree and kind of increase be known.

9. In the absence of any such international policy, there should be no increase except what is technically needed for repairs.

A Socialist View

The pacifists like to call those who believe in preparedness jingoes or militarists. Thus, the Milwaukee Leader, the well-known Socialist organ, treats the subject jocosely:

The jingo press has not got all of us yet. If we are to judge by two meetings held this week in New York, there are several sane persons even in that center of armament hysteria.

An organization calling itself the "National Security League," but which has been much more appropriately dubbed the "National Hysteria League," held a convention, climaxing in a great mass-meeting. . . .

The Socialist party and the trade unions of New York have been holding peace meetings recently. They have held them frequently. They have never had a single Cabinet member, past or present, to decorate their program and platform. But they have had scarcely a meeting at which there were not ten times as many persons as came out to listen to the "hysteria" speakers. All of these meetings have denounced everything for which the "hysteria" league stands.

Saturday Evening Post. 188: 22. July 24, 1915

Unpreparedness

In spite of regnant militarism, extending over more than a generation, only one country in Europe was prepared for war. With the exception of Germany, nobody understood what warfare would be like or what means were necessary to prosecute it. After elaborate preparations for many years, and nine months of actual fighting—with such impressive object lessons last fall as the easy capture of Antwerp and Namur—Russia was turned out of her Galician trenches almost as though big field guns were as novel to her as Spanish firearms were to Montezuma. It was only in May that England effectually woke

to the fact that munitions were the vital point and began vigorously to reorganize herself on that basis.

The enormous consumption of shrapnel, powder, and like commodities, was foreseen by nobody outside of Germany. We were told the United States might get much foreign trade outside the war region because the belligerent nations would be unable to supply their foreign customers with peaceful goods. That has not happened. We were not told that we should be selling hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of war materials to the allies—which has happened.

Saturday Evening Post. 188: 23, 26-7. July 24, 1915

Boycotts vs. Bayonets. Ralph Norman Angell Lane

It comes, then, to this: However great be America's naval and military power, she cannot defend by that power alone even her most elementary rights, like those which she is now attempting to establish as against the aggression of Germany. Did she possess today the greatest fleet in the world she could not radically alter the naval situation of the present war, since the western allies have a sea supremacy as complete as ships can make it. To cover the seas with dreadnoughts would be merely to furnish targets for the invisible submarine.

If she joined the allies, sending armies to France or Russia, the resultant victory might still leave America without any assurance that the rights for which she had fought would be respected in the future; for sea law, as laid down by her own allies, allows combatants to sow the sea with mines, and puts neutral trade in wartime still under the virtual veto of the belligerent who happens to be momentarily predominant.

So that America, having fought a great European war to secure the immunity of her citizens from death by a submarine torpedo, might find that it was still legal to drown them by floating mines. She might find the radical reform of sea law, which alone can assure the rights—moral and material—that she demands, still strenuously opposed by her own allies, with Great Britain at their head.

Even though she could secure agreement beforehand as to the sea law that was to follow the war, what assurance has she that the agreement would outlive the military alliance on which its enforcement depended? There is a vague idea that

she could in some way enforce the agreement by her own naval and military strength, becoming for that purpose the "strongest power in the world"; but nations no longer fight as units—they fight as groups.

This war, curiously enough, has demonstrated that a nation can no longer depend either for its security or for the enforcement of its views of right on its own strength. What would have been the position of any one of the allied nations—France, England, Russia or Italy—if it had had to depend on itself alone? What has made it possible for them to defend themselves is an international agreement; their national lives depend on treaties, strange as that may sound. War has become internationalized.

The Game of Military Alliances

If, therefore, America intends to vindicate her rights—perhaps even if she intends to secure her mere safety on land—by military means, she, too, must do what even the most powerful military states of the past have done: enter into the game of military alliances; but, for America's purposes—the establishment and enforcement of a decent sea law, for instance—the alliances have to be permanent. If she merely, like the European Powers, demanded a certain disposition of certain territory—its transfer or evacuation, as the case may be—the demand could be fulfilled before the armies demobilized; but, in the case of demanding future adherence to a law, how can that be secured by a military alliance unless we can be sure the alliance can be permanent? As soon as it breaks up the means of enforcing the law has come to an end.

Now unhappily one of the very few things that history teaches us, with any certainty, is that these military alliances do not outlast the pressure of war conditions.

No international settlement that has followed the great wars ever settled or endured. The military alliances on which they were based have been, as the facts presented in a former article clearly show, unstable and short-lived. As for destroying a common enemy, like the German of today, those same facts show that the destruction has never lasted more than a year or two; at the end of which time the common enemy, the outlaw, generally became the ally of one of its policemen against all the rest; and the whole process of alliance shuffling begins again *da capo*.

How to Enforce International Law

The line of advance in this matter, therefore, is not to insist that we can do without agreement in international affairs, but to see that the agreement is of such character as not to contain the disruptive elements which military alliances have obviously in the past possessed, and to see that any concerted plan, military or otherwise, is effective to the end it has in view.

What is the minimum that we must ask of any combination designed to insure the security of America and the protection of American rights and interests?

I am taking here, first, the problem of the protection of American rights and interests in the world at large—the problem at this moment presented to our government for solution—because, paradoxical as it may sound, if those rights are protected in the right way a large part of the problem of merely defensive security will be solved, as what follows may help to make plain.

American rights, so far as they are affected by other nations at all, depend mainly on a civilized sea law. Sea law may not sound a very far-reaching thing, but, as the sea is the highway of the universe, to civilize sea laws means to internationalize the world. In order to frame a sea law we must have an international legislative or deliberative body; to secure proper interpretation of it involves an international court; to compel respect for the court's decision means finding some method of enforcing it less ridiculously ineffective than taking part in a war in which both sides are setting such law as exists at defiance.

That will carry us very far; but you will not protect American interests or right with less. An international legislative body, an international court, a means of enforcing the court's decision, sounds like a big order; but nothing less will give us security in our rights, protect very wide and vital interests, and render this country safe from the military slavery that has now brought the populations of Europe under its lash.

Of the program just indicated the greatest difficulty, the feature which involves the greatest danger in its execution, is the devising of means to enforce an international law—the finding of the "sanction," as the lawyers say.

Yet the first essential for any society, whether of individuals or of nations, which desires to preserve rules necessary for the life in common of its members, is some means of restraining

any individual member from taking the law into his own hands. Every society enacts that no one shall be judge of his own case and executioner of his own decision. Any society, national or international, which permits that necessarily becomes a mere welter of rival forces.

Yet the alliances of the past have not managed to secure even that degree of submission among the nations. The non-military alliances—I refer notably, of course, to those arising out of the Hague Conferences—have been as ineffective to this end as the military.

The outstanding defect of both these kinds of alliances is not far to seek. If a treaty is to be enforced merely by the military power of the signatories, those signatories will be few in number. The practical difficulty of arranging the military cooperation of, say, Switzerland and Venezuela is just an indication of one of very many considerations that stand in the way of the formation of military alliances composed of many nations. As a matter of fact, these alliances in the past have seldom included more than four or five Powers; but when they are composed of few members the defection of a single one may suffice to bring the whole thing down—or some circumstance giving to one an increased power will lead it to try to dominate the others.

Where, on the other hand, a large number of Powers form the alliance, but make no provision for carrying their agreement into effect against any one member who may violate it, such agreement is apt to become a mere pious expression of what the nations ought to do if they were good.

Our problem is to find some effective means of compulsion that shall include the following conditions: 1—Be of a kind that will permit the cooperation of a large number of states, big and little alike; 2—Shall not by its nature set up the very conditions out of which grows the evil it is designed to arrest.

Military force alone does not fulfil these conditions. The reason for this failure on the first head has already been hinted at. Its danger on the second head is illustrated by the history of Germany during the last generation or two.

When Remedies Become Diseases

Whether German militarism is the predominant cause of the present war or not does not matter. The point is that in

military efficiency of a high order certain tendencies are set up which make any nation subject to them difficult to deal with as the member of a society. No race or nation seems to be immune. A government having behind it a great and efficient military organization, rightly proud of what it believes it can do, is apt to be a little impatient of discussion; to get tired of "talk" when it feels that it has it within its power to settle the matter out of hand.

And, as the military tradition of "acting, not talking," grows in strength, there comes a moment when the break occurs. And yet, when the fighting is all over, we have to go on with the talking nevertheless. This everlasting discussion of the other man's view is obviously a tiresome and irksome thing; but it is the price we pay for civilization, and we always have to come back to it.

Can we not devise some method of compulsion that shall be free from the special risks—mechanical, psychological, moral—which military compulsion, the world over and history over, has always revealed? A means that in its first stages, supplementing military means, may, as it becomes effective, progressively replace it?

Outlawing a Nation

The nature and possibility of the plan I want to outline can best be indicated by imagining that it had been devised at one of the many treaty congresses of the last hundred years. We can then in some measure judge how it might have borne on recent events and answered our presents needs.

Imagine, therefore, that such an international congress—representing, like the later international congresses, most of the civilized world—had agreed to cooperate in the enforcement of treaties—and enforcement in some way is essential—by these means:

Should any nation, party to the treaty in question, refuse to submit a difference under it to at least impartial examination and report, all other nations, party to the agreement, would automatically cease communication with the lawbreaker. Boycott or nonintercourse would be proclaimed against him and maintained by the whole group. This would not prevent certain nations of the group from carrying on military operations, as well, against him. Some of the group would go to war in the

military sense—all in the economic sense; the respective rôles would be so distributed as to secure the most effective action.

Let us see how the universal boycott, apart from the military action, works, and how it works as an aid to the military action. The effect of the boycott would be that, from the moment of the offending nation's defiance of international law, his ships could enter no civilized ports outside his own, or leave them. Payment of debts to him would be withheld; his commercial paper would not be discounted; his citizens could not travel in any civilized country in the world, his passports being no longer recognized.

Thus, the outlaw nation could neither receive from nor send to the outside world material or communication of any kind—neither food nor raw material of manufacture, or letters, or cables. Money due to him throughout the world would be sequestrated for disposal finally as the international court's judgment should direct; and that rule would apply to royalties on patents and publications, and would, of course, involve precautionary seizure or garnishee of all property—ships, goods, bank balances, businesses—held by that nation's citizens abroad.

In other words, the outlaw nation would be in a state of war of a new kind with the civilized world; but it would not necessarily involve military operations with the whole world. Whether it did or not would, of course, largely rest with the outlaw nation itself. There is nothing now but its own caution that prevents any one nation from issuing declarations of war to the whole world at the same time. We may assume that a nation so placed in a state of nonintercourse with the world would not gratuitously desire to add to the not trifling difficulties of this situation by insisting that every party to it must fight it by its armies and navies as well as by its economic forces.

This point is important, because critics invariably start their objection to the proposal by pointing out that the acts necessary to create a state of nonintercourse provoke a state of war, which calls on a nation so treated to move its troops or its battleships.

So, under existing precedent and conceptions, it does; but with new methods and new conceptions would come new precedents and a new meaning to a state of war. If a nation cares to assume that it has received a declaration of war from the whole world, it can, of course, if it deems its dignity demands it, move its troops against the whole world.

Springfield Republican. January 21, 1915

League to Limit Armaments

The following true and admirable statement and resolutions were adopted on December 18, 1914, at a meeting of patriotic men and women, held at the Railroad Club, 30 Church Street New York. Citizens all over the country, men and women alike, who approve of them, are invited to join the League to Limit Armaments by sending their names to L. Hollingsworth Wood, 43 Cedar Street, New York. There are no dues.

The great lesson of the war in Europe is that large armaments, far from insuring nations against war, lead directly and inevitably to it. We have seen that, for a nation to possess a great navy, coupled with a great army, is to arouse the fear, distrust, bitter hatred, and the active hostility of all its neighbors. Far from insuring against conflagration, armaments set the house of civilization on fire. War experience abroad is destroying the reputation of war experts, so that, to follow them would be to let the blind lead us into a ditch.

We do not know on what weapons, on land or sea, to place our trust, while one great naval action may leave the United States with more battleships than any other nation. More than ever the maintenance of general peace and the reduction of excessive armaments should be the chief objective of humanity.

Already the United States expends for pensions and armaments 72 per cent of all the money voted by Congress. To increase these expenditures is to waste our energies and resources, to undermine our prosperity without corresponding advantage. More than that, before this country looms the greatest opportunity for world leadership in its history, since, as the leading neutral nation of the world, it will undoubtedly fall to its lot to initiate the movement for peace and to give the proper direction to it. To increase our own armaments now would be to forfeit our moral leadership. Hence the American citizens of all faiths and creeds, at this meeting assembled, do hereby

Resolve, That the true policy of this country is not to increase its land and sea forces, but to retain for productive and humanizing outlay the vast sums demanded for armaments, and to wait steadfastly for the day when we may offer our disinterested aid in helping the nations of Europe, crippled by

excess of militarism, to free themselves and the world from the waste and the terror of heaped-up instruments of destruction; and, be it further

Resolved, That there shall be, and hereby is, founded a permanent organization, to be known as the American League to Limit Armaments, to which anyone believing in the principles of the organization shall be eligible.

Sunset. 34: 36-9. January, 1915

Military Position of the United States

Shall the nation strengthen the Army, or the Navy, or both? What will be the effect of such an increase in the armed forces?

In the first place, an expansion of the standing army under the present system to half a million men is impossible. Such an augmentation would involve an annual outlay of at least $500,000,000, based on the present cost of more than $1,000 annually per enlisted man. The only possible way of creating an adequate reserve is through the expansion and remodeling of the present militia system at the expense of the Federal government. So long as the states individually bear the major part of the cost, the militia will continue to be more or less a military joke.

The United States needs no standing army of half a million men. Despite the prophecies of the alarmists, an invasion of this country by an army large enough to hold its own for any length of time is an utter impossibility. The only power which could hope to undertake such a task with initial success is Great Britain, and Britain, besides lacking the desire and the army, has given Canada as a hostage.

The only two vulnerable points in the American armor are the Panama Canal and the Philippines. Though an adequate reserve of trained men and equipment is necessary for the defense of either point, the principal weapon, the deciding factor, will be the Navy.

A standing army of 100,000 men, supplemented by a fully equipped and reasonably well trained voluntary reserve of 250,000 men, can hold the two vulnerable points against any nation which under any circumstances might desire to attack them, if the American Navy is of adequate size. The Navy, not the Army, is the country's strong right arm, and the Navy need by no means

be of overwhelming size. In the first place, the United States is self-contained. Even if its shore line were blockaded from end to end, the nation would not starve or go naked. Yet such a blockade is an utter impossibility.

Except England, no nation has a fleet powerful enough to cope with the American Navy in its own waters. Except England, no nation has a base near enough to American waters for submarine work, though an attacking squadron would be continually exposed to raids from submerged vessels. Under these circumstances there is but one nation which could hope to inflict more damage than it would suffer in an offensive war against the United States. That nation is Japan in relation to the Philippines.

Japan's commercial marine traffic lies mainly in the Far East where the Island Empire occupies the same relative position as the United States does to the rest of the world. Japan need fear neither invasion nor blockade. It has no large overseas commerce to protect. Against the Japanese army operating close to its base no American expeditionary corps could hope to succeed except with the aid of a decisive naval victory.

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The Psychological Bases of Internationalism. George H. Mead

While it is true that it is psychologically impossible to mobilize a modern western nation for any but a defensive war, we cannot push aside the fact that these nations have been willing to accept military preparedness as an essential part of their national lives. The knowledge that the nation is prepared to fight has given it the feeling of self-respect that the knowledge of the art of self-defense and physical fitness give to the well-mannered man.

There has been a great deal of superficial justification of this military preparation for self-defense. Up to the first of last August, men could still maintain that preparation for war is the best guaranty of peace. Prince Kropotkin was the first to recognize publicly that the events which followed that date finally and utterly disproved this doctrine.

It has been stated that a nation in arms will not lightly go to war, and the phrase "a nation in arms" has been so pleasant on the tongue that men have stopped thinking when they have

uttered it. A nation under arms is in fact a nation bound to the unthinking obedience of the soldier to his commander. It is not and cannot be a nation in conscious control of its own policies and its own fortunes. Could there be better evidence of this than the fact of the five great nations fighting with each other for national existence, while the people of all five believe that the war is one purely of self-defense? The government of each has assured them that this is the case.

> Theirs not to reason why;
> Theirs but to do and die.

It is further maintained that in the relations of nations with each other, military power and readiness inspires international respect and enables a nation to enforce its rights without the final proof of the battlefield. In the words of our own militarist, a nation with the big stick may speak softly. And here again the picture is so agreeable that we are loath to look to the history of diplomacy. There it stands very plainly written that as soon as military force is admitted into the argument, it as inevitably crowds out considerations of right, as a file of soldiers introduced into a convention or a court silences every claim except that supported by the bayonet.

Lord Grey stretched his diplomat's imagination nearly to the breaking point when he conceived of England as approaching Germany's situation from the standpoint of national right as distinct from national might, and appealed to the seemingly unrealizable idea formulated by Gladstone, of a public right governing European nations.

Because of the pomp and circumstance of diplomatic intercourse, and the terrible consequences it implies, we overlook the fact that there is at present no situation short of a street fight or a small boys' squabble in which the actual procedure is the same as that of our ministers plenipotentiary and embassadors extraordinary. And there is but one explanation: When there is an armed force behind every proposal, the only convincing counter argument is a *force majeure*; and when this argument has been displayed, any other is a work of supererogation, There is but one possible justification for the situation, and it is the one offered—the necessity of it.

"There is no international right that anyone needs to respect. Between nations, except in moments of exaltation, might is the only right."

While we are reading governmental papers we may accept it. We are back in the age of the Hohenstaufens, when the only guardian of international rights was the Lord of Hosts, the God of Battles.

The curious thing is that while we agree with the diplomatist and the war lord behind him that there is no international right, we would have sent any man not a diplomat to an insane asylum who acted upon that theory. A Frenchman or Englishman who made a contract with a German and refused to keep it, an Italian scientist who laid claim to the achievements of a Russian physiologist, an Englishman who outraged a Belgian peasant girl, on the theory that there was no international right, would all have realized, not only in the country in which the offense was committed, but also in their own countries, that there is an international right that is quite indistinguishable from national right.

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Reservoirs of Strife. Frederic C. Howe

To a somewhat less degree, the differences described as in Europe prevail in America. There are invisible forces at work in this country which make for war. There are shipbuilders, armament makers, and those who supply munitions of war running into the hundreds of millions, who are a menace to peace. There are increasing investments in Mexico, China, South America, and elsewhere, whose owners demand in the name of the dignity of the nation a colossal navy. It is easy for those who have been investing in Mexican railroads, Mexican mines and Mexican oil concessions to feel that national dignity has suffered an affront when some robbing band interferes with their dividends, or checks their aggressions. When joint international loans have been made to China, it is easy to raise the cry of protection to American interests if internal troubles disturb the government of that country.

We, too, have an economic class which is a menace to peace; which cannot think in terms of disarmament, and which demands efficiency in the military and naval departments, an increased army and a colossal navy, as the hall-mark of American dignity.